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
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ANNALS
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THE GROWTH OF GREAT CITIES IN AREA AND
POPULATION.

The growth of urban population during the past century in Europe and the United States has been so marked as to excite the universal attention of students of our social, industrial and political conditions. Not only has the population living in cities increased enormously in absolute numbers during the last hundred years throughout the world affected by European civilization; but the proportion of the total population dwelling in cities has increased in almost as remarkable a manner. This is true no matter how we define the expression urban population, so long as we give a reasonable sense to the term.

The United States forms a striking example of this development. Owing to the enormous extent of its unoccupied and unsettled territory, and the rapid rate at which it has occupied the wilderness, we should have expected to find simply this tendency to diffusion, but parallel with it has gone a tendency to concentrate in cities. The following table shows the growth of urban population from 1790 to 1890:

GROWTH OF URBAN POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES FROM
1790-1890.*

Census years.	Population of the United States.	Population of cities having 8000 or more inhabitants.	Percentage of the population in such cities to the total population.	Number of cities of 8000 or more inhabitants.
1790	3,929,214	131,472	3.35	6
1800	5,308,483	210,873	3.97	6
1810	7,239,881	356,920	4.93	11
1820	9,633,822	475,135	4.93	13
1830	12,866,020	864,509	6.72	26
1840	17,069,453	1,453,994	8.52	44
1850	23,191,876	2,897,586	12.49	85
1860	31,443,321	5,072,256	16.13	141
1870	38,558,371	8,071,875	20.93	226
1880	50,155,783	11,318,547	22.57	286
1890	62,622,250	18,284,385	29.20	448

It will be noted that in the above table only that population is counted as urban which is to be found in cities of 8000 inhabitants or upwards. To accept the number 8000 as marking the limit of urban population is certainly an arbitrary choice, and the figure is one which on the whole is much too high, since people are living under practically urban conditions as distinct from rural in much smaller communities than those of 8000. But owing to the manner in which previous censuses have been taken, this is the figure for which we have most easy and definite comparisons. A glance at the table shows the percentage of urban population to the total population to have risen from a little over 3 per cent in 1790 to nearly 30 per cent in 1890.†

In order to determine, however, the real urban population we may properly take a much lower figure than 8000. The census of 1890 showed 905 places with a population of 4000 and over, containing 20,799,296 people, or 33.21 per cent of

* "Report on the Population of the United States at the Eleventh Census," 1890, Part I. Washington, 1895. Pp. lxxv et seq.

† See "A Model City Charter," by Edmund J. James. Publications of National Municipal League, Philadelphia.

the total population of the country. If we take the figure somewhat lower, namely, 2500, we find that in 1890 there were 1522 places with such a population, having a combined population of 22,717,465, representing 36.28 per cent of the population.* If we count as urban the places with a still smaller population, namely, 1000 or more, it appears, according to the census of 1890, that there were 3715 places in the United States within this category having a total population of 26,109,074, or 41.69 per cent of the total population of the United States.†

A remarkable phenomenon in this connection is the growth of cities in the more sparsely settled states. The appearance of such urban agglomerations as Minneapolis and St. Paul, Omaha, Kansas City, etc., in what are chiefly agricultural states, is one of the most striking facts of our social life. The three Pacific States, with a remarkably sparse population on the whole, showed in 1890 a population of 901,644 in cities of 8000 or more inhabitants, while the rest of the population, rural and village together, only amounted to 969,643. A similar state of things exists in Australia, where a still larger per cent of the population live in cities of over 8000 inhabitants than in the United States.‡

The total population of the United States increased in the decade from 1880 to 1890 by 12,466,467, or almost exactly 25 per cent (24.86 per cent). The urban population, counting as urban the places having 1000 or more inhabitants, showed an increase of 8,366,949, *i. e.*, an increase of 47.07 per cent, while the rural population, meaning by that the population of all places containing less than 1000, showed an increase of only 4,099,518, or 12.66 per cent. That is to say, the increase in the towns of 1000 and more inhabitants was absolutely more than twice as great as in all other

* "Compendium of the Eleventh Census," Part I, p. 442. Washington, 1892.

† *Ibid.*, p. 453.

‡ "Growth of Cities in the United States during the Decade 1880-1890," by Carl Boyd. Publications of the American Statistical Association, Vol. iii (1893), p. 416.

places, while relatively it was nearly four times as great, and this in spite of the fact that in certain portions of the country, as notably in New England, the population of the smaller towns had nearly uniformly shown a decrease. Thus in the aggregate, the towns of Massachusetts having less than 2000 inhabitants in 1890 (179 in number) had a smaller population in that year than in 1820, seventy years before.*

A similar tendency to that which has shown itself in the United States has revealed itself also in other countries, notably in England, France and Germany. Taking the population of the so-called urban sanitary districts in England as urban in character, the following table shows the urban population of England by classes of districts in 1891, and also the percentage of increase from 1881 to 1891.†

URBAN POPULATION IN ENGLAND.

Population of Districts.	Number of Districts.	Aggregate population of Districts, 1891.	Percentage of entire population, 1891.	Percentage of increase, 1881-1891.
250,000 and upwards	6	6,375,645	22.0	9.1
100,000-250,000	18	2,793,625	9.6	19.1
50,000-100,000	38	2,610,976	9.0	22.9
20,000- 50,000	120	3,655,025	12.6	22.5
10,000- 20,000	176	2,391,076	8.3	18.9
3,000- 10,000	453	2,609,141	8.9	9.6
Under 3,000	195	367,282	1.3	2.6
Total Urban	1,006	20,802,770	71.7	15.3
" Rural	8,198,248	28.3	3.4
Total population	28,001,018	100.0	11.65

From these figures it appears that in 1891 22 per cent of the population of England and Wales lived in six towns of upwards of 250,000 inhabitants; 31.6 per cent lived in

* "Decrease of Rural Population," John C. Rose, *Popular Science Monthly*, Vol. xlii (1892), p. 621. Also, "Statistics and Sociology," by Richmond Mayo-Smith, p. 369.

† "Statesman's Yearbook." 1897. p. 19.

twenty-four towns of over 100,000 inhabitants; 40.6 per cent in sixty-two towns of over 50,000 inhabitants; 53.2 per cent in 182 towns of over 20,000 inhabitants, and 61.5 per cent in 358 towns of over 10,000 inhabitants. It also appears that, while the increase of the total urban population was more than 15 per cent in the decade from 1881 to 1891 (15.3), the increase of the rural population was less than 4 per cent (3.4), the increase being over four and one-half times as rapid in the total urban as in the rural districts.

France shows the same tendency, especially during the last fifty years. Taking the communes with a population of over 2000 as the basis of the urban population, the following table shows the percentage of the urban population in France to the total population by five year periods, from 1846 to 1891:

GROWTH OF URBAN POPULATION IN FRANCE, FROM 1846-1891.*

	Per cent of Urban to Total Population	Per cent of Rural to Total Population.
1846	24.42	75.58
1851	25.52	74.48
1856	27.31	72.69
1861	28.86	71.14
1866	30.46	69.54
1872	31.06	68.94
1876	32.44	67.56
1881	34.76	65.24
1886	35.95	64.05
1891	37.4	62.6

In fact, almost the entire increase in population in France of late years has taken place in the cities, the rural population, as a whole, having absolutely declined. Thus from 1886 to 1891 the total population of France increased by

* "Statistique générale de la France." *Résultats statistiques du Dénombrement de 1891.* Paris, 1894. p. 65.

124,289 souls, but the population of cities having over 30,000 inhabitants increased in the aggregate by 372,074; Paris alone by 103,407.* The rural population, estimated on the basis given in the above table, declined by 450,000 souls. The following table shows the population of the Department of the Seine (Paris and its suburbs), having a total area of 185 square miles,† compared with that of the political Paris for certain periods between 1800 and 1896:

	Greater Paris.	Political Paris.
1800	630,585	547,756
1831	935,108	785,862
1851	1,422,065	1,053,262
1872	2,220,060	1,851,792
1881	2,799,923	* 2,239,928
1891	3,141,595	2,447,957
1896	3,340,514	2,536,834†

This table shows in the course of ninety years over a five-fold increase, while the population of the nation as a whole has not nearly doubled, increasing from 27,349,003 in 1801 to 38,343,192 in 1891, or in the ratio of 100 to 140. In the five years from 1891 to 1896 the total population of France increased by 175,027, but the population of cities over 30,000 increased by 327,009, showing again a positive decrease in the population outside of cities of over 30,000.‡

In Germany the same tendency is revealed as in the other countries mentioned before. Taking the places with a population of 2000 or more as urban, the following table

* "Dénombrement de la Population, Avril 12, 1891." Paris, 1892. p. 829.

† "Annuaire Statistique de la France." Vol. xvii (1897). p. 7.

‡ "Dénombrement de la Population pour 1896." Paris, 1897.

§ See (1) Sedlacek, "Die Bevölkerungszunahme der Grossstädte im XIX Jahrhundert und deren Ursachen." "Report of the Eighth International Congress of Hygiene and Demography, held at Budapest September 1-9, 1894." Budapest, 1896. pp. 358 et seq.

(2) Levasseur, "La Population Française." Paris, 1891. Vol. ii, pp. 338 et seq.

(3) Maurice Block. "Statistique de la France." Paris, 1874. pp. 34 et seq.

(4) "Annuaire de l'économie politique et de la statistique." Paris 1844 and following years.

(5) Bulletin de Statistique et de Législation comparée. Vol. xlii (1897). p. 78.

(6) Journal de la Société de Statistique de Paris. Vol. xi, quoted in Sedlacek.

THE GROWTH OF GREAT CITIES.

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shows the growth of urban population within the limits of the present German empire from 1871 to the present. The cities are divided into four classes as indicated in the tables below:

THE NUMBER OF CITIES IN THE GERMAN EMPIRE, 1871-90.

Classes.	1871	1875	1880	1885	1890
1. Large cities, 100,000 and more	8	12	14	21	26
2. Middle cities, 20,000-100,000	75	88	102	116	135
3. Small cities, 5000-20,000	529	591	641	683	733
4. Rural cities, 2000-5000	1761	1837	1950	1951	1997
	2373	2528	2707	2771	2891

POPULATION OF THE CITIES BY CLASSES.

Classes.	1871	1875	1880	1885	1890
1. Large cities, 100,000 and more	1,968,537	2,665,914	3,273,144	4,446,381	5,995,972
2. Middle cities, 20,000-100,000	3,147,272	3,487,857	4,027,085	4,171,874	4,824,754
3. Small cities, 5000-20,000	4,588,364	5,124,044	5,671,325	6,054,629	6,480,192
4. Rural cities, 2000-5000	5,086,625	5,379,357	5,748,976	5,805,893	5,942,311
	14,790,798	16,657,172	18,720,530	20,478,777	23,243,229
5. Other places-rural districts	26,219,352	26,070,188	26,513,531	26,376,927	26,185,241
	41,010,150	42,727,360	45,234,061	46,855,704	49,428,470

PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL POPULATION IN THE CITIES OF THE VARIOUS CLASSES.

Classes.	1871	1875	1880	1885	1890
1. Large cities, 100,000 and more	4.8	6.2	7.24	9.5	12.1
2. Middle cities, 20,000-100,000	7.7	8.2	8.9	8.9	9.7
3. Small cities, 5000-20,000	11.2	12.	12.54	12.9	13.1
4. Rural cities, 2000-5000	12.4	12.6	12.71	12.4	12.
	36.1	39.	41.39	43.7	46.90+
5. Other places-rural districts	63.9	61.	58.61	56.3	52.96

This table shows that in the course of twenty years the number of cities in Germany having a population of

100,000 and more increased from eight to twenty-six; the total population within such cities from 1,968,537 to 5,995,972, and that while their aggregate population amounted to 4.8 per cent of the population of the empire in 1871, they made up 12.1 per cent in 1890. The following table shows the annual rate at which the urban population in cities of over 20,000 increased as compared with the total population of the empire by five-year periods from 1871 to 1895:*

	1871-75	1875-80	1880-85	1885-90	1890-95
Rate of increase of total population	1 per ct.	1.14	.70	1.07	1.11
Rate of increase of urban population (cities of 20,000) . . .	3.06	2.39	2.24	2.87	2.20

What is true of these four countries is true in a general way of Italy, Austria and Russia as well, and even of Spain.†

But it is not only true that the urban population, has increased both absolutely and relatively; but this is also true of the people living in the great cities, the enormous aggregates of population.‡ Indeed the growth of the great cities, meaning by that cities with a population of 200,000 and upwards, has been perhaps the most remarkable fact in this whole phenomenon of urban growth. One may truly call this century not only the age of cities, but also the age of great cities. It is interesting to note also that with few exceptions this enormously rapid rate of growth began rather in the latter half of the century.

The following table shows this tendency in a marked manner:

* See *Vierteljahrsheft zur Statistik des deutschen Reichs*. Vol. v, 1896. No. II, pp. 114 et seq. Also, Vol. i, 1892, No. II, p. 29; also, *Statistik des deutschen Reichs*, Neue Folge, Vol. 32, 1888. "Die Volkszählung im deutschen Reich am 1 December," 1885.

† See Georg v. Mayr, "Die Bevölkerungsstatistik." Freiburg, 1897.

‡ See Sedlacek *op. cit.*

City.	Population with which Compared.	Year.	Per cent of Total Population	Year.	Per cent of Total Population
Berlin . . .	German Empire	1820	.76	1890	3.20
Paris . . .	France	1840	2.73	1891	6.32
Vienna . . .	Lower Austria .	1840	27.41	1890	51.27
Chicago . . .	United States .	1840	.03	1890	1.76
Philadelphia	" "	1800	.78	1890	1.67
London . . .	England & Wales	1801	10.78	1891	14.52
Budapest . .	Hungary	1840	.94	1890	3.25
Glasgow . . .	Scotland	1801	4.80	1891	14.10
Hamburg . .	German Empire	1820	.43	1890	1.14
Brooklyn . .	United States .	1800	.04	1890	1.29
Dresden . . .	German Empire	1820	.20	1890	.56
Leipzig . . .	" "	1820	.14	1890	.59
Munich . . .	" "	1820	.20	1890	.70

The group of cities of 100,000 inhabitants seems in all countries to have increased relatively more rapidly than the smaller cities. There seems to be a tendency, it is true, in the last few years toward a relatively slower growth of the great centres. Sedlacek calls attention to this fact in the article referred to before.* He says that while the population of the great cities comprises from decade to decade an increasing percentage of the total population of the countries within which they are situated, it does not appear that the attractiveness and rate of growth of a city increases in proportion to its size as some have maintained, at least so far as this is revealed by the mere percentage of increase in the population. Boyd, in the article referred to before,† calls attention to the fact that the highest rate of growth showed itself in the case of cities having a population of from 75,000 to 100,000, the increase being 91.25 per cent. Cities with a population of from 60,000 to 200,000 increased at the rate of 63.07 per cent, while those with a population of over 200,000 showed a rate of increase of only 36 per cent. The later censuses seem also to bear out the idea that a slower rate

* See also "London Statistics, 1896-97." Publications of London County Council, Vol. vii, p. x, 1898.

† "Growth of Cities in the United States," p. 416.

of growth has begun for these enormous aggregates of population, but we cannot infer this too definitely without a close examination of the facts relating to the territorial increase of such cities, and to the growth of their suburbs, facts which are rarely considered in the reports. At any rate it must be allowed that for the latter half of the century as a whole this relative increase of the larger aggregates of population is one of the striking factors.

Although these facts are commonplaces to which the attention of intelligent persons has been called again and again, it is doubtful whether, after all, the general public realizes fully the true significance of these facts for our social, industrial and political future. Indeed, it is doubtful whether we fully realize even the plain simple facts themselves, to say nothing of the deeper meaning which reveals itself upon a closer investigation and analysis. This is perhaps owing, among other things, to defective methods of presenting the facts in regard to this development. Our statistical tables, as ordinarily prepared and published, do not present the facts in such a way as to bring home to the public consciousness their absolute or relative importance. This arises from a multitude of circumstances, some of which will be discussed more fully later. It will be sufficient here to refer to one or two of them for the purpose of making plain what is meant. In the ordinary tables of the population of great cities we find the cities arranged in a certain order according to population. Thus if we were to take the tables prepared upon the basis of the census returns collected in the various countries from 1890 to 1895, we should find Registration London put down with a population in 1891 of 4,211,056, and March 29, 1896, of 4,411,271; New York, with a population in 1890 of 1,515,301; Chicago, in 1890, with a population of 1,099,850; Paris, 1891, with a population of 2,424,705; Berlin, 1890, with a population of 1,579,542.†

† Sedláček, *op cit.*

Now the merest glance at such a table as this on the part of one familiar with the facts shows that it fails to give the person who reads it an adequate notion of the enormous aggregates of population which are to be found to-day in these centres. Thus London, which is put down with a population of a little over four millions, had, if we should give a large definition to it, a population a little in excess of six millions.* New York, with a population of a million and a half in 1890, was the centre of an agglomeration dependent for its life and activities upon the city of New York, with a total population of nearly 3,000,000. The recent additions to the city have increased the census population to perhaps three and one-half millions.

New York is considered in the tenth census (1880)† as a metropolis, including the political units New York, Brooklyn, Jersey City, Newark and Hoboken. The growth of the Greater New York as compared with political New York is indicated in the following table:

	Population of the Metropolis.	Population of New York.
1790	34,734	33,131
1800	62,893	60,489
1810	100,775	96,373
1820	137,388	123,706
1830	220,471	197,112
1840	369,305	312,710
1850	660,803	515,547
1860	1,183,148	805,658
1870	1,546,293	942,292
1880	2,061,191	1,206,299
1890	2,710,125	1,515,301

It will be seen that by 1890 the population of the Greater New York had become nearly twice as large as that of the political New York.‡ Paris, Vienna and Berlin should

* "London Statistics, 1896-97." Vol. vii, p. x.

† Volumes on "Social Statistics of Cities." Vol. i, p. 531.

‡ See also the history of the growth of Boston and suburbs. Massachusetts Census, 1895. Vol. i, pp. 45 and 219.

certainly have their corresponding figures increased by from one-fifth to one-half, in order to convey an adequate idea of what these great cities have become. The following table shows the growth of the Greater Berlin from 1801 to 1895:

POPULATION OF BERLIN.*

	1801	1875	1880	1885	1890	1895
Berlin (Political) . . .	173,440	966,858	1,122,330	1,315,267	1,578,794	1,677,304
Larger Berlin (area ten miles from mid- dle point)	197,112	1,131,706	1,314,286	1,558,395	1,957,117	2,254,570

If we look in the ordinary table of population we shall find the city of Manchester put down in 1891 with a population of 505,368; and yet within an area of ten miles from the Guild Hall in Manchester there was probably at that time a population of over three millions. Now it is plain that from such tables one can derive no adequate idea even of the plain and simple facts in regard to these questions, and we are misled time and again in our estimates of what is reasonable and proper in the field of social and economic policy by depending upon such figures as these to give us the requisite basis for reasoning. Thus it seems an unreasonable proposition that a city of half a million of people, like Manchester, should invest \$75,000,000 and upwards in the construction of a ship canal for the purpose of making Manchester a seaport. It is impossible to believe that such an expenditure of public or private capital can be justified by the increase in facilities, and by the greater opportunities for development which such a project, if successfully carried out, may bring. But it is an entirely different proposition if, upon examination, we find that for all purposes of the canal it is to serve the wants of what is practically an urban district, taking somewhat larger limits than those given above of ten millions of people. In the

* See "*Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Berlin*," Vol. **xxi** (1894). Berlin, 1896. p. 14 and Vol. **xxii** (1895). Berlin, 1897. For Paris and its suburbs (the Department of the Seine), see p. 6 of this paper.

same way the enormous expenditures of the city of Paris have a different significance and meaning and a different justification for a population of nearly four millions from what they have if you are considering a population of somewhat less than three millions. Likewise in the case of the city of Berlin; what seems perhaps extravagant and unjustified in connection with a population of a million and a half becomes only reasonable, or perhaps necessary, for a population of two and one-half millions, which is nearer the figures of the Greater Berlin.

These facts are of course recognized by students, but they are not always considered by those who have not the time to examine the details of such matters, and it is no uncommon thing even in the writings of persons who should know better to find arguments based upon these figures taken as they are, and as if they applied to something like the same thing.

The source of error in such reasoning arises from the fact that while we are ordinarily concerned in such discussions with social, or industrial, or economic phenomena or policies, we do not take the social, industrial, or economic unit as the basis of our discussion, but take instead an entirely different thing, namely, the political unit known as the city of London, of Paris, of Berlin, of New York. There would be, of course, little cause for error if as a matter of fact the political unit corresponded with reasonable accuracy to the social or industrial or economic unit. But this is true only in the case of comparatively few of the tables of population which have been constructed to show the growth of urban population in the modern world. It is true that within the last few years cities have shown a decided inclination to make their political boundaries correspond to some extent at any rate with their social, industrial, and economic boundaries. This is the real meaning of the marked tendency toward the increase of city areas, which has shown itself in the last twenty years in all civilized countries. It is rather remarkable

indeed that the extension of the boundaries of the cities have been long delayed,—in many cases, for a full generation after the economic and social conditions demanded an extension.

The history of these extensions is an extremely interesting one, and would well repay a detailed examination. Much ridicule has been thrown on the ambitions of cities in various portions of the world as revealed by their attempt to draw within the circle of their control the immediately adjacent territory. But in such a movement there are more powerful forces at work both to extend the limits of a city, and to prevent their extension than petty pride. Thus there is a very common tendency in recent times for many people who do business within a given centre to move outside the limits of the area controlled, politically speaking, by that centre. Ordinarily the rates of taxation are higher within the city than in the suburban districts, and an addition of a suburban district, while it may mean to the city an increasing expense in certain ways for laying out of streets, water mains, etc., means also an increased rate of tax for these new areas. Practical questions of this sort are liable to be determined largely by questions of local interest. Certain influences favor extension, other influences oppose it. The final outcome is nearly always a compromise entirely satisfactory to no one, and based as a rule on no principle.

But even as a theoretic question it is not easy to determine the point at which a given area adjacent to a city should be annexed and brought within the scope of municipal authority, and the question must undoubtedly be settled largely by local conditions.* Thus it is plain that if a given suburban region is to be settled up rapidly, it lies in the interest of the city, and, in the long run, of the suburban region itself, that the area shall be added to the city soon enough in the history of its development so that the general scheme

* See "Pamphlets Against Consolidation," Nos. 1-5. Published by League of Loyal Citizens. 44 Court St., Brooklyn, 1895.

of streets, of sewers and drainage, of water supply, the general school system, etc., can be easily harmonized and integrated with the existing system of the city.* Otherwise a system of streets and a system of public services of various kinds may be worked out in the case of the suburban district which would require extensive and expensive alterations and sometimes indeed entire reconstruction and rebuilding in order to fit it into the plan of a great city. In some cases it is plainly to the interest of the suburban region, where local conditions are favorable, to keep out of the reach of city control and city taxation as long as possible, while it is plainly unfair in other instances that such adjacent regions should enjoy all the privileges of city life and be enabled to escape a large share of its burdens. So difficult is this problem of adjustment between the interests of suburban regions and the cities, that long periods have elapsed in the history of many of our great cities after the time when the suburban regions should have been annexed before it was possible to overcome the opposition of conflicting interests and bring about the adjustment which lay in the wider and larger interests of all. Philadelphia, before referred to, offers an excellent illustration of this fact.† Around the old city which had only an area of two square miles had grown up a series of suburban regions which, for all practical purposes, were portions of the city, each one to a large extent with its own scheme of local improvements, each one unwilling to yield its independence and fancied superiority for the sake of the larger welfare, and there is no doubt that the people of Philadelphia had to bear a larger additional burden of taxation for the purposes of reconstructing and readjusting and bringing into harmony these local differences than would have been necessary if the area of the city had been enlarged fifty years

* See " *Die Einverleibung der Leipziger Vororte und ihre sozialpolitischen Wirkungen.*" Dr. Ernst Hasse, *Blätter für soziale Praxis*. 1894. Numbers 76-78.

† See " *The City Government of Philadelphia.*" With an Introduction by Edmund J. James. Philadelphia, 1893.

sooner to something like a reasonable point. As an instance of the inconveniences growing out of waiting to annex territory until it has developed a life and organization of its own, the history of annexations in the city of Chicago may be quoted. The sewage system, the water supply system, and the system of schools to some extent which grew up in the districts immediately surrounding the city were at many points so different from that of the city itself, that large reconstructions were necessary, involving great expense to all parties. Thus at one time there were twelve or fifteen different streets within the city having the same name; a circumstance growing out of the fact that the various suburban regions had duplicated in many instances the names of streets in the city. Annexation involved a renaming and a renumbering at the least, a comparatively small matter, but after all one involving considerable inconvenience.

For decades before 1890 strong efforts had been made in Vienna to bring about a political union between the old city and the numerous suburbs which had sprung up about it. The existence of an elaborate system of city customs duties upon various important articles of consumption introduced many complications into the problem. The suburbs did not wish to accept such a method of getting revenue while the old city declared it fundamental to a sound financial system. After long years of fruitless negotiation union was effected under pressure from the general government in 1889-90.*

Ever since 1852 agitation had been going on looking to an extension of the boundaries of Leipzig, but it was not until 1889-90 that the negotiations reached a point where success was possible. The suburbs wished to join for some purposes, but not for others. They proposed many conditions, most of which had a tendency to thwart the very aim of consolidation and when the extension of the territory was

* "*Die Gemeinde-Verwaltung der Stadt Wien in den Jahren 1889-1893.*" Vienna, 1895. p. 1.

finally made, it did not include by any means all the places contemplated at first.*

The complex of different authorities to be found in many of our American cities is to be explained to some extent by the imperative necessity of securing a certain uniformity of treatment in regard to some of the larger elements, such as drainage and water supply over large areas, combined with the unwillingness of portions of this area to enter upon all the duties and obligations, as well as the privileges of the city portions of the area. In nearly all communities of the old world, and in many of our own, the unit of police administration, for example, has been made much larger than the city in the narrow sense with which it is associated, as it is claimed that no efficient police service can be built up within a city surrounded by suburban regions with essentially city characteristics, but without organic connection with the city itself. Thus the police area comprises in the case of the city of Berlin a much larger area than the city proper, and the same thing is true of other cities in Europe and the United States. In some instances a general scheme of water supply, or of drainage, or of fire service, has been adopted for the city and the suburban regions necessitating the creation of separate and to a large extent independent boards, leading to a division of authority, and to a working at cross purposes which can only result in inefficiency and enormously increased expense. The English system of the Metropolitan Board of Works, adopted in London, which was in operation for nearly fifty years, was a creation of this sort to carry out certain public services, which to be efficient must be carried out according to a common plan, and yet which could not, prior to 1890, be under the authority of the city of London, whose municipal authority did not cover so wide a territory.

These considerations may suffice to indicate at least the

* See "*Verwaltungsbericht des Rathes der Stadt Leipzig für das Jahr 1893.*" Leipzig, 1895.

complexity and difficulty of this problem of annexation which has faced every modern city, and which perhaps nowhere is ever solved to the satisfaction of all parties.

It is plain also that for the same reason it is difficult to make thoroughly accurate comparisons between cities of different countries, or even the cities of the same country, in regard to many of the most important branches of the public service, owing to the fact that the statistics and reports kept by these cities do not cover the same body of facts or similar bodies of facts. Enough has been said perhaps to indicate the reason for the statement made at the outset that our statistical tables do not present the facts in such a way as to convey the impression of the real state of affairs to the mind of the reader. But it is worth while to stop a moment longer for the purpose of calling attention to some of the most common errors arising from these misleading comparative statements.

We have already referred to the fact that the ordinary population tables are misleading because they take the political unit instead of the real urban unit and thus give entirely false notions as to the real relative size of great cities. New York, London and Manchester were specially mentioned. Some other cities such as Leipzig, Cologne, Breslau, afford quite as remarkable illustrations, and indeed one may say that there is scarcely a large city in modern Europe or the United States which might not serve as an example of the same proposition. If we were to take the populations of the urban areas instead of the political areas, the tables of population, as ordinarily constructed, would be radically changed, and the order of size would be reversed in very many cases.

It is a mere corollary of this proposition that all these tables show very misleading comparisons as to the relative rate of growth, and as to the relative density of the population. Thus, if we compare the population of Chicago in 1880 and 1890 as given in the ordinary tables, we find that it increased from 503,185 to 1,099,850. This seems to be a

most astonishing growth, a rate of 118 per cent in ten years, and although the city, within the limits of 1880, had a remarkable growth in the subsequent ten years it was far from being so great as these figures would indicate. When we turn to the table showing the increase in the area of the city of Chicago between these two years, we find that the area was increased from 35.662 square miles to 174.554 square miles, an increase of nearly 400 per cent. The greatest increase of population occurred in the annexed area. It had some population in 1880, and the growth of the city as reported was therefore much greater than the growth of population with the limits of 1880.* A still more striking case is afforded by the city of Philadelphia, which, in the year 1850, had a population, according to the census returns, of 121,376, and in 1860, ten years later, a population of 565,529, an increase of over 300 per cent in the limits of one decade. Surely a marvelous rate of progress for a city of over 100,000 population to make. A glance at the table of areas, however, shows that the area was increased from a little over two square miles in 1850 to something over 129 in 1860, an increase of nearly 6500 per cent in area. These annexed areas had already in 1850 a population of 285,396 and annexation without growth accounts for the chief increase in the population of the city during that decade. The same thing is true of European cities. Cologne, for example, increased its population from 144,772 in 1880 to 281,681 in 1890, a marvelous rate of increase for such an old city, to be explained largely by the fact that it increased its area from 770 hectares to over 11,000 hectares, most of the annexed territory containing a fairly dense population. Leipzig showed a population of 149,081 in 1880

*The population in 1880 of the annexed areas is not ascertainable. It included the townships of Hyde Park, Jefferson, Lake and Lakeview, with a population of 45,537 in 1880, also a part of Cicero township, whose aggregate population in 1880 was 5,182, and part of Calumet township whose total population in 1880 was 2,576. As several villages in the two last named townships which were not incorporated in Chicago had, in 1880, a population of 4,872, it is obvious that the population of the annexed district in 1880 fell short of 50,000 persons, while in 1890 it was nearly or quite 300,000.

and of 400,000 in round numbers in 1896; truly a remarkable increase, largely explained, however, by the increase in area from 1640 hectares in 1880 to 5770 in 1896, nearly all of the annexed territory being fairly densely populated.

It follows as a matter of course that all figures in regard to density of population, or the relative rate of increase of density of population, are also untrustworthy and misleading as given in ordinary tables. Thus in the tables constructed by Dr. Sedlaczek, we find that from 1881 to 1890 the population of Chicago increased at a rate of 60,000 per year in round numbers, while in the decade from 1871 to 1880 its increase was only a little over 20,000 per year. This would seem to imply a remarkable rate of increase in the decade from 1881 to 1890 as compared with 1871 to 1880. It is as above stated to be explained in part by the incorporation of fairly well populated territory. The city of Paris showed an increase of 64,288 per year in the decade from 1852 to 1861, and only 15,565 in the decade from 1862 to 1871, which would seem to imply a great falling off in the rate of progress. It is to be explained, however, by the fact that in the decade from 1850 to 1860 Paris increased its area from 3438 hectares to 7802, while it made no increase in the decade 1860-1870. In the same way the city of Manchester showed an average yearly addition to the population of 16,389 from 1882 to 1891, and an actual decrease of 977 per year in the decade from 1872 to 1881. Any deductions from this fact that the city of Manchester was declining in the decade 1871-1880, while it showed a remarkable reversal of its tendencies in the decade 1881-1890, will be of course misleading in the highest degree. As a matter of fact the population of the city of Manchester, as a political unit, decreased, owing to the removal of people from the business portion of the city to the suburban or residence portion. It increased at such a large rate in the decade from 1882 to 1891, among other reasons, because the area was increased from 1737 hectares to 5175.

The population of Liverpool decreased absolutely between 1881 and 1891, declining from 552,508 in the former year to 517,980 in the latter, a decrease of over 6 per cent, and yet this decade was one of marked growth and prosperity in the city. The explanation is again the same. The city, in a political sense comprising less than nine square miles, is only the nucleus of the real city and like so many other "city" or business districts, actually declined in population owing to the removal of residences from the heart of the city to the outer rings. The rapid increase from 1831 to 1841 (165,000 to 286,487) is to be explained, on the contrary, by the enlargement of the city territory from 752 to 2108 hectares.

That experts as well as laymen need to keep these things in mind is shown by the use which Noel A. Humphreys makes of population tables* where he compares the growth of Chicago and Liverpool as if the figures given in the census meant anything for such a comparison.

The above considerations are sufficient to demonstrate that our tables as at present constituted are for purposes of social, economic, and industrial investigation, likely to be the source of much confusion and error unless used with great care.

If we are going to make, therefore, any comparative studies in the growth of great cities, we must reconstruct our tables and base them upon some unit which will correspond to the unit of our investigation, whatever that may be. If we desire to utilize these facts for deductions as to facts and policies in social, industrial, and economic matters, we must strive in some way to obtain an urban unit in each case which will correspond to the social, industrial, and economic unit of which we are speaking, and with which we have to do. To put the case in another way, we must

* "Results of the Recent Census and Estimates of Population in the Largest English Towns," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, June, 1891, Vol. liv, p. 311 et seq.

seek a common denominator for our comparisons, if these comparisons are to be of any assistance for theoretical or practical purposes. Now there are many serious difficulties in the way of obtaining such a common denominator, a common unit of comparison, and these difficulties are partly theoretical and partly practical, and both are equally serious. In the first place, it is by no means easy to determine in any individual case even, to say nothing of a large number of cases, what we should include within the urban unit.* How far shall the radius extend from the centre of one of these agglomerations or aggregations of people so as to include all that ought to be included as a part of the urban aggregate, and exclude what does not belong to it? Various attempts have been made to answer this question, with greater or less success, but all of them based in the last analysis upon a more or less arbitrary assignment of bounds, and consequently upon an assignment which one finds more or less difficult to justify.

Dr. Ernst Hasse has endeavored † to find such a common denominator for German cities. He attempts to draw a distinction by constituting three circles; first, the real city, being the nucleus of the metropolitan aggregation, which is also, generally speaking, the political unit. Second, the city with those suburbs which form a real part of the urban agglomeration. Third, the city with its outlying dependencies, which although dependent in many respects for their life upon the existence of the city, do not really form a part of the urban agglomeration. Now it is evident that the opinions of no two people would probably agree in any individual case as to where such circles ought to be drawn, and consequently in attempting to set such boundaries to the different cities there would be the greatest room for arbitrary designation of boundaries. Indeed Dr. Hasse

* See "Reports of the Tenth Census" (1880), volume on Population, p. xxviii; also "Report on Social Statistics of Cities," Vol. i, p. 531.

† In Mayr's *Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv*, Vol. ii, 1891-92, pp. 16 et seq., in the article on the "Density of Metropolitan Populations."

makes little or no use of this division, but proceeds to an entirely different principle as the basis of his extremely interesting comparisons, namely, that the urban unit is to be determined by the fact of density of population, that this is really at bottom the sole test, and that beginning at the centre of the population aggregate, we should include the area in concentric rings until we have reached a point at which the average density of population in the last ring falls to the average density of population (excluding the urban unit) in the larger district of which the city forms a part, such as county, province, state, etc. Thus if we take the province of lower Austria excluding Vienna, we find that the average population is fifty-nine persons per square kilometer. Now the average density of the tenth kilometric ring, counting from the centre of the city of Vienna, is far above this, and probably we should have to proceed to, say the fifteenth kilometric ring, before the average density of population would sink to the average of the province, excluding the metropolis, in which case the first fourteen kilometric rings, counting from the centre, would constitute the urban district of Vienna. This method of determining the urban area has the advantage of resting upon at least one sound characteristic of urban populations, and although the defects are apparent, perhaps it is as good a method as we have.

Dr. N. Brückner * adopts another system which at bottom is nothing more than accepting the opinion of the officials in the different cities as to what constitutes the real economic unit of their respective cities. This is of course practically taking in each individual case the arbitrary opinion of the statistical office of the various cities instead of trying to base the estimates upon any common principle.

It has been proposed to take as the urban unit the territory

* In two articles upon the "Development of Metropolitan Population in the German Empire," published in Mayr's, *Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv*, Vol. i, 1890, p. 134 et seq., and 614 et seq. Somewhat similar are calculations of Dr. G. L. Matzsch, in his work, "*Die Bewegung des Bevölkerungsstandes im Königreich Sachsen während der Jahre 1871-1890*," pp. 22, et seq.

around such an aggregate of population, which with a reasonably dense population, has shown a tendency to increase in population at a certain constant rate. Thus the area about London, to which the term the Greater London is sometimes given, including what is known as the Metropolitan Police District, was in 1801 fairly densely populated. In the next forty years it doubled its population, and in the next forty years doubled it again; and if we take the outer ring of this region, it increased by almost exactly 50 per cent from 1871 to 1881, and again from 1881 to 1891. The rate of increase of Registration London during a series of eighty years, was remarkably uniform, varying per decade between 17.28 and 21.9 per cent. Registration London, therefore, or the Metropolitan District taken by the Registrar General as included within the metropolis in 1851, shows from this point of view an approximation to what might be called the metropolitan unit.

Certainly we cannot say that up to the present any very satisfactory method has been found of determining what ought to be considered as the urban unit, and we shall see in the subsequent investigation that this is reflected in all the tables, statistical and otherwise, relating to the growth and development of our great cities.

Another real difficulty in the way of intelligent comparison of great cities in the matter of population is to be found in the lack of facts relating to the real population of different districts at different periods. Thus, owing to the shifting of census areas at different times, it becomes impossible to get the exact population of a given area for a long series of years. This is strikingly illustrated in our American cities, particularly in those cities which have added largely to their population and to their areas. Thus in Chicago, for example, where the population of the city has been taken at various times by wards, it is almost impossible to ascertain for any single ward in the city the population at different census periods, owing to the continual shifting of ward boundaries.

Thus when a township or a portion of a township has been annexed to the city it appears in the new census as a part of a given ward; it appeared in the old census as a part of a given township, and in neither case is the population given specifically for the particular area in question. Of course this is a kind of error which it is impossible to make good where the original material of the census has been destroyed, or where in the original material the units taken in one census cannot be in any way made harmonious or co-terminous with the units of the following census. In a few cases the census units have been preserved through a long period. This is true in the case of many of the European cities. In Leipzig, for instance, the population has been taken by *gemeinden*; in London,* many of the censuses, by parishes. The boundaries of these *gemeinden* having remained the same from the beginning, it becomes possible to compare the actual growth within a given area from decade to decade. R. Price Williams declares, however, that even in the case of London it is difficult to trace with any detail the various changes which have occurred in the population of the different districts of the metropolis prior to 1841; owing partly to the scanty information afforded in the earlier census returns, and also to the extensive alterations in the arrangement and grouping of the different sub-districts in the censuses of 1871 and 1881. It will be difficult indeed to secure the basis for comparative study of the past history of these great cities, so far as it is dependent upon this circumstance. The only remedy is to try in the various countries to get the census departments to adopt units for the future which may be kept permanent, or the identity of which can be traced in subsequent periods.

In comparing the areas of great cities, we find a further difficulty in the lack of definite and trustworthy topographical surveys. Mr. Price Williams, in the article referred to, calls

* R. Price Williams, "The Population of London from 1801 to 1881." *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*. Vol. xlviii(1885), p. 349.

attention to this fact in regard to London, and notes that the area of Registration London has been given differently in all four censuses from 1851 to 1861. The following table shows the figures:

TOTAL AREA OF REGISTRATION LONDON.

	1851.	1861.	1871.	1881.
	Acres.	Acres.	Acres.	Acres.
Area, including water . . .	78,029	77,997	75,362	75,334
Area, excluding water . . .	75,260	75,219	74,445	74,427

The actual boundaries of Registration London have remained the same, but, owing to errors in computation of areas, the total number of acres given at different times differs considerably. It will be seen that there is a difference of over 2000 acres between the census of 1851 and 1881, the difference being entirely due to incorrect measurements. It was not until the census of 1881 that full advantage was taken by the Census Department of the ordinance survey maps of the city of London. Even now the different authorities give different areas for the same district. Thus, Price Williams gives the area of Registration London in 1891 as 74,427 acres excluding water, or 75,334 including water. Whitaker's almanac gives 74,692 for the same area. The area of the different cities in Germany is being steadily computed with more exactness. Thus in the single year, 1891-92, the area of the city of Breslau was increased by 58.56 acres, as a consequence of new surveys and correction of errors in computation. The reports of the area of different cities are based partly upon a full catastral survey, and partly upon planimetric measurement. The statement is made on good authority* that very few of the German cities have such accurate surveys as enable them to determine the boundaries and the area of each portion of the city territory,

* "Statistisches Jahrbuch deutscher Städte," Vol. iii, 1893, p. 1.

and that this is true is indicated by the number of corrections made in the areas of the cities during the years 1891-1898. No two tables of the areas of the German cities correspond exactly. Thus in regard to Berlin,* it is stated that the area given in the table is based upon the tax levy tables for the year 1890-91, and differs from the same area for the preceding year by one hectare, eight ares and eighty-five square meters; while the area of the city, as stated in the report of the statistical bureau of the preliminary results of the census of December 1, 1890, is given as 6453 hectares, instead of 6338, a difference of 275 acres. It is further stated that the reason for this very considerable difference will be found only when the new survey of the city area is completed, which will not be for several years. In the report for 1897, in a list of some fifty-five cities, no fewer than nineteen corrections are made in the area as given in the preceding year, these corrections being rendered necessary by the discovery of wrong computations or by the completion of more accurate surveys. Many of the German cities are engaged in making accurate surveys of the entire area of the city. Thus the city of Munich made an appropriation of some \$60,000 to pay its share of the expense, the state government also bearing a portion. Berlin has been carrying on such a survey for over twenty years past, beginning in 1876. Up to 1893-94 it had surveyed a little over 5000 hectares out of a total area of 6339, and at a cost up to that time of nearly \$350,000.

No effort has been made so far as is known on the part of any American city to carry out a survey in this sense of the territory included within its boundaries, all our areas being computed upon the basis of maps based upon more or less accurate general surveys. It will be seen, therefore, that in subsequent computations there is an error of more or less importance arising out of the uncertainty as to the actual area of the cities concerned.

* Ibid., p. 18.

It is stated on official authority* that "no information exists as to areas in the city of Boston sufficiently accurate to be worth publishing." When the commission began its work it found that the list of real estate owned by the city as published by one department did not correspond at all with the statement as made by another. In one such list discrepancies existed in four cases out of every ten. No compilation of the area of the city by wards existed, and no two computations of the city area agreed. What is true of Boston is practically true of the other leading American cities.

There is the same difficulty in tables of population and areas for different countries as for the cities.†

The same thing is true of areas in general in the United States. Thus the area of Long Island, New York, varies, according to different authorities, from 1007 square miles to 1682 square miles, or over 50 per cent of the lower estimate. The measured area of Long Island on the coast survey charts is given at 1353.8 square miles, while the area accepted in the Census Bulletin of 1890 is 1007.‡

The discrepancies in the tables printed in the census of 1890 throw a suspicion upon the correctness of the work at many points. Thus the area of St. Louis is given at one place in the reports as 48, at another as 61 square miles; San Francisco as 50 and 15; New Orleans as 187 and 37; Holyoke as 4 and 18. These figures are evidently based on different units, but no explanation is offered as to their lack of agreement.§

The areas of the United States, of the states and territories and of the counties and parishes at the date of the eleventh

*The First Annual Report of the Department of Municipal Statistics of the City of Boston, January 31, 1898, p. 5.

†Levasseur, "Area and Population of Leading Countries," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, January, 1892. Vol. li, p. 298 et seq.

‡See Walter F. Wilcox, "Area and Population of the United States at the Eleventh Census." *American Economic Studies*, Vol. ii, No. 4, p. 224. *American Economic Association*, August, 1897.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 227.

census are stated in Census Bulletin No. 23, dated January 21, 1891, and prepared primarily for the use of the Census Office. The area of each city of over 10,000 inhabitants was asked of the city authorities and published in Census Bulletin No. 100 on the "Social Statistics of Cities." Where cities and counties coincide we have two independent measurements, and in general they do not agree at all.*

Another serious difficulty in the way of securing an accurate basis, or even an approximately satisfactory basis for such comparisons of urban phenomena is to be found in the fact that even where the census has been taken with regularity in many cases, it has been taken for some specific purpose, and therefore in some particular way, and city authorities have been unwilling to take the trouble of extracting from the mass of information which they have that particular information which is necessary for this sort of work. Thus the surveyor of the city of Baltimore writes that it would be impossible to get the information relative to the progressive additions to the territory of Baltimore from the beginning. Doubtless the full information in regard to such annexation, and additions is to be found in the surveyor's office, but kept probably in such a defective way as to make it impossible to ascertain it exactly without, as he says, some trouble. Dr. Hasse, in the article before referred to, relating to the density of metropolitan populations, says that he was compelled to send special circulars and blanks to the various statistical offices in Europe, which they filled out with more or less accuracy and promptness, but which some authorities declined to fill out on the ground that it would take entirely too much time and too much labor, indicating that their records were not kept in a way which enabled them to answer fundamental questions in a satisfactory way within a reasonable time. Generally speaking, data collected by our American cities have been either so untrustworthy, so inadequate, or have been kept in such a

* Ibid., p. 216.

careless way that the value of their returns is very far inferior to that of continental urban authorities, particularly French and German. The English returns, though perhaps more accurate, are not much more satisfactory than our own, since they fail to collect at many points the information which is needed. In fact one may say that the data concerning the life of great cities are perhaps nowhere adequately collected. They are best collected however in those places where the city supports a statistical bureau whose special function it is to collect statistics concerning the life of the city in various directions.

There is another consideration which ought not to be lost sight of in the study of this and similar problems, and that is that in order to get a fairly adequate idea of the real facts concerning any one of these prominent aspects of urban life, any particular fact should be studied from a number of different view points. The population of a given city, for example, should be compared with the population of other cities, the density of population with the density of population of other cities, the area with the area of other cities; the population in different concentric areas should be compared; the density of population with that of the larger units, such as counties or provinces; the population, as far as possible, with that of the outlying districts, and many other similar facts, in order to avoid erroneous conclusions that might be deduced from a single table or a single set of tables.

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THE FINAL REPORT OF THE MONETARY COMMISSION.

The avowed purpose of the Indianapolis Monetary Convention was to select a "non-partisan" commission composed of men of "such high attainment and character as not only to allay all suspicion of any influence from class or sectional interest but of such fitness as to inspire confidence in the mind of the fair-minded citizen of the republic that its work will be done for the permanent welfare of the nation." To this end eleven men of recognized ability were chosen and assigned the duty of preparing a "plan" which could be embodied in such legislation as would "place our monetary system on a permanently sound basis." A "plan" having been prepared and submitted, the commission then set about "to marshal those facts and arguments which truly supported" their conclusions. These constitute the "Final Report" of the commission, a book of some six hundred octavo pages. Professor Joseph French Johnson, of the University of Pennsylvania, has pointed out in the *ANNALS** what appear to him to be the patent defects of the proposed "plan," and it is not the purpose of this article to discuss the merits of its proposals. Assuming that they have merit, the present purpose is to examine the presentation of "facts and arguments" in the "Final Report."

That the report contains much of historical value and many suggestions of interest to the students of finance and monetary reform is not to be questioned. But in estimating the value of a treatise it is proper to notice the methods employed in its preparation. In so far as it purports to be an "exposition" of "facts," it is incumbent not only to examine whether the statements be true, but also whether all of the facts necessary to an understanding of the subject are included. If the treatise does not stand this double test

* March, 1898.

then any conclusions which are based on these statements will be unsafe as premises for further reasoning. Again, the theories employed as premises must take account of all the facts and explain all of the phenomena within the field of investigation. If they do not they will serve only to bewilder and confuse instead of leading to a better understanding. Further, the processes of reasoning must be logical; for if they are not the truth of the facts employed and the conclusiveness of the premises cannot save the conclusions. It is not to oppose any of the theories employed or to deny the truth of any of the conclusions reached, but to submit the statements, theories and conclusions contained in the report to the test proposed, as a means of estimating its value, that this paper is written.

The Indianapolis Monetary Convention in the course of deliberations on the prerequisites of "a consistent, straightforward and deliberately planned monetary system" reached the following conclusions:

"First, That the present gold standard should be maintained.

"Second, That steps should be taken to insure the ultimate retirement of all classes of United States notes by a gradual and steady process.

*"Third, That a banking system be provided which should furnish credit facilities to every portion of the country and a safe and elastic circulation."**

Upon these three propositions rest both the plan proposed and the final report. As the first is essential to all that follows, and as it is subject to greatest controversy, it would seem necessary, therefore, to establish it beyond a reasonable doubt. The first labors of the commission in the preparation of the final report are devoted to its demonstration; therefore, our examination of methods employed will begin here.

Upon investigation it will be found that the form of reasoning employed to establish the conclusion "that the

* P. 8.

present gold standard should be retained" is a *priori*. The syllogism is as follows:

First premise.—A perfect standard is one which will "place both debtors and creditors in exactly the same absolute and the same relative position to each other at the end of the contract that they occupied at its beginning."

Second premise.—While, in practice, no standard can meet these requirements, the "single gold standard" meets them more nearly than any other.

Conclusion.—Therefore, the single gold (the present) standard is more nearly perfect than any other and should be retained.

The conclusion from the premises seems unassailable. But in this as in all examples of a *priori* reasoning the inquiry is pertinent: Are the premises true? The major premise is quite generally admitted. Relying on this fact the commission simply postulate it without attempt at argument or demonstration and for the present purposes we will accept it in the form stated as the norm for our judgment of a perfect standard. This leaves the second premise only to be discussed. The truth of the second premise is denied by a very large number of thinkers; it cannot, therefore, be admitted without demonstration. On this account the commission proceed to its establishment.

In this connection, it should be noticed that the statement of the second premise, which is the present subject of inquiry, involves a comparison of the gold standard with all other standards; that it is premised as being "the most perfect;" and that the norm of perfection set up for judgment is found in the first premise. The commission seek to determine the higher degree of perfection of the gold standard by comparison and the gradual elimination of those standards which, judged by this norm, are found less perfect.

In this process it is first concluded that "owing to their durability, the precious metals are least likely to vary in

value on account of changes affecting themselves."* This conclusion excludes all base metals, paper and other easily destructible materials which have been used. Then a second conclusion is reached that "the choice of a standard lies between gold and silver."† By this, the field is again narrowed; all precious metals except gold and silver are eliminated. There are now four standards left to be considered, viz:— (1) the "combination standard" (advocated by some theorists) which would, by international agreement, make coins of such alloy of silver and gold as would absorb the money supplies of both; (2) the "bimetallic standard," which would use each metal, in turn, as a standard, whenever the coins made from the one metal or the other, as the case might be, should be of lower value—the metal to be coined under a system of free-coinage of both, with full legal tender qualities, at a fixed ratio; (3) the "the single silver standard;" (4) the "single gold standard." The first three of these are eliminated by the following process:

The "combination standard" is dismissed by showing that even when combined in an alloy there would be nothing to keep the metals at a parity in the ratio agreed upon and that consequently the value would tend, as before, to a wide divergence.

The "bimetallic standard" receives more attention; it is not so quickly set aside by the commission. It has had and still has many friends. Its advocates claim that it not only provides for the use of the entire stock of both metals available for coinage purposes, but also that under the bimetallic system the forces of supply and demand are set in operation in such manner that the values of the coins can not, and in practice do not, widely diverge; that the "bimetallic standard" makes provision against the defects of any "combination standard" which might be proposed, and therefore meets all of the objections urged on account of wide

* P. 97.

† Ibid.

divergence of value; that while the metal which is temporarily lower in value will, for the time being, be used as the standard yet, on account of the provision made in the "bimetallic system" for shifting the monetary demand from the higher to the lower, these values will keep so nearly together that no loss will be occasioned in business exchanges or the settlement of debts, on this account. In support of this theory they cite the quotations on gold and silver, and the history of the process of "shifting" from one standard to the other, during a long experience under the bimetallic system. They further claim that, by reason of this fact, when changes do take place, which affect the value of the metal that happens at the time to be the standard (the demand being shifted) there is little or no effect produced on prices unless the value of the other metal is also affected, and that in this case the one affected the least will be the standard; that "bimetallism," while it has only one standard at a time, has the benefit of a standard which in its operation includes the total available supplies of both metals, and will be least influenced by speculative movements. This they support by the data of business, the nearly corresponding movements of gold and silver values prior to 1873, the gradual divergence in values of gold and silver since that date, the data concerning the effects of speculation, the statistics of production of the precious metals, etc. Such are the arguments to be met and such the data to which we are referred in discussions involving a comparison of the two standards.

It is to be noticed that the commission do not attempt to overthrow these claims of the "bimetallists" by showing their premises to be incorrect, their reasoning illogical, or their conclusions contrary to the facts of monetary experience. They would eliminate the "bimetallic standard" by a process of indirection. Certain theories are offered in opposition. The first of these reads as follows: "We can not have two different standards of value, at the same time,

without having two sets of prices."* Does this theory accord with any of the facts of monetary experience? When the "bimetallic standard" was the one used, did we have two sets of prices or two scales for the liquidation of debts? If such was not the experience then the theory can be of little use in explaining the phenomena of that period. In the second place we will test it as a logical process. Does it, even if theoretically true, in any manner oppose the statements, logical processes, or conclusions of the bimetallic system? It is only by a peculiar license of expression that the bimetallic system can be said to have "two standards" at any one time. Under bimetallicism there never was more than one standard at a time, nor was this ever claimed by those who express themselves accurately. The theory proposed by the commission relative to "two standards" and "two prices," however true hypothetically, is wholly out of point. As no further use of the theory is attempted, as they leave the conclusion to be inferred, we pass to the next theory stated.

This is in form the following:

"Even if gold and silver were bound together, changes in prices relative to them must necessarily take place if changes occur in the cost of production of articles exchanged against the double standard."*

This case is found to be entirely hypothetical. When brought to the test of fact we find that under bimetallicism, gold and silver never were "bound together" in any other than a figurative sense, and a figure of speech unless given an exact scientific meaning is dangerous when used as a premise for argument. The only manner in which the two metals were ever bound together, in practice, under the bimetallic system was by operation of the forces of supply and demand. This being understood as the meaning of the commission, we will apply the test of its logical importance

* P. 97.

† Ibid.

in argument. Whatever may be the theory of "cost of production" of articles exchanged against the "double standard" the theory would apply equally to each metal or both. It cannot be used, logically, to show the greater perfection of the one as compared with the other. One other expression should be noticed in the statement—the phrase, "the double standard." This expression, in order to do violence neither to fact nor to theory must be understood as having the technical meaning of "the bimetallic standard." The object of comparison being to determine which standard is more nearly perfect, this second theory can serve no logical purpose other than to direct the attention away from the issue.

The third theoretical statement directed against bimetallism is as follows :

"Granting all that may be asserted by the advocates of international bimetallism, conceding that the values of gold and silver may be maintained at a fixed ratio to each other, it must be evident that the problem of a standard of deferred payments is not thereby solved ; because it does not follow, even if gold and silver can be successfully tied together, that they together will always maintain the same exchange relations and the same level of prices with labor and with all other commodities." *

In considering this objection it must first be noticed that the commission, in "granting all that may be asserted by the advocates" of bimetallism, grant nothing which they claim. No claim of the bimetallicists corresponds to the concession "that the *values* of gold and silver may be *maintained at a fixed ratio* to each other." Their contention is that, the *ratio of coinage* being fixed by law, the forces of supply and demand will cause the values in their *fluctuations* to approximate that ratio.

The only part of bimetallic theory which deals with a fixed ratio is that wherein the ratio of coinage is fixed by law and no one would say but that this might be

* P. 97.

maintained whatever the values of the metals. The second form of expression is "if gold and silver can be successfully tied together." This is another figure of speech to which the criticism urged above should be made. Therefore, though they purport to concede, for the sake of the argument, the theory of bimetallism no such grant is found in their statements and in so far as these statements might enter into the argument the conclusion would be invalid. But these statements do not enter into the argument; from a logical standpoint, they are purely linguistic overtures, and only amount to a misleading description of the system with which they are making the comparison. The argument stated is: Conceding the position of the bimetallist, it does not follow that the bimetallic standard will always maintain the *same level of prices*. Bringing this to a logical test we find that it states a different norm of judgment from that set up for the comparison in their first premise. Their second premise now under discussion, asserts that no standard can operate with perfection according to the rule stated in the first, but that gold approaches this *more nearly* than any other; now they would condemn the "bimetallic standard," because it would not operate with perfection according to that ideal. The point at issue is one of comparison; but no comparison is made. The argument put forth, therefore, has no logical place from any point of view. The statements and conclusion may be admitted as true, but still they would not be germane to the issue.

The fourth attack on bimetallism is that "we are forced to believe that bimetallism, national and international, is impractical."* This is left entirely without argument or attempt at demonstration.

The conclusion follows immediately, viz.:

"If we are thus—as seems inevitable—forced to set aside the plan of attempting to regulate the values of gold and silver, at some ratio, then the choice is between a single gold, or a single silver standard."†

* P. 97.

† Ibid.

The question is certainly pertinent: Have the commission shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the "single gold standard" is more nearly perfect than the "bimetallic standard?" Without in any manner attempting to show, prior to reaching their conclusion, that the bimetallic theory is wrong or that their own theory accords with the facts of monetary experience, by a process that will not stand the test of reason, the "bimetallic standard" is eliminated and we are brought to consider the remaining two—the "single silver" and the "single gold" standard. We will therefore accept this conclusion in order that we may follow the process to the end.

The report now proceeds to its final comparison of standards. The form of argument used to show that gold is a better standard than silver is as follows: (1) By reason of the taking away of the "monetary demand" for silver, it has been subject at times to great changes in price.* (2) "No such sudden and erratic changes have taken place in the exchange value of gold."† (3) The conclusion is then stated as if logically following. It is scarcely necessary to call attention to the character of such an argument. The line of reasoning is, in short, that silver has been demonetized; therefore gold is the better standard. But, admitting that a demonetized metal may be used for purposes of comparison, the fact that it has fallen in value relative to gold proves nothing. The norm of judgment is quite a different one than that at first set up. When the first premise is adhered to another conclusion may be reached.‡

But with this step the commission deems that it has established the second premise to the main conclusion—"that gold is a more perfect standard than any other."

* "Losing a great part of its monetary demand, this large mass became heavy in value, and in its downward movement it showed possibilities of sudden rushes as it fell (like an avalanche) from one point of support to another lower down."—"Final Report," p. 99.

† P. 99.

‡ See *Journal of Political Economy*, March, 1897. "Gold and Silver in Terms of Commodities," by E. S. Meade.

"The conclusion, therefore" says the report, "is *irresistible*, that since it is desirable to choose a commodity as a standard which fluctuates least in its exchange value in short periods of time, for reasons affecting itself, *gold* must be that commodity."*

This conclusion having been reached, it might seem that further discussion of standards was unnecessary. But, in the conclusion just quoted, we find the important qualification "in short periods of time," which leaves out of consideration long time contracts, concerning which the whole argument about standards has arisen. It has been the fluctuations over long time periods that have led to charges of injustice, and to the whole question, "What is the more perfect standard?"

The commission appear to recognize that their case is not complete, for they now seek to justify the fluctuations of the gold standard over long periods. To meet the charge that such fluctuations have wrought great injustice to those who have made business ventures requiring a period of years for development, and the complaint that the gold standard has fallen very far short of the norm of perfection, another process of reasoning is employed. Comparisons are laid aside. Regarding long time contracts the commission affirm that "it should be kept in mind that it is not a proper function of government to step in and save men from the *ordinary risks* of trade and industry."† But what has the question in hand to do with "ordinary risks" of trade and industry? Are changes due to the acts of government in the adoption of a standard "ordinary risks?" Does a man in business ordinarily calculate on his properties depreciating 50 per cent in ten years owing to the enhanced value of the standard? But admitting that these are ordinary risks, then the theory proposed is directly opposed to the underlying purpose of the discussion. Does not the whole argument turn on the maintenance of a certain standard *by the government*? Was it not the

* P. 100.

† P. 103.

object of the convention to have the government to "step in" and act according to a "plan" to be proposed by *them*, in order to "place our monetary system on a permanently sound basis?" They see evils in our "present system," which make the conditions of business very uncertain and hard, and would have the government establish a system to correct them. This attempt at justification, therefore, when considered in the light of their own reasoning, is illogical throughout.

To reinforce their position they propose another argument—that losses occasioned by fluctuations of the standard are attributable to "inefficiency" and "lack of judgment" on the part of the business man. In the language of the report:

"A government should no more appear in such cases to remedy the *inefficiency* of business men than to indemnify them for losses occurring in business, due to *lack of judgment* in other directions."*

The manufacturer who, in 1885, borrowed money to build his plant, on a ten-year loan, is chargeable with "inefficiency" and "lack of judgment" because in 1895, when the obligation becomes due, his product and his plant are worth only 60 per cent of their value in 1885. But the other side of the operation must also be taken into account—the creditor's gain on account of the fall in prices or the increased value of money during the ten years. The commissioners should have attributed this to the *greater efficiency* or *better judgment* of the creditor, but they prefer to call it an "unearned increment" which could not be rightfully claimed by anyone and therefore belongs as much to the creditor as to anyone else.

To show that we have here an unearned increment, a very striking argument is elaborated—a theory of "cost of production" that is *sui generis*. The commission, in discussing the functions of money, have shown that "value is a ratio;" that "the value of anything is the quantity of the

* P. 104.

other articles for which it will exchange;" that "the price of anything is the quantity of the standard for which it may be exchanged;" that "it depends merely upon the side looked at whether there has been a rise or fall in value . . . if the price of wheat rises we may correctly say, that since wheat commands more grains of gold, either wheat has risen or gold has fallen in value, relative to the other." Now in this relation the commission reach the conclusion that, owing to the improved processes of production

"there has been greater ease of acquisition of both gold and goods . . . but goods have *cheapened somewhat more* than gold; hence the resulting fall of prices."*

This might be logically used to show why wages or the return for human effort should have advanced, but when applied to the price ratio between gold and commodities it gives us a new theorem in mathematics. A process of reasoning is hereby evolved which will allow each side of a ratio to decrease relative to the other at the same time.

Some attention is also given to the "common belief" that one of the causes for the alleged "fall in prices" is the relative scarcity of gold. The theory offered in opposition to this is that

"when people who are hard pressed . . . say that there is not money enough they mean that they do not have wealth or property enough to satisfy their wants. Those who have marketable property have no difficulty in getting money."†

Does this theory accord with the facts? The people who usually make the complaint are those who are in debt; they are not those who have no property, otherwise they would not have had such heavy obligations. They are those who, estimating the value of their property, have incurred *obligations to pay money* which, at the time, were considered safe by both debtor and creditor. Their complaint is not that they have nothing to sell, but that they

* P. 101.

† P. 83.

cannot get as much for what they have as they could at the time of contracting the debt. They complain of the fall in prices, in other words the comparative rise in the value of the standard and the increased difficulty of exchanging their property, or of converting it into means of payment. To such the commission offer the theory that it is not money they need, but property. The debtors appeal to the norm set up by the commission in its first premise. They ask that they may have a standard of deferred payments which will place them in the same relative position at the time when the debt is due that they were in when the debt was contracted. The answer of the commission seems neither to take cognizance of facts nor to be consistent with reason. But since the debtor complains of the injustice of the standard, and cites the fall in prices, or conversely the rise in the value of gold, in justification of his plea, the commission have undertaken to answer him by another line of argument.

The interesting point is, say the commission, that as compared with human labor, gold has depreciated.* "If gold had risen in value relative to both labor and goods there might be some plausibility in the conclusion that it was 'scarce.' " In another place it is indicated that the exchange value of labor has risen because under the improved processes of production the returns on industrial effort have been largely increased and, therefore, in the competitions for efficient laborers the undertaker has been compelled to bid higher for his services. But what has any theory of the increase in the price of labor to do with the question of a standard of deferred payments? Payments for labor are made when the service is complete. They have nothing to do with long time fluctuations. They are practically on the same basis as cash transactions. As shown by the commission in another place, in "transactions which begin and end on the spot," the parties have all the elements to the transactions in hand and therefore no question of justice or

* P. 101.

injustice on account of fluctuations can arise in these. For the purpose of exchange it is largely a question of convenience; the norm of "perfection" is an entirely different one. The conclusion, therefore, that "the great gain to the laborer at the close of the century is the fact that his labor exchanges for more gold; and that in addition gold exchanges for more of the comforts and necessities of life," is quite irrelevant.

If it be true that labor exchanges for more gold and gold for more of the comforts and necessities of life than at the beginning of the century, what then? If the value of the standard had gradually decreased so that the prices of commodities had been twice as high as at the present would not labor, for the same reasons, have been twice as high also? Would not a day's work have purchased exactly the same amount of the comforts and necessities? This whole discussion is not only beside the point, but also illogical throughout. The question as to whether the gold standard places the business man, the one who undertakes an industrial enterprise which requires years to develop, who borrows capital on long time, in relatively the same position as at the time of contracting the debt or undertaking the enterprise is not answered.

Not only has the commission attempted to show by the method above set forth that money is not "scarce," but that there is little or no use for money; that

"to-day this medium of exchange (credit) is so largely used that over 90 per cent of the large exchanges of the country are performed without the use of actual money;" "that if all persons were of high honor and intelligence, and if the transaction were large enough to warrant the trouble and expense of borrowing at the bank, there would be almost no use at all for actual money in exchanging goods."*

These conclusions rest upon a part only of the facts within the field of investigation. The statement that "over 90

* P. 81.

per cent of the large exchanges are performed without the *use* of actual money," loses sight of the immense sums of money used as a basis for this credit. The commission shows that there is \$3,210,735,758 of deposit currency. This they would have us believe, "takes the place" of so much money. We also have our attention drawn to various other credit devices for doing business. But why are these used? Is it not because all who hold these credit instruments and devices can obtain money on them on demand or when due? Are there not about 25 per cent of "money reserves" held against the deposit currency above referred to? Do not some of the largest banks find it necessary to hold from 30 to 40 per cent as reserves in order to be able to meet these demands? Are not these money reserves in use just as much as, even more actively than, the coin in the pockets of the people "in general circulation?" The money in the pockets of the people is kept as a reserve to pay their small debts. The money in the vaults is kept to pay the debts of the banker, to his customers in the settlements of large transactions. When they announce the theory above stated they lose sight of these enormous "money demands" which are made and which must be met in order to support the credit devices of individuals and monetary institutions.

But time and the patience of the reader will not permit the enumerations and analysis of more of the theories and "arguments" employed by the commission in seeking to show that the "in long periods of time" the gold standard also meets the requirements of the most perfect standard and therefore should be maintained. In order to follow the methods presented in reaching the other conclusions of the commission, however, as before, we will accept the first proposition as if established.

The second main conclusion of the commission, "that steps should be taken to insure the ultimate retirement of all classes of government notes," follows directly from the first. As shown in the report, the money demands

upon the standard supply are greater than can be continued with safety. The demand obligations of the various kinds of representative money alone, at the time of last official information,* were about as follows: Silver dollars in circulation, \$61,491,073; subsidiary silver, \$65,720,308; gold certificates, \$36,557,689; silver certificates, \$376,695,592; treasury notes of 1890, \$103,443,936; United States notes, \$262,480,927; currency certificates, \$43,315,000; national bank notes (redeemable at the treasury of the United States), \$223,827,755; making a total of "representative money" for which gold could be demanded of \$1,183,532,280. To meet these demand obligations the government held in the treasury \$197,469,236.† Considering all of these facts the commission reached the conclusion "that the most serious evil affecting our present monetary system is the threatened degradation of the standard;" that "the first need of the situation is to fortify that standard." Granting the first main conclusion as a premise, viz., "that the gold standard should be retained," and this second conclusion is inevitable.

How is this standard to be fortified? Cut down the money demands. In the judgment of the commission the demand obligations of the "representative" forms of money are fully \$400,000,000 too large; the "United States notes" are the most objectionable form outstanding; therefore by retiring these and a small part of the silver obligations, the standard will be safe. A statement of the amount of "representative money" which it is necessary to retire to protect the standard from this form of demand is a question of judgment and expediency which we cannot here go into. But assuming that the judgment of the commission is well founded, does their conclusion that, by retiring the "notes"

* "Monetary Report," p. 87.

† There were also about \$195,000,000 of gold on deposit in national banks, but as about this amount would be required to be kept there to supply the demands of its customers, any attempt on the part of the government to get at this supply through note redemptions, would probably be met by counter demands on the treasury through the other forms of demand obligations.

and the prescribed quantity of silver, the standard will be safe, follow? If this conclusion is to be accepted then it must appear that they have taken account of all of the demands which threaten the safety of the standard. A careful examination of the report will show that they have taken into account the demands of "representative money" for redemption, but have entirely ignored the "legal tender" demands; not only have they ignored this class of demands on the standard, but in places have even gone so far as to deny its existence. Before reaching the conclusion that a retirement of the greenbacks would make the standard safe against degradation, should they not have considered whether the \$3,210,735,758, of deposit currency constitutes a demand; whether the bank discounts of something like \$3,000,000,000 would in any manner look to the standard for support; whether the various forms of collateral security held in banks, and which must be liquidated, would add to the strain? Should not the principal and interest of public debts which must be met, the large volume of private accounts (many times larger than the bank obligations), payable on demand and which in times of financial strain are demanded, the time obligations of private parties, the demand obligations to labor, the stated dues on insurance, interest, assessments, etc., should not all of these forms of money demands at least receive a fair consideration before dogmatically declaring the result? In this relation have they not overlooked the whole credit system?

It may well be, if we are to retain the gold standard, that the proposed "plan" does not go far enough. In times of monetary stress, the United States ought to be in the best possible position to obtain gold, and that end can be best attained when the money in circulation—*i. e.*, in the pockets of the people and in the vaults of banks—is gold instead of silver and other forms of demand obligations for gold.

Again, in considering the various arguments for "retirement," we find them wanting in continuity. Looking

to this we find that the main argument, the fundamental theorems used by the commission in establishing the expediency of retiring the demand notes, is almost entirely lost in a confusion of side lights. One must look through the entire volume to find the underlying argument. The arguments which are given a prominent place pertain to subjects quite foreign to the main issue. For example, a chapter is given to the effect of paper issues upon wages during the civil war. It is difficult to see just what bearing a discussion of wages during a period of "depreciated paper" has upon any issue presented. Another chapter is devoted to the effect of paper issues on prices during the civil war. Again we ask, what has the question of prices, quoted in a depreciated paper currency, to do with the subject in hand? One part of the argument is pertinent, viz., that part which relates to the "alleged contraction." It appears desirable to show that the retirement of notes would not cause a further fall of prices. To this end the report seeks to show that the fall in prices after the civil war was not in any manner due to contraction. Its method is to assign another cause for the price movement. In so doing the commission have taken a position diametrically opposed to that assumed in the main discussion on the subject of the standard. The argument is here as follows:

"The real cause . . . was not an imaginary contraction, but the serious change which was taking place in the value of the standard itself. . . . At the close of the war prices were expressed in terms of a currency which had suffered heavy depreciation. As conditions became more settled and the credit of the government rose, the value of its promise rose correspondingly. This merely amounted to a continual change in the standard, and entailed the usual injurious consequences upon those who had made contracts at the time when paper was more heavily depreciated. . . . The value of a dollar in greenbacks had been steadily rising, and, by the middle of 1867, had reached seventy-one cents in gold. The result of all this had been a decrease in prices."*

* P. 418.

The contrast is striking between the theories employed in support of the "single gold standard" and those here used relative to the "government credit standard." In the former case it was said that the fall in prices was due to decreased cost of production; that the margin of difference due to the fall was an "unearned increment;" that the fall in prices caused no injustice to anyone and in fact was a "great gain to the laborer." In the latter case the fall of prices is considered a "cause of suffering" which entailed "great disorder in business," and "the usual consequences upon those who had made contracts at the time when paper was more heavily depreciated." This "suffering" and these "usual consequences" it is said, were "due to a change in the value of the standard." By an evolution of thought in the minds of the commission which we will not here attempt to explain, the gradual fall of prices from the time of greatest depreciation in paper until 1879, is viewed as a most serious misfortune, while the like downward movement of prices from 1879 to the time of writing the report is held to be not only *just* but a *blessing*. Does the conclusion that contraction did not affect prices follow from the premises? Granting that the increasing value of the paper standard had the effect of continually lowering prices, what was the course of gold prices at the time? There was in fact a contemporaneous decline in gold prices, though at a less rapid rate. The commission not only take a paper standard as a premise for a conclusion relative to gold prices, but ignore entirely the fluctuations in gold prices. They arrive at the conclusion that the price fluctuations were not due to retirement of notes.

In discussing the effect of paper issues upon prices, the statement is made that during the war

"the issues of an irredeemable government currency destroyed the existence of the former gold standard and substituted for it a standard of government paper—a standard consisting only of the government's promise to pay." "We often speak," says the report, "as if the

paper currency issued by the government had some value of its own. This is not the case."^{*}

Later, in dealing with the same subject, we read that "the *value* of the legal tender note was, in short, regulated by the same forces which controlled that of any other form of government debt."[†]

Now in the light of these statements may it not be pertinent to ask which theory has the greater weight with the commission—the one which holds that paper money has no value, or the one which assumes that it has value?

Another example of the method employed appears in the discussion of the bond issues of 1894-96. It is asserted that the government received "some \$40,000,000 less than the amounts for which the same bonds could have been sold a few years earlier,"[‡] because "for some reason," the credit of the government was impaired and confidence in its ability or intention to pay had been lost. Does the theory explain the facts? Is any account taken of the increased value of money? Do investors usually pay a premium on low rate securities of any kind where the credit of the debtor is impaired and "confidence lost" in the ability or intention to pay?

We pass to the next consideration, the third main proposition of the commission, "that a banking system be provided which should furnish credit facilities to every portion of the country," etc.

Thus stated, the proposition would be accepted without argument. But it is not primarily to establish this principle but to draw conclusions from it which is the purpose of the commission. After postulating what a banking system should do, the commission seek to show that the proposed system will do this better than any other, and hence it should be adopted. It is with the methods employed to establish the second premise that we are concerned.

^{*} P. 466.

[†] Ibid.

[‡] P. 483.

Their first effort is directed toward a theory of banking which will be in harmony with the conclusions of the preceding parts of the report. It seems desirable that the credit system shall not appear to make heavy demands on the standard. The arguments employed relative to "prices," the alleged "scarcity" of money, etc., forbid. Then, too, the principal reason for urging the retirement of government notes is that the token and other monetary demands must be reduced so that the monetary system, supported by the single gold standard, will not fall by reason of its own weight. If the credit system also constituted a heavy demand upon the standard, *i. e.*, upon legal tender money, difficulties would multiply. The commission meet this issue by employing a theory of credit and banking which avoids it. This theory is that banking is a process of "coining property." Banks are conceived of as institutions which estimate the values of marketable goods, or property, in terms of the standard and then issue a currency of their own based, not on money, but on this property. Credit is viewed, not as a demand for money, but as a "title" to property.

"The operations of legitimate banking," say the commission, "are based on property." "A man having property can borrow upon the strength of it, get the value of that property converted into means of payment, and exchange it for other forms of property."*

The banking process is illustrated as follows:

"A manufacturer may have a stock of hardware, and yet he needs a means of payment at the present moment. If he has sold goods on ninety days' time and needs means to pay a note maturing to-morrow . . . he can present his evidence of sale of this property to a bank and get it changed into means of payment. The value of goods expressed in terms of money (the common denominator) is by the bank converted into means of meeting obligations so that goods may be exchanged against goods."†

* P. 163.

† P. 168.

It will not be denied that transactions of this nature do take place. But such a theory relegates the business of banking to the scope of the pawnbroker or the chattel mortgage loan agency. Generally speaking, the bank has little to do with "titles" to property. Its main business is dealing with demands for money. Very often a business man may wish to obtain means of payment before his "bills receivable" that have arisen out of property exchanges come due, and these are turned over to the bank. But these "bills receivable" usually are not "titles" to property and, moreover, the bank does not become the owner of them. They are usually taken as collateral; in case they are paid when due, the amount received goes to liquidate the debt of the borrower; in case they are not paid, the borrower is at once notified by the bank that his collateral has not been honored. But when we have accounted for the chattel mortgage loans and the bank loans based on collateral, there are still a large number of transactions that remain unexplained and unaccounted for—transactions which have nothing to do with goods (expressed in terms of the common denominator and then represented on paper in such a manner that they may be exchanged against other titles to property). By referring to the report of the comptroller it will be found that about 50 per cent of the loans made by the New York banks are on paper without any collateral, and a large part of these are on paper unendorsed. Under a theory that banking is a coinage of property how are these transactions to be classified? This theory either fails to take into account more than a small part of the operations of a bank or else it is so highly figurative as to be misleading. It certainly lends nothing to an understanding of the facts of banking, nor does it contribute to systematic thought on monetary problems.

In order to fortify the position that the credit system does not constitute a demand on the standard, it is affirmed that

the legal tender quality does not affect the value of the standard commodity.

"It should be learned," the report has it, "that a commodity or standard holds its value quite independent of the fact that it is given legal recognition."*

Yet elsewhere it would appear that the standard is created by giving the legal tender quality to a certain kind of money. This at least is the theory which underlies the discussion of the paper standard used during the civil war.

Another instance of the arguments of the report may be cited from its discussion of bank issues. It is evidently desirable to overcome the common belief that banks make a profit out of the issue privilege. "To assert that the banks make a profit out of the notes issued," it is affirmed, "is sheer ignorance of banking."† The logical processes employed to correct this erroneous concept is worthy of notice. The commission first present an analogy between the obligations arising out of bank deposits and bank notes. From this analogy it is concluded that bank notes and bank deposits are identical. Upon this hypothesis of the "identity of the note and deposit" a comparison is instituted between two banks of like capital, the one enjoying the issue privilege under the present National Bank Act and the other not having this privilege. The illustration‡ is so singular that it may be given in full:

I. NOTES AND NO DEPOSITS.

Bonds at 3 per cent	\$107,861	Capital	\$100,000
Loans at 10 per cent	68,639	Notes	90,000
5 per cent redemption fund	4,500		
10 per cent reserve	9,000		
	<hr/>		<hr/>
	\$190,000		\$190,000

* P. 133.

† P. 186.

‡ P. 190.

I. NOTES AND NO DEPOSITS—*Continued.*

Income:

On bonds	\$3,235.83	
On loans	6,863.90	
		<hr/> \$10,099.73
Deduct special expense on notes		958.65
Net income		<hr/> \$9,141.08

II. DEPOSITS AND NO NOTES.

Loans at 10 per cent	\$176,500	Capital	\$100,000
15 per cent reserve	13,500	Deposits	90,000
	<hr/> \$190,000		<hr/> \$190,000
Income in loans			\$17,650.00
Deduct net income above			9,141.08
			<hr/> \$8,508.92
Balance in favor of second plan			\$8,508.92

The conclusion is that "the advantage in favor of the deposit system is thus \$8,508.92."* The palpable absurdity of the illustration and the conclusion is such that comment may be brief.

In the first case we have an original investment of \$107,861. This capital is invested in government bonds at 3 per cent. But under the law the banker is allowed to deposit this first investment as security and receive \$90,000 in notes which, less legal reserve, he can again invest at 10 per cent. In the second case we have an original capital of \$190,000—\$100,000 of the banker's money and \$90,000 procured from others without in any manner investing the first \$100,000. By law the banker may invest \$176,500, which he loans at 10 per cent. The fallacy appears in assuming that there is the same amount of active capital in each case. Leaving out of consideration the minor details, the comparison is between an active capital of \$107,861, and \$176,500, instead of two capitals of \$100,000 each.

Why did they not argue that if there were two banks possessing \$100,000, one having \$90,000 in notes and no

* P. 191.

deposits, while the other had \$500,000 deposits and no notes, the second would make larger profits. It would have been equally true and equally irrelevant to the question whether bank notes afford a profit.

Passing over this remarkable slip we may note that the doctrine that bank notes afford no profit, finds no place in the chapter on circulation secured by bonds. Here it is held that the present system is inelastic because the amount of notes issued depends not in the accommodation of the public with a suitable currency, but on which investment is the more profitable at a given price for bonds. If bonds are high then the banks sell, for they can more profitably invest in other securities; if they are low banks may derive a larger income by investing in these low rate government securities and then issuing notes thereon. How does the commission harmonize this position with the one taken above?

As already stated I would not be understood as opposing the plan or the conclusions of the commission. Every proposition may be worthy of adoption; every conclusion may be true to the best interests of the nation. It is only affirmed that the arguments of the commission do not justify its conclusions; that in so far as the report deals with preconceived theories and conclusions, their exposition of facts has been partial and is inadequate to furnish a safe basis for reasoning; that the theories employed as premises have not explained the facts and phenomena within the field of inquiry; that the processes of reasoning are illogical, and therefore, however true the conclusions, their truth or falsity does not appear from the report.

It is much to be regretted that such is the case. The time is one in which citizens of a common country in a common cause are considering problems of deepest import to the welfare of the nation. A carefully compiled statement of facts on the subject of money and banking, in itself, would have been of inestimable service. Having the facts

necessary to a mastery of the subject well in hand, or within easy reach, the commission might have evolved a body of thought which would give a proper understanding of the facts. This done, a "sound" system of money and banking might be adopted by the government, having such popular sanction as to make it "permanent."

In the report there is a large fund of information collected; also many suggestions of value are made. In so far as the commission have not appeared conscious of an imperative necessity to support some preconceived opinion or theory, the report may be considered as a valuable contribution. Their exposition and discussion of our present monetary system, of the functions of money, the banking principle, note issues based on commercial assets, elasticity, redemption, uniformity of note issues, bank reserves, inspection and examination, the guaranty fund, insolvency of banks, branch and small banks, the retirement of government notes, etc., in the main, are of a high character. The only danger to be avoided in reading the report is that encountered by the commission themselves—that of a failure to discriminate between facts and arguments selected and directed toward an end, and a scientific investigation of all of the conditions of business and finance, leaving theories and conclusions to follow as a logical result.

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WEALTH AND WELFARE.*

Chapter III.

IMPORTANT ECONOMIC CONCEPTIONS.

The cases are fortunately few in which it will be necessary to use words in several senses or in a sense widely different from that which they have in popular speech. But whether used in a new sense or an old sense, in one sense or many senses, there is equal need of definiteness and consciousness of our own processes. There is all possible difference between systematic elasticity, and indefiniteness and vagueness. In addition to the important distinction between object and subject, considered in the preceding chapter, a number of important conceptions require analysis before we can safely proceed with our discussion.

The group of words, happiness, pleasure, enjoyment, etc., have not been more fortunate than wealth at the hands of careful writers. We saw that philanthropy and class conflict have had a hand in shaping the definition of wealth. Philosophical controversy has had a hand in defining happiness, which is incomparably worse. The first gives us only the tangle of accident; the second gives us the tangle of planful ingenuity.

Is happiness one thing or more than one? Do happiness and pleasure stand for distinct and inconvertible experiences, or are they but species under a true genus? Is happiness attainable as the result of conscious search, or is it incidental to the pursuit of something else? Into the discussion of these questions we cannot now enter with profit. It is reasonable to hope that our inquiry into the nature of the satisfactions which men derive from their contact with

* Chapters one and two were published in the preceding issue of the *ANNALS*. The concluding chapters will appear in the March issue.

persons and things will throw some light upon these questions, but we will not prejudice our inquiry by needless assumptions. For the present all we need to decide is which of these terms we are going to employ and in what sense.

The terms happiness and pleasure have become relatively specialized and contrasted with each other. Happiness suggests a relatively permanent state of mind and pleasure a temporary and superficial experience. The one is associated with character and virtue, the other with circumstance and indulgence. The familiar definition of happiness in treatises on ethics as "pleasure resulting from right action" gives technical sharpness to this popular distinction. Whatever may be the validity of this distinction, it plainly is not so fundamental as to require us to recognize it at the outset. Underneath the specific difference there is still a generic unity which is artificially obscured by the popular emphasis upon prominent characteristics. When a man enjoys actions and experiences which most men associate with discomfort, his enjoyment is naturally attributed to a predisposing character on his part. His enjoyment is attributable to himself. But if he enjoys what other men enjoy it does not seem peculiar. Attention is directed to the circumstances which are familiar to all as fugitive conditions of enjoyment. Such enjoyment is attributable to circumstances. Of course both explanations ignore that which is common to both and so unemphasized by contrast. No amount of susceptibility in itself creates happiness. Men do not enjoy susceptibility, they enjoy by means of it. Equally, no amount of favoring circumstance can produce enjoyment without some degree of favoring susceptibility. Character enjoyment and circumstance enjoyment are alike dependent on two factors, character and circumstance, which though differing widely in kind and amount, must invariably co-operate. This co-operation of character and circumstance, susceptibility and environment, subjective and

objective, is fundamental and generic, is precisely the relation we are to consider in the broadest sense. The differences of kind and amount are specific and subordinate. That they may be and often are of the profoundest practical import, I by no means deny and in all relevant connections am eager to affirm, but they are not basal to our inquiry.

What is the generic character for which we seek a name? The one fact which is common to all these experiences is that they are *experiences which an individual, knowing their character, would undergo for their own sake*. Such a category would exclude many wholesome experiences, which though conducive to ultimate enjoyment, are not in themselves enjoyable; it would also include many experiences which are ruinous in their consequences but enjoyable in themselves. The criterion applies to the experience itself, not to some other which precedes or follows it. It applies equally to all agreeable experiences, no matter how concentrated or diffused.

The terms happiness and pleasure do not ordinarily designate any such inclusive category. They are popular names for species under the genus. We cannot profitably use them, therefore, until we come to discuss these specific differences. The term enjoyment, on the other hand, has acquired no such limiting associations, but is comprehensive in its suggestions and fitted to designate the aggregate of the experiences we are to study. I shall continue to use it in this sense as I have hitherto done.

But this use has one great disadvantage. Enjoyment has no correlative term to express its opposite. We have happiness and misery, pleasure and pain, comfort and discomfort, but no such correlative for enjoyment. Whenever we have no occasion to emphasize this distinction the word may very well stand for both. The term enjoyment would therefore be applied to all agreeable and disagreeable experiences taken together, while all objects would be called enjoyable which in any way affect enjoyment. But the moment we

wish to distinguish between agreeable and disagreeable experiences we are embarrassed. I have already expressed my aversion for such clumsy phrases as positive enjoyment and negative enjoyment, whose scientific advantages are more than counterbalanced by their literary defects. Of the various correlatives available for this purpose pleasure and pain seem least objectionable. It will be understood therefore that when used as correlatives pleasure and pain are inclusive terms referring respectively to agreeable and disagreeable experiences in general and with no reference to differences between high and low, sensual and spiritual, character and circumstance.

The word consumption has had a most unfortunate experience in economic literature. At least three meanings can be traced, with the usual variations and blendings. It is an open question whether the term has not become radically and incorrigibly misleading, not so much because of its different meanings as because of its inherent unsuitableness for them. Its primary and irrepressible suggestion is that goods are *used up*. The word was selected at a time when attention was concentrated on goods of which this was conspicuously true. These goods still have undue prominence in the minds of economists. Of course Walker and others have called attention to the fact that goods are not destroyed by use to anything like an equal extent, some not at all, to which may be added that some goods are actually preserved by using and perish by disuse. But still the incident of the process is more prominent than its essence—thanks to this same ill-chosen word. Sometimes the essence is forgotten altogether, as in the recent treatise of Nicholson.

“On the other hand, sometimes the work of consumption is performed by nature altogether against the wishes of the possessor of the commodity. Thus breakwaters, embankments and docks are wasted by the powers of wind and water; buildings crumble away under atmospheric influences; useful plants and animals are destroyed by living plagues; whilst in addition to the accumulated effects of

slowly-working causes, we have occasional catastrophes through hurricanes, floods and earthquakes."

And this is not the worst. This conception of consumption is at least definite, if not wholly justified, by the etymology of the word. It means destruction, nothing more nor less, and might be dismissed with no other commentary than that the word, destruction, would have been a better name for it. But this same writer mixes this conception inextricably with the other which economists have been striving to associate with the unfortunate term, namely enjoyment or use, thus sanctioning the very confusion which it is so important to avoid. We have small reason to wonder that popular conceptions of economic relations are vague.

The deterioration of goods, either through use, accident or causes inherent in their nature, is a matter of importance in economics as in practical affairs, and one which can not be ignored in a consideration of enjoyment. But to describe this process the word deterioration is as unambiguous as words are apt to be. For that specific kind of deterioration which is incident to use the word consumption is admirably adapted. The deriving of satisfactions from goods is a perfectly distinct process, bearing only a fortuitous relation to the foregoing. For this process, too, we have a number of terms—use, enjoyment, utilization—none of them ideal, but all of them fairly available. But fate has willed that this process should be known as consumption in all recent discussions. It is not without hesitation that I decide to try to stem this current of vicious tendency, but if such an effort is ever worth while it is so here. All principles of terminology demand the change. We are dealing with distinct conceptions which need names, and usage, while piling up words on one of them, leaves the other with no distinctive designation. The use of the word consumption to indicate the enjoyment of goods by processes often involving no consumption at all, is in defiance of an etymology that is visible on the surface and an extensive

counter usage with its powerful current of suggestion. Even within the technical field where this incongruous meaning has grown up, the original and incompatible meaning has persisted with most mischievous results. So I will venture to excuse the term from its new duties and confine it to its original use. Except when quoted or in references to quotations from other authors, I will use the word only to indicate the destruction of goods incident to their use. This is not necessarily all the destruction which is simultaneous with use, since nature destroys on her own account, a destruction for which use is not responsible. Nor does it necessarily involve a net increase of destruction, for consumption may displace a destruction which would be more serious than itself, or finally there may be no effect, destructive or preservative, in connection with use, in which case consumption is nil. But it is only to this incident of use that the word refers, a distinctly objective phenomenon as contrasted with enjoyment, which is a subjective phenomenon. The generic term for these unfavorable changes in goods is deterioration, of which consumption and destruction are species, the one incident to use and the other independent of it.

The word use is an excellent example of that elasticity of meaning which we have noticed as the characteristic of popular speech and which in this case at least has proved safe and serviceable in scientific discussion. In such expressions as: What is the use of doing that? the use of silk is increasing; the muscles are developed by use, the variety and the definiteness of meaning are both apparent. There seems to be no occasion to protest against this free use of the term, but it is desirable to notice the fundamental meaning of the word and its relation to other conceptions which we have considered.

All economic processes are reducible to two, getting good out of things, and putting good into things. The first and more fundamental process is use, the second and subsidiary

one is production. The good which men are thus busy in getting out and putting into things is usefulness or the power to further our enjoyment, and things which have this good, artificially or naturally, are goods. These goods are of two kinds, final and mediate, the former yielding up their usefulness in the form of enjoyment, the latter passing it on into another good. The former goods are enjoyable, the latter are not, but all are useful. Usefulness is therefore the capacity to produce enjoyment, directly or indirectly; enjoyableness the power to produce it directly. Enjoyableness is therefore a variety of usefulness, the final form into which it passes as the result of its many transformations. Thus we enjoy pictures, but we use paint. The latter does not assume an attractive form which directly contributes to our enjoyment till the painter has *used* it and *produced* a picture. The laws of use are therefore closely analogous to the laws of enjoyment, the same laws in fact in wider application.

It will be noted that while use is entirely distinct from production in the case of final goods, it is apparently identical with it in the case of mediate goods or capital. We can not use such goods without producing goods, since by hypothesis that is the only thing they are good for. But after all, the identity of the two is merely apparent. When we use flour we produce, but we do not produce flour; we produce bread. Logically and in their bearing upon a particular good the two processes are fundamentally opposed. To pour wine out of a bottle and into a glass is a single process, but for all that there is a difference between pouring out and pouring in. While therefore use is intimately associated with production, it is never to be confounded with it. It is one aspect of a process which in its other aspect is either production or enjoyment according to the nature of the good.

I have so far avoided the term utility, which is generally regarded as the more scientific synonym for usefulness. So

far the two terms have not been differentiated, because the two conceptions toward which they severally gravitate have not been clearly distinguished. But it is plain that there are two conceptions and that the word utility, which has been applied to both, has been used in a double sense. The first of these is power to further enjoyment, which I have designated as usefulness. The second is apparent or anticipated power to further enjoyment, which may be conveniently called utility. So far as etymology goes this distinction is an arbitrary one, but it is plainly foreshadowed by recent discussion. In all discussions of value and in the definition of value as marginal utility it is this anticipation or estimate of enjoyment which is considered. The distinction is important because anticipation not only differs from realization but it differs from it pretty regularly and in accordance with principles which may be formulated, at least in part. In certain connections, however, this approximate parallelism between the two makes the distinction unimportant. When we consider the relation of utility to any other phenomenon it must be sharply distinguished from usefulness. But if we consider the relation of one kind of utility to another, it makes no difference whether we consider actualities or anticipations. What is true of the one will be true of the other, with slight differences of degree. Wherever relations can be discussed equally well as anticipated or realized it will be convenient to use the term utility without emphasis upon the special meaning here defined. Although standing for the less fundamental of the two conceptions it is the more familiar of the two terms and can be safely used in the more representative sense.

Chapter IV.

ECONOMICS AND EVOLUTION.

In considering the nature and extent of economic jurisdiction we have so far confined our attention to internal problems. We now turn to the problem of foreign relations. These present somewhat perplexing examples of dependence and independence, joint and rival jurisdiction. The most important of these inquiries is that of the relation of economics to evolution. Economic problems are problems of enjoyment. We have seen that this is the lodestone of all economic impulse, whether recognized or unrecognized, visible or concealed. The problem before us is therefore that of the relation of enjoyment to evolution.

The economist has seldom troubled himself with such an inquiry, has often indeed been conspicuously averse to doing so. And strictly speaking, it is hardly a part of economics. But if he cares more to come to correct conclusions than to be exclusively economic such an inquiry will be profitable. It concerns the main premise of the science and one which has been the subject of persistent fallacies. The study of organic evolution has thrown much light upon the origin, nature and limitations of the impulse to enjoyment, and in assuming it as the starting-point of economic inquiry it is well to know what we are assuming. In revising the premises of our science we have much to gain by a careful study of the laws of evolution, the process to which all the phenomena with which we deal owe their existence. Impulses and energies must be understood in their largest relations if they are to be made the basis of sound conclusions. This is a very different thing from merely translating economics into the language of biology under the plea of making it an evolutionary science.

One of the most persistent obstacles to an understanding of this relation is the assumption that enjoyment (happiness) is the purpose of evolution, or in older phrase, the

purpose of nature or of creation. The assumption that nature goes about her work knowingly and has an eye to the satisfaction to be gotten out of her work is so instinctive and universal that it has governed the development of language so that we can not speak of nature without seeming to subscribe to the theory. Such an assumption would be profoundly significant if it were not the obvious result of our limitations rather than of our insight. We naturally explain the unfamiliar by the familiar, the actions of others by our own, the activities of nature by the activities of men. The echo is supposed to be somebody speaking; actions are regarded as malign which would have been malign had we committed them. The process is valid enough, but with the meagre data of individual experience, its conclusions are often false. There are few better tests of culture than the ability to escape from the provincialism of individual experience. In accord with this tendency the savage peoples his little world with ghostly agents; Ulysses, baffled by storms, attributes the hindrance to the anger of Neptune, and the philosopher, noticing adaptations in nature with little attention to the changes that produce them, reverts to the same ready explanation of personal purpose. In all these explanations we can discern the reasonings of men too absorbed in their own activities and disproportionately conscious of the causes which emanate from their own minds.

By a slow but wholesome process, exceedingly wholesome in its reaction on human conduct, nature is exonerated from the motives thus attributed to her specific acts. Storms become impersonal and men build breakwaters instead of altars to Neptune. Disease is attributed to bacteria instead of demons and inoculation takes the place of incantation. The attribution of purpose retreats from the specific to the general. It is there that we encounter it as the assumption that the purpose of evolution is enjoyment, that this is the

goal toward which the whole movement has from the first been and still is intentionally directed.

I am far from asserting that this assumption is false, but it is certainly premature. We know all too little of the direction of evolution in its various stages and are still too ignorant of what it has accomplished in the way of conscious happiness to warrant so sweeping a conclusion. The most that we can confidently assert is that force is not in equilibrium, that change is constant, and that for a long time back this change has been in the direction of increasing complexity of organic life; that finally, pleasure and pain are familiar experiences to higher organisms and bear to each other an uncertain proportion, whether favorable or unfavorable, constant or changing in the aggregate we can not say. Avoiding, therefore, any such dangerous working hypothesis as this, we have simply to observe the circumstances under which enjoyment appears and the rôle which it plays in the evolution of organic life. Why has life developed the power of feeling pleasure and pain? What function do these experiences perform?

The general law of organic evolution is familiar. There is reproduction in geometric ratio, (quite inevitably) overcrowding, struggle for existence and natural selection or survival of the fittest. The result is an increasing adaptation of the organism to its environment. If the environment itself were fixed the adaptation would become complete and the species would have an absolute hold on life. But as the environment itself is subject to change, and as the rate and direction of the change in the two cases may not be the same, the evolving organism may run a losing race and eventually be ruled off the field. How is this process affected by the susceptibility to pleasure and pain?

An organism that knows nothing of evolution and is oblivious of remoter consequences will do its best to secure pleasure and avoid pain. But it does not follow that because the organism seeks enjoyment nature will co-operate to that

end. An individual may conceivably enjoy things which are detrimental to him, in which case nature may mark him for extinction instead of furthering his desires. Pleasures are not necessarily profitable experiences and any amount of divergence is possible between the desires of an organism and the necessities of its existence.

Yet in the long run pleasures and pains tend to identify themselves with profitable and unprofitable experiences, respectively, or rather, there is a tendency for those experiences, and only those experiences which are favorable to existence to become pleasurable. If we introduce into a sheep pasture a plant which is injurious to sheep and different from any with which the sheep are familiar, there is likely to be at first a difference of taste regarding it on the part of the sheep. Some will like it and some will not. Eventually, as the result, it may be, of a heavy mortality among the sheep, all will come to dislike and avoid the noxious plant, not so much because of any observation of its consequences as because the plant will have sorted the sheep and eliminated those with unfortunate predilections. Thus conduct unfavorable to life becomes associated with disagreeableness or pain. In the same manner experiences favorable to life become associated with pleasure, not because there is any necessary or predetermined relation of this kind, but because only those species can permanently exist whose members establish such a relation.

This seems at first sight to point to the conclusion already referred to that enjoyment is the end of evolution, but such a conclusion is subject to serious qualifications. Aside from the fact that evolution encourages pleasure apparently as a means rather than as an end, there is the farther and more serious fact that pain is developed and used in precisely the same way. The two seem to serve a similar purpose and to be employed by nature in no fixed proportion. Whether she rewards the necessary act or punishes its neglect, it is likely to be performed in either case if the connection is

perceived and the incentive sufficient. Doubtless the one line of incentive is better adapted to certain cases than the other, but we can discern no fixed necessity calling for an increased proportion of pleasure as evolution proceeds.

In the second place, evolution does not assure increasing adjustment, only a constant tendency toward it on the part of the organism. Lesson after lesson may be learned and the proper adjustment established between profit and pleasure, and still the lessons to be learned may be more numerous and perplexing than before. There may be more perilous pleasures and more ambiguous pains than at an earlier period, all because the environment to which the species is trying to adapt itself, will not stay fixed, but goes on changing under the pressure of forces which have no regard for these adaptations.

Finally, changes in the environment may make previous adjustments into misadjustments and thus give the lie to their associated pleasures and pains. A line of action which has long been profitable and so has become uniformly pleasurable by selection, may become by a change of circumstances unprofitable and dangerous, while still for a long time its pleasurable nature persists. This is peculiarly true of the human species in its relatively recent social evolution. Countless centuries of organic evolution have established instincts and pleasures useful in a pre-social state, but inimical to associate life. The most poignant of our miseries are connected with this painful undoing of nature's amazingly perfect work. These social requirements are but an extreme example of what is continually taking place, a change in environment requiring new or even contrary adjustments. If such a change is more rapid than the adaptive changes in the organism, the adjustment between pleasure and pain on the one hand and wholesomeness on the other, becomes less perfect, and for a time we have retrogression, a decrease in enjoyment and a lower general vitality in the species. Periods of retrogressive evolution

or decreasing adaptation seem to be unfavorable to enjoyment and the same is apparently true of all periods of extensive readjustment. In periods of relative quiescence the species seems to enjoy with less discount the fruits of hard-won adaptation, but even here the good of pain is not absent nor the pleasure of life unmixed. We can not assume that there is any force outside the individual which tends irresistibly to secure a preponderance of pleasures over pains in his experience.

We have now to consider what opportunity is granted to the individual by this all-enveloping process to work out his own enjoyment. For the individual knows nothing of evolution and its ends, as evolution knows nothing of him and his. He prefers the enjoyable as uniformly as nature prefers the livable. That his preference must be subordinate to hers is plain, for if he chooses the inadmissible he will not live to do much choosing. Nature seems not to have created man with any intention of making him happy or making him miserable, but those whose inclinations and aversions are such as to impel them along the straight and narrow path that leads to life, these persist and perpetuate their type and their inclinations.

So far as the foregoing considerations have to do with the problem of survival they are apart from the problem of economics which is concerned with enjoyment rather than with life. To this problem we must now more definitely turn. What bearing has this subordination of enjoyment to vital interests upon our study of the laws of enjoyment?

In the first place this general subordination of enjoyment to vital interests is in itself the fundamental law of enjoyment, one which limits all others. It is thus the main premise of our science. Every tendency to pleasure is sure sooner or later to encounter the inexorable requirements of life and to suffer subordination or annihilation as a result. This inevitable encounter is of interest alike to the study of

enjoyment and to the study of life. We have not completed the life history of an enjoyment until we have followed it to this critical point and discovered what becomes of it. To study subordinate phenomena and ignore their subordination is misleading in both theory and practice. We lose sight of the co-ordinating principle and open the way to all manner of baseless assumptions. In the present connection we also lend countenance to mischievous fallacies in practice. The notion that all enjoyments are matters of taste and that one man's taste is as valid as another's, while not without a certain limited justification, is troublesomely prominent in popular thought. But what has economics to say against such a notion if it ignores the ultimate subordination of enjoyment to vital interests, that is, its functional character in the evolution of the species? We need not be disturbed by the temporary moral consequences of scientific inquiry, but we may well have a concern for the moral consequences of unscientific inquiry. This is our main premise: Enjoyment is the servant of life.

But is this serviceable pleasure the only enjoyment to which man may attain? Such an assumption would poorly account for the phenomena of life as we now see it. In spite of the inexorableness of nature's processes, there is in them much of alternative, much of elasticity. Some things man must do or forbear doing on pain of death, but there are many more which he may do or not as he likes. Eating is a necessity to which man is impelled somewhat by the promise of pleasure, more by the threat of pain. But gastronomy is not a necessity. It is man's deliberate effort to enhance the feeble pleasure of eating. Nature looks on indifferent at man's manipulation of his surplus resources, knowing full well that whether he succeed much or little, sufficient incentives will remain for the accomplishment of her necessary purpose. Man is equally concerned to lessen the pain which constantly attends upon nature's requirements. The numberless pitfalls in man's primitive

environment are avoided only by the admonitions of nature, which are more or less painful in their working. Man undertakes extensive modifications, which by removing the pitfalls make the admonitions unnecessary. Thus all the way from the growing of seedless grapes and thornless roses to the blasting of Hell-Gate the pain-destroying process goes on, nature not forbidding till by an unlucky venture some pain is removed which guards an interest or some pleasure devised which betrays him whom it tempts. Then, again, remorseless nature intervenes with her Draconian penalty. Thus eating is required, gastronomy permitted, gluttony forbidden.

Man is thus permitted to achieve for himself a happiness to which the process of evolution is indifferent and which it does not assure. He exploits the neutral territory, not without danger, for to trespass beyond its uncertain boundaries is death. It remains to note that this neutral territory is perhaps an enlarging one. As man acquires power over nature and masters her secrets he finds new ways of meeting her requirements with less of risk and pain. More of marginal resource, more time and strength, are thus available for his chosen purpose. The requirement to eat is as imperative as ever, but a requirement which once took all his time and strength now takes but a small part of it. The rest is free for activities before impossible. Doubtless these activities tend to become essential in turn, if not for physiological, at least for social reasons which are not less imperative for the perpetuation of the individual living under social conditions, but this takes time, and such pleasures remain often for a long time functionless and self-justifying. Dangerous pleasures, too, are handled with more skill in the light of greater knowledge. Gastronomy has greater possibilities than before without lapsing into gluttony. The range of territory which may be exploited in the interest of enjoyment is thus extended. Though it is constantly encroached upon by the growing requirements of life, it is

as constantly enlarged by the exploring pleasure interests. This neutral territory is thus a shifting but a perpetual fact.

Specific pleasures after a probationary period acquire a definitely favorable or unfavorable character, but in a progressive evolution there are always pleasures on probation. These probationary enjoyments constitute a second and important part of our subject. They are of the profoundest importance to the problem of survival, since from them are recruited the ultimate forces that make for or against life. They determine, too, which of many alternative paths life will follow in its growth and the kind of necessities which it will develop. But for the time at least this territory is one of relative freedom for the exploiting interests.

These neutral pleasures are not necessarily higher or lower than others, as these terms are commonly used, but are intimately associated with pleasures of every order. No illustration can be given which is not purely relative. Eating is the most mandatory of obligations, but the eating of an orange to one who has an unimpaired digestion may not affect in the slightest degree the chances of survival, either of himself or his posterity. Like illustrations may be found in the intellectual and emotional spheres. There is apparently no form of human activity which may not under certain conditions have this neutral character as regards vital interests.

In contrast with these neutral pleasures and pains whose character is sufficiently plain, stand those already described as guarding interests which affect the existence of the individual and the species. These, which may be appropriately designated as vital pleasures and pains, present variations and complications which have occasioned much confusion in economic inquiry. In spite, therefore, of their subordinate character, we can not profitably postpone their consideration. We can best get at the problem by means of an illustration.

Picking my way absent-mindedly across a muddy street,

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I am suddenly apprised that a runaway team is almost upon me. With a frantic effort I escape the whirlwind that sweeps past me and stand exhausted and trembling with the awful terror, from which it takes me some time to recover. But after a while I meet danger in a new form and my conduct is strangely inconsistent. The physician tells me that certain ominous symptoms imply over-work or ill-regulated life and prescribes rest or dieting as imperatively necessary. I almost resent the information and the advice. My action instead of being instant and strenuous is probably both grudging and ineffectual. Similar contrasts are manifest in the eating of food. The starving man eats the most indifferent food with frantic eagerness, while the normal individual gets from dainties only a finite satisfaction.

In recent discussions of utility these facts have been obviously embarrassing. The intense eagerness with which the first few mouthfuls of food are eaten after a long fast had to be accounted for. As it seemed to be out of proportion to the immediate pleasure of eating, the utilitarian has usually fallen back on one of those pseudo-explanations which always stand ready to relieve embarrassment. These first mouthfuls furnish infinite satisfaction because they are the condition of life itself. Farther eating is pleasant, but nowise necessary; so we get less pleasure from it. The general acceptance of this explanation is surprising, in view of the obvious objections to which it is open. It certainly speaks poorly for the power of psychological observation which has been at the disposal of economics.

First of all, whatever may be the net advantage of living, it is not infinite. It may even be nil or less. If the morsel of food which keeps a man from starving assures him all the pleasures which after-life can furnish, it just as certainly assures all the pains which after-life involves. Whatever the balance between these two may be, it is not the principal determinant of men's action. Our illustration makes this clear. In the first place, the same man acts differently

under different circumstances in defence of the same interest. A sudden menace to his life produces energetic action; a slow one, weak and ineffectual action. If the action is naturally less frantic in the second case than in the first it remains to be explained why it is less willing and effectual. On the other hand, men act alike who estimate the value of life very differently. The suicide planning his own destruction will dodge a bullet or flee from sudden peril quite as effectually as the exuberant optimist. The man who insists that life is not worth living may be an exceptionally anxious observer of his own physical symptoms.

In the second place, it is clear from these same considerations that whatever may be the net value of life, men do not calculate that value before they dodge a runaway or begin to take medicine. Indeed such calculations tend rather to weaken than to reinforce their efforts, for the instinct of self-preservation acts most vigorously in creatures which are incapable of making such calculations. The value of life is therefore in no constant proportion to the effort which is put forth to preserve it, and if it were, the organism would not know it or act in deference to it.

But if these efforts are not to be explained as motivated by the pleasure of living, can they be explained by any reference to pleasures or pains? Patten, the most acute of recent writers on this subject, seems to think that they can not. He distinguishes between "absolute" and "positive" utility. Absolute utility is the capacity which a good has of maintaining life. Absolute utilities take precedence of all other considerations, no matter how important, by virtue of their paramount necessity. "No matter how great a sum of satisfaction is sacrificed, these absolute utilities must be secured." "Life is precious and we are willing to sacrifice other ends to preserve it" (a statement which unconsciously involves the theory which we have mentioned and which Patten rejects). "In contrast with these absolute utilities,

positive utilities refer, not to life, but to the content of life; they are the sum of satisfactions that can be added to a bare living." From these and other passages it is plainly to be inferred, though nowhere explicitly stated, that the first increments of a commodity used produce a particular kind of result which demands full precedence of the other result. This primary result once accomplished and out of the way, a new kind of use begins which produces a result which did not in any degree follow from the earlier use. Patten does not indeed draw the line so sharply, but his words necessitate the inference we have drawn. In the interest of clearness it is to be regretted that the matter was left to inference. But postponing for the present the question of the order or combination in which these utilities appear, let us inquire whether they are, after all, so radically different. Different, they certainly are, but are they so different that one impulse is referable to pleasure instincts and the other not?

We have seen the fallacy of trying to completely identify these impulses. It involves an ingenious philosophy of life resting on reasons which the individual never thought of and motives which he does not feel. The starving man not only makes no calculation as to the net value of life, but there is no telling what his conclusion would be if he did. If all the good of after-living is contained in a morsel of food, all the pain of living is wrapped up in it, too. The sweet may entice us, but the mixture of bitter and sweet is of doubtful attraction. And even when the food is eaten and life assured, all its good things remain to be paid for at much their full value. Why pay an infinite price for the food which only assures us the privilege of making farther purchases? I am not trying to prove the futility of living, but rather to prove the futility of such calculations as are here presupposed. The agonizing struggle for existence could not be accounted for by any such calculus of pleasures if there were one; but there is not. The great majority of

mankind live on by default, asking no questions as to the aggregate profit of the transaction.

But if the preservative impulses can not be explained by reference to the pleasure of living, either present or prospective, have they no relation to pleasures and pains? Must we assume them to be absolute, *i. e.*, inexplicable? I am surprised that the alternative explanation has not commended itself to writers on this subject, the more so as it is confirmed by unmistakable experience. The impulse to escape sudden danger is not a struggle for pleasure; it is a recoil from an awful terror which nature has evolved in all species as a condition of their existence and which, while it lasts, is the most terrible of all agonies. The enormous value of the means to that escape as of a plank to a drowning man, is due, not to the exceeding joy of living, but to the terrible pain of dying, which this means enables us to escape.

If we could consider calmly all that is involved in the two alternatives of living and dying, we might act very differently. To live is too often to suffer, and after all, the dying must come. As a mere matter of advantage, therefore, why should a man flee—it may be ignobly—from the peril of sudden death to the prospect of living unhappily and dying with lingering disease? But when confronted by sudden danger we can not figure things out like this. Present pleasures and pains necessarily occupy the foreground of consciousness, and if they are very near they hide all else from view. On the other hand, when the danger is remote and we have an opportunity to compare and estimate advantages, we do make just such calculations, and our action is correspondingly uncertain and inefficient.

These same principles hold true of preservative pleasures, but the extremes are less marked. No appetite, at least in man, acts with the suddenness and intensity of the dread of death, unless it be in those extreme cases where again the

motive is pain rather than pleasure. But who has not known the experience that present pleasures have been inordinately tempting and have subordinated considerations of prudence to a degree inexplicable in moments of later reflection?

The conclusion of all this is so obvious that it may seem to have been unwarrantably deferred. Vital pleasures and pains, though more intense and urgent than others, involve no new principle. The most intense instinct, like the most far-reaching plan or the feeblest inclination, is but a phase of the universal recoil from suffering and attraction toward enjoyment. The intensity of this recoil or attraction is determined, not by the intensity of the ultimate experiences, but by the vividness with which they are anticipated at the moment in question, a fact that explains many apparent inconsistencies. Incidentally it is of interest to note that the more intense preservative instincts are based on pain stimuli rather than on pleasure stimuli. Their gratification involves no infinite satisfaction, indeed no positive satisfaction at all, a fact abundantly attested by experience. If it involved the infinite satisfaction so often assumed, the ideal condition of life would be to live in continual peril or on the verge of starvation.

There are not two kinds of utility, therefore, but one. When we include pain in our calculations we are quite able to explain why a few morsels of food may at times have such an extraordinary value without imagining computations which nobody makes or presupposing any inexplicable impulses. We have now to note that this "infinite value of the first increment" is ordinarily a pure fiction. The pleasure derived from the first mouthfuls of one's dinner is nothing so very considerable. If they exorcise the spectre of famine they may indeed be precious, but ordinarily there is no such spectre to be exorcised. Only in the rarest cases have the earlier increments of consumption any such exaggerated importance. On any such supposition

computations of total utility all figure up to infinity. Not only is food of infinite utility, since it saves men from starving, but as planks may save men from drowning, there must be an infinite utility for planks. Economics becomes a bewildering computation of infinities. But the opportunity to render such extraordinary services is fortunately rare. The ordinary loaf or plank, even though it be the first of its kind, has but a commonplace opportunity. It is a travesty on experience to assume that the first morsels of an ordinary dinner have an incalculable utility to a person who never got wholesomely hungry in his life.

It will be useful to recall briefly the conclusions reached in this chapter. We have seen that enjoyment in its double form of pleasure and pain is not an accident or an arbitrary addition to life, but a means to its preservation and development. Its function is to incite to wholesome and deter from unwholesome action, a function which it is ultimately constrained to perform. But while pleasures tend to become identified with wholesome experiences and pains with those that are unwholesome, there are at all times pleasures which have not acquired such associations or in which these associations have become obsolete or even reversed. There are therefore mandatory, neutral and forbidden pleasures, and monitory, neutral and obligatory pains. The more urgent interests, especially those of self-preservation, are in general entrusted to the protection of monitory pains; the less urgent, including those of procreation, are secured by mandatory pleasures or appetites. Forbidden pleasures and obligatory pains are in general survivals of conditions which have disappeared, or they are the product of disturbances in settled adjustments due to the appearance of new interests. Pleasures and pains which are closely associated with vital interests can not be consciously manipulated with any profit. Human enjoyment, so far as it depends upon these, can be modified only by modifying individuals so as to bring them into harmony with nature's requirements. This can be

temporarily accomplished by education, the encouragement or repression of tastes as need may require, but its permanent accomplishment must depend, we are constrained to believe, principally upon the efficiency of natural and social selection, a process to which as yet our conscious efforts lend but doubtful assistance. With this process, conscious or unconscious, we are not at present concerned, save in so far as its consideration is inseparable from enjoyment. It is the subject of a distinct study.

Neutral pleasures and pains, those not yet drafted into the service of vital interests, or those that have been set free from that service, those indeed which, like eating, are charged with important functions, but have a certain margin of freedom at their disposal, these may be legitimately manipulated in the interest of immediate enjoyment. Of course the enjoyments which economics must consider are not confined to those which vital interests would pronounce legitimate. Prohibited pleasures are feverishly pursued and monitory pains are deadened with opiates, but these manipulations are ephemeral. There is not and can not be any permanent tampering with vital interests. These enjoyments, whether legitimate or illegitimate, wholesome or unwholesome, are the subject of our present study. Taken in connection with the activities to which they give rise they are the subject of economics.

H. H. POWERS.

BRIEFER COMMUNICATIONS.

A "UNIT" IN SOCIOLOGY.

Professor Lindsay's thoughtful paper on "The Unit of Consideration in Sociology"* suggests to me a number of queries which I submit for what they are worth.

It is growing more and more evident that the people who call themselves sociologists are of two varieties: First, those who start by abstracting something or other which they are pleased to term "social" from the sum of associated human activities or their qualities, and who declare that formulation of the part which this "social" element plays in the world be called "sociology;" second, those who think of sociology as a search for the meaning elements in associated human life, how many soever they may prove to be, and a setting of these elements in order in their functional relations to each other. My questions assume that Professor Lindsay does not belong to the former of these groups. If the assumption is incorrect, my questions may be understood as addressed to sociologists who propose the broader inquiry, yet use language very similar to that in Professor Lindsay's paper.

I agree with Professor Lindsay that Professor Ross sounded a true note when he spoke for less debate about what society is and more discovery of what society does. I suspect that Professor Lindsay's concern about a "unit of investigation" is not quite consistent with the aim thus endorsed. It looks to me that throughout the motley miscellany of "sociologists," however divergent their conceptions of "sociology," there is a common desire to know what is generally true about men in association (*i. e.*, what society does); and more than that, to know how to account for those things that are generally true (*i. e.*, why associated men do what they do). These desires are common to both varieties of "sociologists," although the former decline to classify all the knowledge that the desires call for as proper subject-matter of sociology. Not to enter upon the merits of that question, does not the spirit of Professor Ross' program impel search rather for classes of facts presented by men in association than for "a unit of investigation?" It seems to me that Professor Lindsay calls for something that cannot be had until we are well along toward the end of the sort of investigation which he has joined Professor Ross in approving. Professor Lindsay would start his method of inquiry with the question (p. 44):

* ANNALS, Vol. xii, p. 214, September, 1898.

"Is it possible to find in the data of sociology any constantly recurring factor in the socializing process which is fundamental to the concept of society in all stages of development, and which therefore can be regarded as a unit of investigation, consideration and reference for all true sociological data?"

Does not this question assume precisely what Professor Ross' proposal implicitly denies, viz., that the "data of sociology" are in hand? Professor Ross starts with the perception that we have not done as much as we should in the way of collecting and organizing the evidence as to what society does. He maps out a splendid piece of sample exploration. Nobody can foresee how many more such pieces of work will be necessary before we shall have in hand sufficient data about the activities of associated men in all their departments of action. Until we have gathered and classified samples of all discoverable types of facts that make up what associated men do, how can we say what is a common or general *factor* in the things that they do?

It is as though we should start a theory of arithmetic with the assumption that there is some prime factor common to all numbers, although we had "factored" only a few even numbers. If we should proceed on that hypothesis we should be in hot water from the outset. No factor that we could pick out would appear in all the new cases that would present themselves. If we should give up trying two, and experiment with three, and then fly to five, and so on, we should be repeating the pitiful process of those sociologists who are trying to generalize before they analyze and compare. We might squabble forever over the claims of one proposed "factor" after another. There would be no peace till we dropped the original assumption that there is a factor common to all numbers.

I am not now contending that there is no common factor in society, although, as a matter of fact, I do not believe there is any absolutely general factor, with the exception of the human individual on the one hand, and the physical and moral environment on the other. I am content just now with urging that at present we are not wise enough to demonstrate any such factor. I would point out also the inconvenience of loading ourselves down with the assumption of a universal factor in societary combinations before we are able to make out the different types of combination in which men act, and thus to distinguish the particular factors present in these combinations. Until we get such comprehensive data, what we call generalizing is very amateurish particularizing. It is apt to be merely conceited guessing. It is at best a very precarious centre of gravity for a "science." Serious students of society

ought to be able to take the logical measure of that illusion by this time.

I am led then to a query about the precise content of the concept "unit of investigation," or "unit of consideration." What does Professor Lindsay mean by it? Does he mean "an ultimate component" in terms of which the sociologists may formulate all their facts? To quote my colleague, Professor Henderson: "Does he mean a unit by explaining which we may suppose ourselves to have explained the whole societal unity? If so, he is talking about something which exists only in words." There is no objective reality which can go very far toward explaining the rest of society, without exposing the need of resort to this rest of society, to explain itself. Even if we were to fix upon some common factor which appears in all societal combinations, it is a far cry from that to a "unit" in the sense which Professor Lindsay seems to suggest. Or does Professor Lindsay mean by "unit of inquiry" a norm of limitation to mark off a certain abstraction which shall be the field of consideration? This would, of course, carry him into the former of the two camps of sociologists distinguished above. Does he sometimes think of a "unit of inquiry" as the starting point of description, a simple element to be analyzed before passing to more complex parts of the social whole? In either case, has Professor Lindsay sufficiently considered whether the discovery of such a factor necessarily makes that factor the "unit of inquiry" in sociology?

General chemistry is sometimes defined as "the science of atoms and their behavior." The same chemists who use this definition acknowledge that they have never discovered the hypothetical "free atom." The only close likeness in this respect that I can discover between general sociology and general chemistry or biology is in the fact that we must use the conception of human individuals, although we can find no such object in reality as the free individual. If we should describe sociology as "the science of human individuals and their behavior" we should be in verbal uniformity with one way of defining chemistry; but I do not see any profit from that fact in the shape of more knowledge about society. Unless we are willing however, to take as our ultimate concept "the human atom," "the individual," "the social man," or whatever we may choose to name the irreducible element in societal combinations, I see nothing but arbitrariness in the plan of adopting a "unit of inquiry." Is it not a purely gratuitous assumption that at present sociology needs or can use a unit of inquiry in the sense to which Professor Lindsay seems most to incline?

My next query assumes, for the sake of argument, that the foregoing is all answered in Professor Lindsay's favor, and that the idea of a "common factor" must be accepted. Must we then accept the special hypothesis of such common factor which Professor Lindsay proposes? "To view the facts of social life as they relate to *some social imperative* . . . should be a chief aim of sociology" (p. 56).

The indefinite article in the last clause seems to me to indicate an auspicious reservation in Professor Lindsay's mind after all. I cannot take issue with this particular proposition, if the word "chief" is not pressed to the limit; but it appears to me to assert less than the paper as a whole seems to demand. No one can doubt the importance of finding out what rôle a social imperative of any sort plays in society. My questions, however, are these: Just what does the phrase "social imperative" mean to Professor Lindsay? Does it mean a *consciousness* on the part of the individuals in association that they are under some sort of bond to conform to the societary will; and does it mean that all acts in society are to be considered as functions of this consciousness? If this is the sense, who can prove that such a factor presides universally in human association? Is not this one of the very things that we are trying to find out? Or does Professor Lindsay mean by "social imperative" an actual power exerted by society to mould men's actions, whether individuals are conscious of the influence or not? If this is the thought, I should regard the phrase as unfortunately chosen. It necessarily suggests to my mind the former idea. Supposing, however, that Professor Lindsay has this second interpretation in mind, several questions arise. Thus: Is it not premature to assume that the stimuli which produce action among associated men are in any demonstrative sense one, rather than many? If we answer this question in the affirmative, must not the phrase "social imperative," instead of standing for an ascertained factor in society, serve at most as an interrogation point, as another way of expressing the unsolved question, What factors make men act as they do in society? Can the phrase at present serve as anything more than a classifying title under which to arrange social stimuli when discovered?

My query may be put in another form, viz.: Is not the universality of a "social imperative" substantially the present bone of contention between MM. Tarde and Durkheim? Are we not all weighing with interest the *pros* and *cons* as to the generality of a social constraint that reduces the individual to the rank of clay in the hands of the social potter? Would not Professor Lindsay be within more correct logical lines if he declared that "a chief aim

of sociology should be to find out how generally and how decisively a 'social imperative' (in either of the above senses or in any other) has part in the activities of associated men?" Would not this better carry out the program suggested by Professor Ross? Is not this really what Professor Ross undertook to do in part, and did he not show wisdom in implying that his was not the only quest for sociologists to pursue, but one of many? Would not acceptance of the latter view avoid premature judgments about the relative rank of other societary factors? Would it not leave us the real "unit of inquiry" after all? The actual unit is the social unit. It is not an abstraction, but as sociologists are coming more and more to agree, it is the concrete whole, viz., all men pursuing the aims of human life under the inevitable conditions of reciprocal influence. The real search of the sociologists is for that which is universally, generally or typically true within these actual relationships. Are not the primary technical desiderata then appropriate terms of description, and suitable categories of classification, rather than a less concrete and real "unit of investigation?"

All these queries amount to this: Are we not far enough along in the organization of inquiry into societary facts to tolerate *many kinds* of research, with the expectation that they will at last complement each other? Can we not see reasons for Ward's search after the "psychic factors," and Patten's examination of the "social forces," and Tarde's hunt for "imitation," and Giddings' quest of "the original and elementary subjective fact," etc.? May we not profitably exercise a little more restraint upon our disposition to pronounce premature judgments upon the relative importance of societary factors? May we not meanwhile advantageously push generalization of observable facts as far as actual uniformities warrant? Have we not in fact the two general categories, "societary forms" and "societary forces?" Are we not as yet very imperfectly instructed about the essentials of both? Will not progress in classification depend upon further observation, analysis and generalization of the workings and interworkings of these forms and forces? Is it not safer to hold the concept of a universal factor within these particulars as a strictly formal conception, to be filled up with a content by severely inductive generalization? If, on the contrary, we attempt at present to fill out this formal concept with an actual content by hypothesis, are we not in danger of retarding knowledge of objective reality by arbitrary assignment of values?

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A "UNIT" IN SOCIOLOGY—A REPLY TO PROFESSOR SMALL.

The questions which Professor Small raises in connection with my paper on "The Unit of Consideration in Sociology" indicate plainly that I have not made my thought clear in respect to one or two fundamental notions involved in the discussion. Some of Professor Small's inquiries would carry the discussion a step farther than was attempted in my original paper, and I am indebted to him for some suggestions which make possible a restatement of my thought in a way that I did not contemplate at the outset.

Professor Small's two classes of sociologists are not mutually exclusive, but if I understand his meaning he is right in supposing that my sympathies would be rather with the second class to which he refers, namely, "those who think of sociology as a search for the meaning elements in associated human life." Such an aim gives us a concrete science but does not prescribe any particular method. In general, I fancy that I would lay more stress than Professor Small upon the use of a deductive method, even in a concrete science, in the classification and arrangement of the multitudinous inductions necessary as a part of this "search for the meaning elements in associated human life." It was this factor of method in Professor Ross' work that seemed to me to make his achievement something of a new departure in recent sociological literature. I do not assume at all that the data of sociology are at hand in the sense that they are complete. Some data are readily accessible, and the work of making them complete will progress as scientific description of society gains in accuracy and in extent. The trained observer is not so useful in any science in its infancy, paradoxical as this may sound, as the man who can make some use of the meagre results of even crude and imperfect observation, and single out the few elementary, general and typical things that hold good within limits that determine the boundaries of a science. Ricardo was a poor observer of the facts in the economic life of his time, but no one did more to advance economic science to a stage at which verification of established principles and modification of those principles in the light of subsequent verification could be carried on by others. When a science is in this stage the trained observer, the man who will enlarge the basis of generalization, is the man who is at a premium in the ranks of its devotees. It seems to me that sociology has suffered because the basis of generalization has been altogether too broad out of which to construct a single science unless it be a general science of social phenomena, so vast in its scope and so exacting in its demands as to be, as Professor Alfred Marshall has said, highly desirable but humanly speaking, unattainable."

Another point on which, judging from Professor Small's inquiries, I have laid myself open to misunderstanding, is in the attempt to make all sociological investigation conform to one mould or type of scientific inquiry. I said at the outset of my paper, after having examined briefly the nature of the kind of unit to be considered, that I proposed "to examine briefly one such unit which I will call the 'social imperative.'"^{*} I had in mind distinctly the thought that there might be a number of similar units around which sociological material, or, to be more explicit, newly acquired data in sociology might be profitably grouped. My only contention, if, indeed, contention it be, was regarding the necessity of a unit. It does not seem to me that from the time of Bacon down to the present, the men of science who throw the emphasis upon observation and induction without consciously starting with a principle, however crude, which rests upon previous induction, have materially advanced the subject-matter in hand. One may range the earth for facts and add to his collection to the end of his days without ever getting on the right road to a general principle. General principles are discovered only when, in the examination of facts in the process of verification of some already known or hypothetical principle, one is led to see the truth of a new principle which is capable of wider or deeper verification.

Taking up once more the "social imperative" as a possible unit in sociology, I may add one or two statements to the brief discussion I was able to give in the limits of the first paper. Society arises where a man in his contact with his physical environment finds co-operation with his fellows useful in enabling him to satisfy his primary economic wants. Thus Plato and not Aristotle was right in his account of the origin of society, as I think is abundantly shown by accumulating materials which furnish us information about the most primitive forms of social organization to be discovered on this planet. "Man is by nature a political animal," says Aristotle, and by "political" he means of course social; but this is a generalization that can be verified only in comparatively advanced stages of society when man's nature has been modified by contact with his environment. But the economic factor which accounts for the origin of society and causes one transformation after another in the forms of human society, does not explain the phenomena of society in any of its stages. Here is where the line between economics and sociology, as separate and distinct sciences, must be drawn. If we study any given stage of society within a fixed geographical environment, we can readily find certain economic factors

^{*} ANNALS, Vol. xii, p. 218, September, 1898.

which will account for the existence of this particular stage of society when contrasted with the immediately preceding stage out of which it grew. But the individuals who make up and are a part of this new objective society by reason of changes in their environment, bring with them social standards, ideals and ambitions which are the product of a number of stages of society preceding the one under consideration. What is then sure to happen is, that the great body of these individuals will soon be adjusted to the new economic conditions, but that there will not be a social life and social control to correspond. A few individuals will begin to project in their thought and conduct new modes of activity in their relations to their fellows, and a few new social institutions will arise which must be harmonized with the inheritances of the past. Those modes of social activity more or less adjusted to the economic conditions of a period as embodied in a few individuals and still fewer social institutions, social ambitions and social standards, constitute what I would term the "social imperative." If, therefore, in our "search for the meaning elements in associated human life" the sociologist in whatever department of social facts he is working, will first attempt to ascertain the social imperative, I think he will have a unifying factor that will make his work stand out with perfect clearness, and that he will perform a service not at present rendered by any of the other social sciences.

Such a concept of a unit of investigation does not restrict the freedom of sociologists nor condemn in advance any of the various types of sociological investigation to which Professor Small alludes. In the history of most sciences and especially in the history of economics the attempt has been made to regard some one principle at some time or other as co-extensive with the science. Thus in economics it was supposed that all economic phenomena could be interpreted in terms of the law of diminishing returns, and again in the law of rent; in physics, that all phenomena of physical science could be interpreted in terms of the law of gravitation. Subsequent progress in these sciences proved of course that these general laws and principles furnished a formula for stating only a portion of the observed facts. If the social imperative proves to be a useful concept in connection with some of the more important problems now engrossing the attention of sociological students, as I believe it will, it may well fall into its relative place along side of other concepts which are destined to advance our science.

SAMUEL McCUNE LINDSAY.

University of Pennsylvania.

P. S.—Proof sheets of the above statement were sent to Professor Small and with his permission I quote a few sentences from a letter received from him after

he had read my reply. "Your reply has just reached me, and it leaves nothing for me to say. Perhaps the misunderstanding is entirely the reader's fault, but I am certainly one among several who read your paper without getting the impression which this reply conveys. Perhaps others will think that we have wasted words over this matter, but I am glad to find myself more nearly in agreement with your thought than I supposed. . . . My whole objection was virtually to the use of the idea of a 'unit' in the sense to which you allude in your closing paragraph. I think you have not overestimated the probable usefulness of the *social imperative* idea, if it is guarded from being a blanket mortgage upon 'meaning elements.' "

PERSONAL NOTES.

AMERICA.

Ann Arbor.—Hon. Thomas McIntyre Cooley died at Ann Arbor, Mich., on the twelfth of last September. He was born near Attica, Wyoming County, N. Y., January 6, 1824. In 1834 he removed to Michigan, and, after his admission to the bar in 1845, he practiced law in Tecumseh, Mich. Settling in Adrian, he edited the *Watch Tower*, in which capacity he gained a reputation for good judgment and solid attainments. In 1857 he was selected by the Michigan legislature to compile and publish the state laws, and a year later was also appointed reporter of the decisions of the supreme court. In 1859 he was chosen as one of the professors in the law department of the University of Michigan. He became dean of the faculty and continued in that position until 1885, when he retired from the bench. He served as justice of the Michigan Supreme Court for eight years and as chief justice from 1868 to 1869. From 1885 to 1888 he was Professor of American History in the University of Michigan, lecturing also on constitutional law and kindred subjects. In 1887 the United States circuit court at Chicago appointed Judge Cooley receiver of the Wabash Railway Company. He undertook the active management of this property until President Cleveland urged him to resign and accept appointment as Interstate Commerce Commissioner. This position he held for four years. His fellow-members chose him as chairman of the commission. His health broke down in 1891 and he retired from active life. Judge Cooley will be remembered longest for his achievements in the field of constitutional law. His great work, "The Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union," which was published in 1868, at once became the standard authority on that subject. Besides this and works that may be called compilations, as "The Michigan Reports and Digests," he edited the "Commentaries" of Blackstone and Story's "Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States." His other works are:

"*Law of Taxation.*"

"*Law of Torts.*"

"*General Principles of Constitutional Law in the United States.*"

"*Michigan, a History of Governments.*"

Most of the legal articles in the "American Cyclopaedia" were also written by him, and he was for many years a prolific contributor to reviews and magazines.

Chicago.—Dr. Elisha Benjamin Andrews has recently been appointed Superintendent of the Chicago Public Schools. Dr. Andrews was born January 20, 1844, at Hinsdale, N. H., and received his early education in the public schools of Montague, Mass., and later at the Connecticut Literary Institution, at Suffield, Conn. He left his studies in April, 1861, to enlist as a private in the Union Army. He remained in the service of the United States until October, 1864, when on account of a severe wound he received his discharge, having at that time attained the rank of second lieutenant. He then finished his preparation for college and entered Brown University in 1866 and received the degree of A. B. in 1870. He has since received the degrees of A. M. from his *alma mater*, in 1873, and the honorary degrees of D. D. from Colby University, 1882, and LL. D. from the University of Nebraska, 1884. After his college graduation he became principal of the Connecticut Literary Institution at Suffield, Conn., and held this post for two years, when he entered the Newton Theological Institution at Newton Centre, Mass., from which he graduated in 1874. He has subsequently held the positions of pastor of the First Baptist Church, Beverly, Mass., 1874-75; President of Denison University, Granville, Ohio, 1875-79; Professor of Homiletics in the Newton Theological Institution, 1879-82; Professor of History and Political Economy in Brown University, 1882-88; Professor of Public Finance, Cornell University, 1888-89, and President of Brown University, 1889-98. Before entering on his duties as professor at Brown he was absent in Europe for a year, pursuing studies at the Universities of Göttingen, Berlin and Munich. In 1892 he was a member of the Delegation of the United States to the International Monetary Conference at Brussels.

Dr. Andrews has been a prominent member of the American Historical Society and of the American Economic Society since their foundation, and is connected with various other organizations. He has been a prolific writer, and in addition to a large number of articles published in the general periodical press, as well as the economic journals, he has published the following books:

"*Institutes of General History.*" Boston, 1886.

"*Constitutional History of the United States.*" Boston, 1886.

"*Institutes of Economics.*" Boston, 1887.

"*Popular History of the United States.*" Two volumes. New York, 1888.

"*Wealth and the Moral Law.*" Hartford, 1893.

"*Eternal Words*" (sermons). Hartford, 1893.

"*An Honest Dollar and Other Essays.*" Hartford, 1894.

"*History of the Last Quarter Century of the United States.*" Two volumes. New York, 1895.

Dartmouth College.—Dr. Frank H. Dixon* has been appointed Assistant Professor of Economics at Dartmouth College, and he has entire charge of the work in that department. He has written:

"*Railroad Control in Nebraska.*" *Political Science Quarterly*, December, 1898.

Harvard University.—During the absence of Professor Ashley in Europe his place will be filled during the spring term by Dr. William Cunningham, of Trinity College, Cambridge. Since Dr. Cunningham was elected professor in King's College, London,†—a position which he resigned last year, owing to the increasing pressure of his duties in Cambridge—he has been engaged in investigation in the lines with which his name has been associated. In addition to his university duties Dr. Cunningham is rector of an important parish in Cambridge and has in this connection been frequently called upon to discuss social problems from the Christian standpoint. He has devoted his leisure for some years past to antiquarian pursuits, especially his "*History of the English Towns.*" In this connection he has brought together a unique collection of lantern slides, which illustrate his lectures and lend a particular interest to them. These materials have not yet been published, but his argument on the far-reaching "*Influence of Hippodamus of Miletus*" will appear in the next volume of the *Transactions of the Antiquarian Society*. His publications since 1891 have been as follows:

"*The Growth of English Industry and Commerce in Modern Times.*" 1892.

"*The Relativity of Economic Doctrine.*" *Economic Journal*, 1892.

"*The Perversion of Economic History.*" *Ibid.*, 1892.

"*A Plea for Pure Theory.*" *Economic Review*, 1892.

"*Die Regelung des Lehrlingswesens.*" *Zeitschrift für Social und Wirthschaftsgeschichte*, 1893.

"*The Laws of the Mercers' Company of Litchfield.*" *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 1893.

"*Discourse Concerning the Commonwealth*" (edited with Miss Lamond). 1893.

"*Political Economy and Practical Life.*" *International Journal of Ethics*, 1893.

"*Dr. Cunningham and his Critics.*" *Economic Journal*, 1894.

* See ANNALS, Vol. x, p. 432, November, 1897.

† See ANNALS, Vol. II, p. 256, September, 1891.

"*Economists as Mischief Makers.*" *Economic Review*, 1894.

"*Why Had Roscher So Little Influence in England?*" *ANNALS*, November, 1894.

"*The Living Wage.*" *Contemporary Review*, 1894.

"*Outlines of English Industrial History*" (with Miss E. A. MacArthur). 1895.

"*The Gild Merchant of Shrewsbury and Walter of Henley.*" *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 1895.

"*The General Election and Prospects of Social Legislation.*" *Economic Review*, 1895.

"*The Growth of English Industry and Commerce in the Early and Middle Ages.*" Revised edition, 1896.

"*Modern Civilization in Its Economic Aspects.*" 1896.

"*Alien Immigrants to England.*" 1897.

"*Essay on Western Civilization.*" Volume I. 1898.

Norwich, Conn.—David Ames Wells, the economist, died at Norwich, Conn., November 5, 1898. He was born June 17, 1828, at Springfield, Mass., and graduated from Williams College in 1847. After leaving college he was identified for a time with the *Springfield Republican*. In 1849 he entered the Lawrence Scientific School of Harvard University, graduating in 1852. He was afterward an assistant professor at Harvard. In 1857-58 he was a member of the firm of G. P. Putnam & Co., New York, and in this period he compiled school text-books on physics, chemistry and geology.

In 1864, while living at Troy, N. Y., he published a pamphlet "*Our Burden and Our Strength*," dealing with the financial system of the Federal Government. In the spring of 1865 Mr. Wells was appointed chairman of a commission to consider means of raising revenue for the needs of the government. In January, 1866, he was appointed special commissioner of the revenue, an office which he held until 1870. He was then appointed by the governor of New York chairman of a tax commission, which submitted reports on state taxation in 1872 and 1873. Mr. Wells was a member of the Cobden Club, and an honorary member of the Royal Statistical Society, and an associate of the French Academy of Political Science. In 1871 he received the degree of LL. D. from Williams College, and in 1874 that of D. C. L. from Oxford. Besides innumerable contributions to magazines and the government reports already mentioned, Mr. Wells published:

"*The Creed of Free Trade.*" 1875.

"*Production and Distribution of Wealth.*" 1875.

- "*Robinson Crusoe's Money.*" 1876.
 "Why we Trade and How we Trade." 1878.
 "The Silver Question." 1878.
 "Our Merchant Marine." 1882.
 "A Primer of Tariff Reform." 1884.
 "Practical Economics." 1885.
 "Principles of Taxation." 1886.
 "A Study of Mexico." 1887.
 "Relation of the Tariff to Wages." 1888.
 "Recent Economic Changes." 1891.
 "Principles of Taxation." Series of articles in *Popular Science Monthly*. 1898.

Washington and Lee University.—Dr. Henry Parker Willis has been appointed Adjunct Professor of Economics and Political Science in the Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Va. He was born August 14, 1874, at Weymouth, Mass., and received his early education in the schools of Racine, Wis. He attended the Western Reserve University and the University of Chicago, where he received the degree of A. B., in 1894. After completing his undergraduate course he became a Fellow at the University of Chicago and pursued his studies at that institution, and also in Paris, Leipzig and Vienna. The University of Chicago conferred upon him the degree of Ph. D., in the year 1897. Dr. Willis was assistant to the Monetary Commission of the Indianapolis Convention in the year 1897-98, and assisted Professor Laughlin and Mr. Root in preparing the final report of the Monetary Commission.

Dr. Willis has published:

- "*Income Taxation in France.*" *Journal of Political Economy*, December, 1895.
 "Vienna Monetary Treaty of 1857." *Ibid.*, March, 1896.
 "Credit Devices and The Quantity Theory." *Ibid.*, June, 1896.
 "History and Present Application of the Quantity Theory." *Ibid.*, September, 1896.
 "Monetary Reform in Russia." *Ibid.*, June, 1897.
 "History of the Latin Monetary Union." In press, 450 pages.

William and Mary College.—Dr. Lyon G. Tyler, President of William and Mary College and formerly Professor of Moral Science and Political Economy in that institution, has been elected Professor of Economic History and Politics, while still continuing as President of the college. Dr. Tyler was born August, 1853, in Charles City County, Va. His early education was obtained from

private teachers, and in 1870 he entered the University of Virginia. He graduated in 1874 with the degree of A. B. and received the degree of A. M. in 1875. The next year he studied law at the same university. In 1877 he became Professor of Belles Lettres in William and Mary College. The next four years Professor Tyler was principal of classical schools in Memphis, Tenn., and Waco, Tex. In 1882 he removed to Richmond, Va., where he engaged in the practice of law. During 1887-88 he was a member of the Virginia House of Delegates, and in the latter year he was elected Professor of Moral Science and Political Economy at William and Mary College and also President of that institution. In 1895 Professor Tyler had the degree of LL. D. conferred upon him by Trinity College, Connecticut. He is a member of the American Philosophical Society, American Historical Society, Virginia Historical Society, Maryland Historical Society, New England Historical and Genealogical Society and the New York Historical and Genealogical Society.

Professor Tyler has been editor of the *William and Mary Quarterly Historical Magazine* since its establishment in July, 1892. He has also written:

"*Letters and Times of the Tylers.*" Vol. I, pp. 633 (1884); Vol. II, pp. 736 (1885); Vol. III, pp. 234 (1897).

"*Parties and Patronage in the United States.*" Questions of the Day Series. Pp. 133. New York, 1891.

Address at Jamestown, published in *Richmond Times*, May, 14, 1895.

Address made before Richmond College on "Yorktown and Its Memories," published in *Richmond Times*, 1895.

GERMANY.

Greifswald.—Dr. Magnus Biermer,* formerly of Münster, has recently been appointed Ordinary Professor of Political Economy at the University of Greifswald. In recent years he has been an active contributor to Conrad's "*Handwörterbuch*" and Elster's "*Wörterbuch der Volkswirtschaft*," contributing about forty articles upon labor questions to these two compilations. His other publications have been:

"*Leitsätze zur Beurtheilung der gegenwärtigen Währungssituation.*" Berlin, 1896.

"*Leitsätze zur Beurtheilung der Währungsfrage*" (second enlarged edition of the preceding). Berlin, 1896.

"*Die Goldwährung.*" Münster, 1896.

* See ANNALS, Vol. iv, p. 813, March, 1894.

"*Eine neue britische Stimme über das Lohn- und Gewerkvereins-problems.*" Schmoller's Jahrbücher, 1897.

"*Die Arbeitseinstellungen in Preussen in den letzten Jahren.*" Conrad's Jahrbücher, 1897.

"*Die neueste Entwicklung der britischen Arbeiterbewegung.*" Münster, 1898.

"*Die britische Arbeiterbewegung.*" Jahrbuch der internationalen Vereinigung für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre, 1898.

Heidelberg.—Dr. Karl Knies, Professor of Political Economy at the University of Heidelberg, died August 2, 1898. He was born in 1821 at Marburg, where he began his career as a teacher in 1846 as privatdozent for history and political economy. In 1849 he became a teacher in the polytechnic school at Cassel; in 1852 in the cantonal school of Schaffhausen, and in 1855 he became Professor of the "Cameralistic" Sciences at the University of Freiburg, Baden. In 1865 he accepted the post of Professor of Political Economy at Heidelberg, which he held until his death. His principal publications are as follows:

"*Ueber die in Kurhessen angeregte Forderung eines konstituierenden Landtages.*" Marburg, 1848.

"*Die Statistik als selbstständige Wissenschaft.*" Kassel, 1850.

"*Die katholische Hierarchie in den grossen deutschen Staaten seit 1848.*" Halle, 1852.

"*Die politische Oekonomie vom Standpunkte der geschichtlichen Methode.*" First edition, Brunswick, 1853; second revised edition, 1883.

"*Die Eisenbahnen und ihre Wirkungen.*" Brunswick, 1853.

"*Der Telegraph als Verkehrs mittel.*" Tübingen, 1857.

"*Die Dienstleistung des Soldaten.*" Freiburg, 1860.

"*Zur Lehre vom volkswirtschaftlichen Güterverkehr.*" Freiburg, 1862.

"*Das moderne Kriegswesen.*" Berlin, 1867.

"*Finanzpolitische Erörterungen.*" Heidelberg, 1871.

"*Geld und Kredit.*" Two volumes. Berlin, 1873-79.

"*Weltgeld und Weltmünze.*" Berlin, 1874.

"*Karl Friederichs von Baden brieflicher Verkehr mit Mirabeau und Du Pont*" (edited, with an introduction). Two volumes. Heidelberg, 1892.

"*Machiavelli als volkswirtschaftlicher Schriftsteller.*" Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 1852.

"*Das Getreidewesen in der Schweiz.*" Ibid., 1854-55.

"*Die nationalökonomische Lehre vom Wert.*" Ibid., 1855.

"*Ueber die Geldentwerthung und die mit ihrer verbundenen Erscheinungen.*" Ibid., 1858.

"*Erörterungen über den Kredit.*" Ibid., 1860.

Leipzig.—The Professorship of Political Economy vacated by the retirement of Professor von Miaskowski, has been filled by the appointment of Dr. Wilhelm Stieda, previously of the University of Rostock. Dr. Stieda, was born April 1, 1852, at Riga. He studied at the Universities of Dorpat, Berlin, Strassburg and Tübingen. From the last named he received the degree of Doctor of Political Science in 1875 and from the University of Dorpat the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 1879. In 1876 he became privatdozent at Strassburg, and was called as Extraordinary Professor for Political Economy and Statistics to the University of Dorpat in 1878, where a year later he was appointed ordinary professor. From 1882 to 1884 he was connected with the Statistical Office of the German Empire in Berlin and in 1884 accepted the post of ordinary professor at Rostock. Dr. Stieda has published:

In the "*Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*," the articles "*Arbeitsbuch*," "*Arbeitseinstellungen*," "*Artelle*," "*Einigungssämter*," "*Enquete*," "*Fabrik*," "*Gewerbegericht*," "*Handwerk*," "*Innungen*," "*Jugendliche Arbeiter*," "*Koalition und Koalitionsverbote*," "*Lehrlingswesen*," "*Normalarbeitstag*," "*Sontagsarbeit*," "*Stapelrecht*," "*Südseegesellschaft*," "*Trucksystem* and "*Zunftwesen*."

"*Die Artelle in Russland*" Conrad's Jahrbücher N. F. Bd. 6.

"*Haftpflicht und Unfallsversicherung.*" Ibid. N. F. Bd. 8.

"*Frauenarbeit.*" Ibid., iii. F. Bd. 2.

"*Das Reichsgesetz über die Gewerbegerichte.*" Ibid., iii. F. Bd. 2.

"*Die Syndikatskammern der französischen Arbeitgeber und nehmer.*" Schmoller's Jahrbuch. Bd. 2.

"*Deutschland's sozialstatistische Erhebungen im Jahre 1876.*" Ibid., Bd. 12.

"*Russische Zollpolitik.*" Ibid., Bd. 7.

"*Die Enquete über der Sonntagsarbeit.*" Ibid., Bd. 12-13.

"*Das Sexualverhältniss der Geborenen.*" Strassburg, 1875.

"*Zur Entstehung des deutschen Zunftwesens.*" Jena, 1876.

"*Die Eheschliessungen in Elsass-Lothringen, 1872-76.*" Strassburg, 1879.

"*Die gewerbliche Thätigkeit der Stadt Dorpat.*" Dorpat, 1879.

"*Revaler Zollbücher und Quittungen des 14 Jahrhunderts.*" Halle, 1886.

"*Die deutsche Hausindustrie.*" Leipzig, 1889.

"*Das Gewerbegericht.*" Leipzig, 1890.

"*Die Schragen der Aemter, und Gilden in Riga,*" (with C. Mettig)
1894.

HOLLAND.

Hague.—Dr. Walter Albert Baron van Verschuer, president of the Statistical Central Commission of the Netherlands, died at the Hague September 27, 1898. He was born at the Hague February 2, 1840, and pursued legal studies at the University of Leyden, where, in 1861, he received the degree of doctor juris utriusque, after defending a thesis upon the political life of Baron de Repperder, a Dutch diplomat of the eighteenth century. In 1863 he was appointed chief of a bureau in the council of state, in 1870 chief of division in the Ministry of Finance. In 1878 he was transferred to the Ministry of Commerce. From 1879-86 was a delegate in the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine, and from 1888 to 1893 delegate of the government in the administration of the railroad companies of Holland. When the Central Commission of Statistics was organized in 1892, Baron Verschuer was made its president and remained in this office till his death.

BOOK DEPARTMENT.

NOTES.

"CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES" * is the attractive title which Mr. John Jay Chapman has chosen for his last volume of essays. They discuss "politics," "society," "education," "democracy" and "government," with a view to unfolding "the idea that man is an unselfish animal." The author thinks "our political corruptions and social inferiorities can be traced to the same source—namely, temporary distortion of human character by the forces of commerce." He is an ardent disciple of Froebel, finding "in a mere niche" of the latter "the whole of Emerson." "Our frame of government" he believes to be "in accord with sound philosophy and a constant influence tending to correct the distortions" alluded to above. As these quotations suggest, the most characteristic quality of Mr. Chapman's essays is the abounding optimism that pervades them. They have in addition a freshness and freedom from academic bias that makes them pleasant reading.

MR. COLQUHOUN'S BOOK on the Nicaragua Canal has made his name known to many American readers, but his last book on "China in Transformation" † will secure him a much larger audience, both because of the present public interest in the subject and because of the unquestionable merits of the book. Mr. Colquhoun is an engineer and geographer, who has held official administrative positions in Burma and Africa, and who has made several visits to China both as a special correspondent of the London *Times* and in connection with negotiations concerning the location and construction of railways in China. The author has written upon a subject in which he has a keen interest; his information is extensive, his presentation is temperate and fair, and his style is clear and entertaining.

After describing the geography of the Empire and giving a brief account of the history of China's foreign relations, the author devotes several chapters to economic and commercial questions and England's relation to them. The remaining sections of the book deal mainly with the political and social institutions, and the work closes with an analysis of the present political situation.

* Pp. viii, 166. Price, \$1.25. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1898.

† *China in Transformation*, By ARCHIBALD R. COLQUHOUN. Pp. x, 397. Price \$3.00. New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1898

The most striking characteristic of the book is the author's seemingly thorough appreciation of Chinese motives and the traits of Chinese character. He avoids being censorious or picturesque. In describing the government, the diplomatic intercourse, the native press, or the Chinese people, he is always able to account for the existence of institutions which seem strange or objectionable to the western mind. There is always a reason from the Chinaman's standpoint why he thinks and acts as he does, and Mr. Colquhoun seems to know the Chinese people well enough to appreciate the reason.

The author believes China to be in imminent danger of Russianization, and the book closes with an earnest plea for immediate and determined action on the part of Great Britain to check the further encroachment of Russia in China. Russian influence must be kept north of the valley of the Yang-tze-Kiang, or Great Britain will lose not only her foothold in China, but also her control of India. In other words, the struggle of the giants, the Anglo-Saxon and the Slav, is inevitable, and if the Anglo-Saxon giant is to win, he must strengthen his position by controlling the economic development of central China.

PROFESSOR J. W. CROOK'S monograph on "German Wage Theories,"* following after the chapter in Taussig's "Wages and Capital" on the "Wages Fund in Germany," will be of the greatest assistance to students who wish to obtain some idea of the development which economic theory has received at the hands of German writers, but are either unwilling or unable to seek this knowledge at the sources. The book is divided into seven chapters, of which the first four treat of Hermann, his forerunners and successors, and the last three of von Thünen, the socialists and Schulze-Gävernitz. The author emphasizes the intimate connection between the development of English and German economic thought and explains the lack of originality on the part of German writers by reference to the tardy industrial development of the country. In his treatment of contemporary writers he groups Brentano and Phillipovich together as followers of Hermann and contrasts with them the socialists and Schulze-Gävernitz, a German representative of the residual claimant theory. The longest chapter of the seven is devoted to von Thünen, "a genius, about whom it is desirable that American students should know more." The monograph is without an index.

* *German Wage Theories. A History of Their Development.* Pp. 113. Price, \$1.00. Columbia University Studies. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1898.

MISS JULIA FRANKLIN "has put the English reading public under much obligation" by her admirable translation of Rodbertus' theory in regard to the cause of crises* as set forth in his letter to von Kirchmann, first published in German in 1850. The work is supplied with a critical introduction by Professor J. B. Clark, which not only explains the problem to be solved and the chief points in Rodbertus' solution, but indicates some of the lacunæ in the latter's reasoning, and thus prepares the way for a different treatment of this much debated topic. In its English dress Rodbertus' theory loses none of its persuasive attractiveness, and its perusal in conjunction with Professor Clark's criticisms may be commended as a valuable training in economic reasoning.

SINCE THE APPEARANCE of Wilson's "Congressional Government," considerable attention has been directed to the peculiarities of our congressional system. Dr. McConachie's book on "Congressional Committees"† is the latest treatment of the subject along these lines. The author points out that the committee is a necessary and universal means of saving time. "The Christian Endeavorers find remarkable utility in the committee idea. So does Tammany Hall." The difference between various systems of government lies principally in the different uses made of committees. As to the origin of the American committee system, the author explains that "from England the American colonies, most notably Pennsylvania and Virginia, drew and transmitted to the legislative bodies of our Federal Union the commonest parliamentary forms relating to the use of select and standing committees, as well as the device known as the Committee of the Whole." Naturally the colonies had not developed a Cabinet Committee; therefore this feature of the present English system was not transmitted to the Federal Union. In the Continental Congress and under the Articles of Confederation committees were also entrusted with executive power in the absence of any regular administrative organization. With the growth of federal powers has come an enormous increase in the extent and variety of committee work. The author traces the rise and development of the more important committees, showing their influence upon legislative methods in general and the concentration of power in particular. To outward appearances legislative organization is based upon the equality of

* *Over-production and Crises*. By KARL RODBERTUS. Translated by Julia Franklin. With an introduction by John B. Clark. Pp. 140. Price, 2s. 6d. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1898.

† *Congressional Committees*. By LAURENCE G. MCCONACHIE, Ph. D. Library of Economics and Politics. Pp. xiv, 441. Price, \$1.75. New York: Crowell & Co., 1898.

individual legislators and the perfect freedom of debate; in reality nothing could be farther from the truth. Legislative work consists not in deliberation, but in action; hence freedom of debate is impossible. Legislative action is determined by the chairmen of committees, who in their turn are but chosen lieutenants of the speaker; therefore the equality of members is but nominal. Among the interesting changes proposed by the author are the popular election of the speaker and the establishment of public sessions for all committees, with special committee chambers and all the officers and accessories of a miniature legislature.

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY is about to bring out Professor Patten's latest work entitled "The Development of English Thought." Those who have read the book in manuscript declare it the most profound and suggestive work which has yet been written by this well-known economic author. Professor Patten's study is confined to the thought-life of England, but incidentally offers many suggestive hints as to the underlying causes of the important social, political and economic institutions of the last three centuries. As was to be anticipated the author looks for the explanation of philosophical systems in the great economic changes that preceded them. Beginning with Hobbes, he shows how every great English thinker down to Ruskin in our own day has been influenced by his environment. Even those who are least in sympathy with this attempt to offer an economic interpretation of history will welcome the work as the first serious effort of a trained economist to prove the thesis which so many writers on contemporary problems tacitly accept. In its scope and originality Professor Patten's work is comparable with that of Buckle.

A COMMENDABLY TEMPERATE advocacy of the program of the followers of Henry George is presented in a brief monograph entitled "The Standard of Living in Its Relation to Economic Theory and Land Nationalization," * by Frederic W. Sanders, Assistant Professor in West Virginia University. The work is divided into two parts, the first treating of "Economic Theory," and the second pointing out the "Application." The argument is so lucid and succinct that it would be unfair to the author to attempt to abridge it. Convinced that the "standard of living" is the source and index of social progress, the author approves of land nationalization on the ground that it will equalize industrial opportunities at the same time that it raises wages and interest and thus stimulates

* Pp. 64. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1898.

industry and thrift. Unlike so many of the followers of Henry George, he recognizes that this is no panacea, and presents it merely as "the most important reform before the public." It is to be hoped that the author will supplement this theoretical study with a monograph dealing with equal frankness with the practical difficulties in the way of land nationalization.

THE TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT* of the Commissioner of Labor of the United States consists of an interesting study of some of the "Economic Aspects of the Liquor Problem." After the general introduction are special chapters on the production and consumption of liquors, on traffic in liquors, revenue from liquors and the practice of employers in regard to the use of liquors by their employes. Then follow eleven tables giving the available statistics on the subject, while the work concludes with a synopsis of the laws regulating the revenue derived from liquor production and traffic. Not much of the information contained in the report is new, but as a compilation it should prove of value to students of this perplexing social question.

"THE WONDERFUL CENTURY†" is the title which Mr. Alfred Russel Wallace has chosen for a volume of notes upon the world's successes and failures during the period covered by his long life. The book is divided into twenty-one chapters, of which fifteen describe the scientific discoveries and mechanical inventions of the last hundred years, while six are reserved for the condemnation of our present society for delusions which it still cherishes and abuses which it continues to tolerate. The titles of these last chapters indicate with sufficient clearness the point of view of the author. They are: "The Neglect of Phrenology;" "The Opposition to Hypnotism and Psychical Research;" "Vaccination a Delusion—Its Penal Enforcement a Crime;" "Militarism—the Curse of Civilization;" "The Demon of Greed," and "The Plunder of the Earth." The book is well written and contains a great deal of interesting information not often presented in such a popular way.

IN HIS VOLUME on "American Citizenship,"‡ Professor Willoughby has given us what is undoubtedly the best introduction to the study of

* For 1897. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1898.

† Pp. 400. Price, \$2.50. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1898.

‡ *The Rights and Duties of American Citizenship.* By W. W. WILLOUGHBY. Pp. 336. Price, \$1.00. New York: The American Book Company, 1898.

government that has, as yet, appeared. The work is intended primarily as a textbook for class-room purposes and is particularly well adapted to the needs of high schools or for the first year of university instruction. A clear and interesting style, aided by a skillful use of illustrations of political theory from the facts of political life, give to the book a value beyond that of the ordinary textbook. The information which it contains is such as every citizen should possess in order to discharge intelligently the duties of citizenship. It is safe to predict that the book will enjoy a wide circulation, as it is the only work that corresponds in scope and content to Raleigh's admirable "Elementary Politics," which received so cordial a welcome in England.

STUDENTS WHO ARE about to enter upon legal studies will find Professor Edwin H. Woodruff's little book, "Introduction to the Study of Law,"* suggestive and helpful. It will give them an elementary notion of the scope of law, of how and where to find the law, of the operation of law and of the courts and their procedure. Two-thirds of the book is devoted to a description of the operation of law and the subject is well handled.

REVIEWS.

Aristocracy and Evolution. A Study of the Rights, the Origin and the Social Functions of the Wealthier Classes. By W. H. MALLOCK. Pp. xxxiii, 385. Price, \$3.00. New York and London: The Macmillan Company, 1898.

The sub-title of this book fairly describes it. The social functions of the wealthier classes mean, however, not their responsibilities, so much as their agency in causing modern civilization. Their rights are also emphasized. In writing this book, Mr. Mallock aims to correct erroneous sociological method, and at the same time he hopes to undermine socialistic teaching. Many writers have conceived society as composed of approximately equal units, whereas congenital inequalities exist among men and must be postulated to explain adequately sociological facts, including social inequalities. This is the correction which Mr. Mallock suggests for the sociologists. The socialists have demanded that exceptional reward shall not go to any class of men; that all shall labor and share approximately alike. Mr. Mallock champions the cause of the exceptionally gifted

* *Introduction to the Study of the Law.* By EDWIN H. WOODRUFF, Professor of Law in Cornell University. Pp. 89. Price, \$1.00. New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co., 1898.

by pointing out their matchless services to society, and seeks to justify any exceptional reward which comes to them in consequence. In this aspect the book is an argument in favor of attributing to great men the chief credit for social progress. The first step in the argument is to isolate the great man from the aggregate. In attempting this Mr. Mallock must fight Herbert Spencer at every turn, but his modesty is not allowed to exercise a restraining hand. Mr. Spencer had minimized the agency of particular men in great discoveries and great movements. He argued that every so-called first discovery was involved in previous discoveries and that any ability which may be found in one man is the product of the past. "If it be a fact," says Spencer, "that the great man may modify his nation in its structure and actions, it is also a fact that there must have been those antecedent modifications constituting national progress before he could be evolved. Before he can remake his society, his society must make him, so that all those changes of which he is the proximate initiator have their chief causes in the generations he descended from." Mr. Mallock treats these views lightly, claiming that they are either irrelevant, or, if true, theoretically, are not true practically.

Having brushed Spencer aside he proceeds to distinguish the work of great men from that of the physiologically fittest survivors. The latter promote progress by simply surviving and thus raising the general level of the race. The former promote progress by being superior to their contemporaries. One causes slow movement, the other rapid movement. Great men's superiority is essentially cleverness as distinguished from ordinary ability and stupidity. The test of cleverness is success. The various systems of economic organization, such as slavery, serfdom and the wage system, are methods by which the great men apply their greatness to wealth production. Capitalistic competition means the domination of the fittest great men, and the fundamental condition of progress is the industrial obedience of the many to the few. Such are some of the views expressed in exposition of the great man theory of history which Mr. Mallock appears to accept in its entirety.

One of the most difficult problems that face the socialists is to find motives sufficiently strong to insure efficient economic activity when the motive of wealth accumulation shall be removed. They have had to rely upon the higher nature of man, such as the hope of honor, the pleasure of doing good to the whole community, and the desire to excel. Mr. Mallock in Book IV, Chapter II, does something to show the inadequacy of these motives for wealth production.

But in the final chapter he is not always so happy, for he undertakes the difficult task of showing that the unequal distribution of wealth has no natural tendency to cause unhappiness. However, Mr. Mallock admits the existence of discontent with unequal distribution, but accounts for it by saying that socialism creates a spurious desire for wealth, and hence the discontent it breeds is barren and artificial.

Mr. Mallock's treatment of socialism, while not original, contains some good points well put. On the whole the book impresses one as lacking depth, and as unnecessarily controversial.

J. W. CROOK.

Amherst College.

The State and Charity. By THOMAS MACKAY. English Citizen Series. Pp. viii, 201. Price, 2s. 6d. London: Macmillan & Co. 1898.

The author of this little book is Honorary Secretary of the St. George's-in-the-East Committee of the London Charity Organization Society. He is a vigorous opponent of socialism;* of increased state intervention in industry;† of the principle of a minimum wage;‡ of public relief works;§ of public outdoor relief;|| and of any state system of old-age pensions.¶ Any person, however, who jumps to the conclusion from familiarity with the general standpoint of the author that there is nothing to be learned from this book, and that the views expressed in it may be inferred from the title, will make a serious error. The author well says that "Charity, whether we regard it as a Christian virtue, or as the voluntary benevolent act, or as the compulsory benevolent act which is not charity, but the Poor Law, or again as a tenure of property specially recognized by English law, touches everywhere on fundamental principles of human society." Several of these principles are subjected to a searching analysis in the present volume.

The introductory chapter is devoted to a definition of the legitimate place of charity in our social economy. Its early history is

* "A Plea for Liberty," London, 1891; "A Policy of Free Exchange, London, 1894. Both edited by T. Mackay.

† *National Review*. August, 1896.

‡ *Charity Organization Review*. January, 1894.

§ *Ibid.*

|| *Ibid.*, August, 1893; April, 1894.

¶ Paper read at a meeting of the Society of Arts on February 22, 1893. Reprinted in *Charity Organization Review* February, 1895, from the *Journal of the Society of Arts*.

then sketched and the disintegration of our naïve faith in the efficacy of relief giving under the criticism of eighteenth century scepticism is described. A chapter is devoted to Turgot and the economists, and there is a careful examination of the inquiry started by Mr. (afterward Lord) Brougham and the subsequent struggle for the reform of charitable endowments. Mr. Mackay points out that the attitude of those who seek to protect the interests of the poorer classes by talk about a "fair" or a "living wage" is reactionary, and for himself cherishes a "restrained and reasonable optimism" leading to a belief that any want of remunerative employment is due to the fact that the mechanism of exchange is not yet fully developed. Another interesting generalization which is not flattering to the principle of democracy is that "all the worst abuses of the old Poor Law, all the worst abuses of the present Poor Law [in England] have been due to the inability of a local majority to refrain, in this matter of public relief, from urging the responsible authority to spend the public money lavishly and without system."

Public opinion has tended to distinguish between the common property in a system of poor law relief and that in charitable endowments, admitting the evils of the former, but assuming that the latter can be rendered not only innocuous but even useful. The author inclines toward the earlier views of Turgot and Adam Smith that endowments also are on the whole pernicious. It is evident that this question is one of vital interest in America, where the successors of the old-time pious founders are able because of greater resources to accomplish vastly more for good or ill than their prototypes. Mr. Mackay excepts from his condemnation those endowments of which the benefits are susceptible of a full and common enjoyment. Parks, museums and cathedrals are to be approved, since they are capable of enjoyment by all without any act of personal appropriation. A dole charity is at the opposite extreme. The whole subject, however, is as much in need of study and investigation as when it was courageously attacked by Turgot in the *Encyclopædia* in 1756.

Nothing could be better than the keen analysis of the existing agencies of relief and the discussion of hospital reform contained in the two concluding chapters of the book. Especially valuable are the details as to the inner history of the reform movement in London prior to the foundation of the Charity Organization Society in 1869, including the labors of Edward Denison in the east of London. The author believes that after thirty years of persistent and not unsuccessful agitation this reform is still in its early stages. The great end to be achieved is the establishment of a clearly recognized

division of labor between private charity and the poor law in order that so far as the relief of families in their homes is concerned the stern disciplinary check of the poor law may be replaced "by a sentiment which is honorable in itself, and which does not necessarily confine the generosity of the giver to any narrow and pedantic interpretation of a bare adequacy." In Mr. Mackay's opinion "it is impossible to eliminate the injurious effects of a system of legal outdoor relief."

EDWARD T. DEVINE.

New York City.

Des Agglomerations urbaines dans l'Europe contemporaine. By PAUL MEURIOT. Pp. 475. Paris: Belin Frères, 1898.

The growth of cities and the accompanying migration from rural to urban districts are phenomena which have attracted the attention of every writer on social topics. The existence of the movement of population toward cities is so evident that little effort has been made to analyze and compare the available data. The work of Professor Meuriot is the first systematic attempt to present the facts in regard to urban development and to compare the strength of the movement in different countries. In the twenty-two chapters into which the book is divided the author considers every phase of the question, dealing in Part I with the facts of city growth; in Part II with the causes and method of rural and urban migration; and in Part III with the social, moral and political consequences of urban growth. In his arrangement of statistical data Professor Meuriot shows rare good judgment and sense of proportion. He devotes but little space to the general facts of urban development, assuming that these are well known to everyone who has given any attention to the subject. On the other hand, we are given a most careful analysis of the internal and inter-state movement of the population of Europe, which makes it possible to trace more clearly and accurately than ever before the specific causes that have led to the concentration of population. Fortunately, the author has recognized the necessity of placing the great metropolitan cities in a separate category. An entire chapter is devoted to the growth of these centres of population. The author shows that the position of these cities has been determined primarily by geographical conditions: Paris is the centre of the great trade routes; London is the natural receiving port of the great trade routes from the Continent; while Berlin occupies a point of commercial advantage as the crossing point of commercial routes from north to east and

south to west. The author recognizes, however, that while geographical considerations are of primary importance, political conditions have largely contributed to give to such cities their predominant place in the political and social life of the country. The fact that Berlin was made the capital of Prussia and in 1870 that of the German Empire, has given it a commercial importance which it would never have acquired under ordinary conditions. The same is true of Paris and of Vienna.

In discussing the growth of the metropolitan cities the author discusses tendencies in the movements of population within the limits of the municipality. In all the great cities of Europe we find the population of the central districts rapidly decreasing, while the peripheral areas give evidence of phenomenal growth. The recent development of adequate means of urban transportation accounts largely for the strength of this movement.

The work of Mr. Meuriot will be warmly welcomed by every student of social science, because of the detailed information it furnishes upon many subjects which up to the present time have been discussed only in a very general and unsatisfactory way.

L. S. ROWE.

Railway Economics. By H. T. NEWCOMB, LL. M. Pp. 152. Price, \$1.00. Philadelphia: Railway World Publishing Company, 1898.

The present volume is the outcome of a series of short articles recently published in the *Railway World*, presenting the principal facts of railway transportation in the United States in their relation to the general industrial conditions of the country. The book is a popular treatise likely to have a large circulation. While we can not apply the stricter canons of criticism to such a work, we should attempt to show its agreement with or its deviation from the accepted thought upon the subject.

Mr. Newcomb's positions in the Department of Agriculture and on the staff of the Columbian University, as well as his former connection with the Interstate Commerce Commission, have well equipped him for his task. The present book is not without defects, due to its rapid conception and execution; but its many virtues give promise of far better work from the author in the future.

In twenty-nine short chapters he discusses the development and present condition of American railways, and the general problems of competition, consolidation, pooling, discrimination, rate-making and taxation of railways. Mr. Newcomb rejects the popular hypothesis that railway competition has reduced rates, and maintains that this

force has merely succeeded in increasing railway capital and diminishing railway earnings. The decline in railway rates he attributes to the competition of shippers and of districts rather than of carriers. The reduction has been made possible by the reduced cost of operation, due to an increase in the intensity of traffic and to improved apparatus and methods.

The keynote to Mr. Newcomb's thought is the wastefulness and uselessness of competition and the necessity of concerted action upon the part of the railways. He shows how the railways ruin themselves and the public by their reckless, internecine struggles, and quotes Commissioner Knapp's laconic statement of the situation: "The power to compete is the power to discriminate." As competition is wasteful and ineffective, and as most forms of the resulting discrimination are inequitable and unjustifiable, the railways must be allowed, if not compelled to co-operate. Railway associations under our present laws have been of minor value. Consolidation, which is not inherently bad, may result in serious detriment when the railways are forced into it. Pooling, therefore, which was successful before 1887, and the prohibition of which was forced into the present Interstate Commerce Law by a clamorous and obstructive but numerically insignificant minority, remains the only remedy for the evils of the situation. The author recommends that pooling agreements subject to the regulation and control of the Interstate Commerce Commission be permitted. The book further suggests the necessity of some remedy for the excessive and unequal taxation of railways and for indiscriminate and ill-advised construction of new lines, and it also contains an attempt to establish a general theory of reasonable rates.

We may now turn from an exposition of the contents to a criticism of the defects of this book. The many excellent features of the work render its faults the more glaring, and the signal ability of the author is to be considered rather as an aggravating than as an extenuating circumstance. Mr. Newcomb has not done his best in this work. The style is prolix and involved. It interferes with clear thinking. The author frequently appears to have solved a problem that he has no more than touched. His analysis of reasonable rates amounts to this: That for any individual service no less shall be charged than what that single service actually costs the railway, and, that under one condition, the rates shall be so fixed as to provide the largest practicable contribution toward reasonable remuneration of other expenses (p. 88). This is the theory of "what the traffic will bear" in its purest and most unadulterated form. The condition above referred to is, that if remunerative

traffic prevents the movement of a larger quantity of unremunerative traffic, the business that does not pay should be preferred to the business that does pay. At its best, the theory does not tell us what the relation of coal rates should be to wheat rates, or what "reasonable remuneration" of joint expenses should include. Mr. Newcomb has in our opinion resorted somewhat too freely to indefinite statements. He holds that the railway companies should receive a "reasonable remuneration for the sacrifices involved" (p. 79), or "the same remuneration as a similar amount of energy expended in other lines of production" (p. 69), without, however, explaining to what extent the allegedly watered stock has a right to remuneration. Mr. Newcomb's position that there may be too much and consequently socially undesirable transportation is well taken, but more might have been made of this discussion by not limiting it so exclusively to the long and short haul controversy. The latter problem, moreover, might advantageously be dealt with more from the point of view of distribution and less from that of production.

There are other points upon which many would be forced to disagree with Mr. Newcomb. On page 42 he states that the business depression of 1893 and 1894 did "not result in any material reduction in the rates of wages paid to railway employes" (compare, however, with page 77). While the average rate of wages did not decrease materially, ninety-four thousand men, or almost 11 per cent, were thrown out of employment in a single year, and the weeding out of the comparatively inefficient probably had the further effect of raising the general average. It is equally difficult to agree with Mr. Newcomb that a railway tax, or at least the greater part of it, can be shifted from the carrier to its patrons (pp. 145-47).

Other questions raised by this book might be treated if there were no limits to the reviewer's space. In recapitulation we may say that the work has great merits and glaring defects, and that, while it exhibits knowledge and originality, the haste and lack of thoroughness in its preparation mar its usefulness. The demand for books upon this subject will, we hope, result in the bringing out of a second and improved edition of Mr. Newcomb's work.

WALTER E. WEYL.

Philadelphia.

The Monroe Doctrine. By W. F. REDDAWAY, B. A., Fellow of King's College, Cambridge. Pp. vii, 162. Cambridge University Press, 1898.

Mr. Reddaway touches American susceptibility rather rudely in his introduction by claiming a place for the history of the Monroe

Doctrine "in the record of human error." His account of the origin and evolution of the doctrine itself is, however, strikingly free from prejudice and contains little to which an impartial critic would care to take exception.

The "complex circumstances" leading to the final enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine are succinctly set forth in the first four chapters of the book, in which the author first lays down the postulates of the doctrine, then depicts the international situation in 1823, next describes the Monroe administrations, and finally characterizes the diplomacy resulting in the President's Message. In the matter of the authorship of the doctrine, Mr. Reddaway gives Adams the real credit he deserves. "The connection of Canning with the doctrine, of which he has often been termed the author," is clearly exposed, and "the part played by Jefferson, on whose behalf also a claim has been put forward," seems in the author's mind "to be defined in the fact that his advice was sought and was not followed." "The problem therefore reduces itself to a decision between the claims of the President and the Secretary of State," and after a careful analysis of the question, Mr. Reddaway concludes that "the conception of the Monroe Doctrine and much of its phraseology came from Adams, and that the share of Monroe did not extend beyond revision."

In criticising the later appeals to the Monroe Doctrine, Mr. Reddaway takes the doctrine itself too literally. It was, as he himself admits, but the expression of a national sentiment, its keynote being "the sharp political severance of America from Europe;" and thus, though the sentiment remained the same, the mode of its expression was bound to adapt itself to the altering diplomatic situations. Under no theory of national dynamics could we expect the wording of 1823 to apply exactly to a case arising in 1895; it is enough if the principle was found applicable.

Mr. Reddaway's book is serious in tone, judicial in presentation, and apparently authoritative in matter. It is well written—with the exception of an exasperating frequency in the use of the pluperfect tense—and altogether a solid addition to the literature on an interesting and important subject.

LINDLEY M. KRASEBY.

Bryn Mawr College.

Petrarch, the First Modern Scholar and Man of Letters. A Selection from his Correspondence with Boccaccio and other Friends, Designed to Illustrate the Beginnings of the Renaissance. By JAMES HARVEY ROBINSON, with the collaboration of HENRY WINCHESTER ROLFE. Pp. x, 436. Price, \$2.00. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1898.

The scope of this important contribution to our understanding of the significance of the Renaissance is clearly indicated in its title. In his introduction, which has literary charm as well as historical interest, Professor Robinson characterizes the position of Petrarch with reference to the mediæval and modern epochs as that of the chief figure in the period of transition. The relative merits of his prose and poetry are discussed and some striking facts in regard to the appreciation they have enjoyed, respectively, since the time of their production, are given. The conclusions of de Nolhac as the result of his attempt to trace Petrarch's library to its final disposition are related, and Petrarch's connection with the philosophy and educational methods of the schools is set forth.

The first chapter of the book itself is biographical, and opens with Petrarch's own narrative of the events of his life in the "Letter to Posterity." In Chapter II, Professor Robinson has permitted the letters themselves, in graceful and effective translation, to tell the story of Petrarch's relations with his literary contemporaries. In Chapter III, Professor Rolfe has advanced in a dozen pages the thesis that Petrarch, more than any other man, was responsible for the Renaissance, and has fortified his assertion with fifty pages of *pièces justificatives* from the Letters. Professor Rolfe sees, perhaps, too vividly the great mediæval and modern epochs narrowing down to a point of union, where Petrarch stands like a magician, summoning the spirit of reason from out the mists of theology. This fault, which permeates the whole philosophy of the book, must find its justification, if anywhere, in the dramatic necessities of presentation.

The other chapters by Professor Robinson deal with travels, political opinions, and the conflict of monastic and secular ideals. Here, as throughout the book, the happiest use is made of extracts from Petrarch's letters, which bring out the conditions of the time more clearly than any amount of second-hand description could do.

The book is beautifully made. It has a wholesomeness that invites perusal and ownership. The illustrations possess the merit that they are of Petrarch's own time. The portrait opposite the title page, from a manuscript in the National Library at Paris, although it lends to Petrarch a certain robustness which disqualifies

him as a member of the famous trio of dyspeptics, carries with it a sense of unquestionable resemblance, like a spirit out of the past. The single criticism which the manufacture of the book inspires touches the use of Petrarch's sketch upon the cover; this both on account of its lack of symmetry and of its poverty of meaning. A trifle thrown off by a man of genius in the direction of his ineptitude is not adapted for the symbolic characterization of his work and personality.

As a piece of scholarly work the book meets all requirements. It is withal so charming and, now that it is done, so necessary, that the reader is tempted to wonder why the task has been so long deferred. Of the three men, Petrarch, Erasmus and Voltaire, whose lives afford such interesting parallels, primarily because they were unfettered with the ideals and conventions, religious and otherwise, of their times, the first in chronological sequence has been the last to find a sympathetic expositor in the English tongue. In the case of Erasmus, peculiar circumstances, the fact of his left-handed connection with the Lutheran movement, called him forth from obscurity at a time when men of his rationalistic tendencies might otherwise have failed of recognition. Two men at least were moved to construct epistolary Lives, whose chief motive was to minimize his fault toward Luther; to erect, in other words, a defence where none was needed and to sacrifice the impregnable logic of Erasmus' position. Fate has been kinder to Voltaire in later times, trusting his memory to the hands of a biographer, who, though differing from Voltaire in point of view, has so much in common with him in the manner of his thought that his presentation weakens in no wise the significance of Voltaire's activity. It would be interesting in this connection to discover the reasons that have conspired to delay so long the rehabilitation of the eldest of this trio of spiritual free lances, whose offence against theology is of so long standing that he might well pass muster as a religionist of to-day.

That Petrarch may be presented without Laura, and that his rhetorical complaints against the corruptions of Avignon may be relegated to a comparatively insignificant space, is nothing if not a sign of better times in the intellectual world and of a disposition and an ability to make use of the more valuable, if less dramatic, materials that history affords. Petrarch presents an excellent example of the manner in which a progressive civilization seizes upon and utilizes the things which nourish its transient ideals. A sentimental period, for instance, has found in Petrarch the hopeless lover of Laura, pouring forth his sorrows in lyrical rhapsodies, when very likely Laura was never more than a song-motive or a bit of

conventionalism from the Provençal. Another, a polemical period, seeking to build up a lurid background, to justify the main facts of Protestant defection, hunting the cradles and the graves of pre-Lutheran generations in search of Reformers before the Reformation, has seized upon Petrarch's invectives against the Babylon of the West, invectives motived by patriotism or irritability, to make this man of books, the least of whose interests was theological, bear unwilling witness against a corrupt Papacy. When Petrarch has been put to such frivolous and unworthy uses, surely it is sounding the note of advance to bring him forward in all the length and breadth of his intellectual interests.

It is not as a biographer, Professor Robinson tells us at the beginning of his book, nor as a literary critic that he approaches his subject. His effort is to present Petrarch "as the mirror of his age." But is the phrase well chosen? A little further on, opposite the opening page of Chapter I, our author has set a half dozen lines from M. de Nolhac, whose work on Petrarch is elsewhere warmly commended. Here Petrarch is called "*le premier homme moderne*," a note, by the way, of biographical enthusiasm rather than of scholarship; and it is said to be "the least contestable mark of his genius" that "he escapes almost entirely the influence of his century and of his environment." Which view shall we accept? for unquestionably here lies a contradiction. Perhaps the point is not worth the taking; but what Petrarch really does mirror is not his age, in its intellectual achievement or otherwise, but the activity of a chosen coterie of spirits, who were exceptional in their generation and rather of a piece with an age to come.

It will be interesting to observe what success will attend the literary venture of Professors Robinson and Rolfe. Since the work has been so well done, its success will indicate to what extent the English reading public has come to the point of interesting itself in a treatment of the purely cultural side of the first of humanists. Already in France, M. Victor Develay has thought to discover a demand for Petrarch's Letters. The conditions that determine the sale of books are often individual and altogether elusive, but the fact that the "*Lettres à Boccace*" and the crisp little booklets of the *Librairie des Bibliophiles* are so easily to be had, with uncut pages, at half the publication prices, merely stimulates the hope that another public may prove more appreciative.

MERRICK WHITCOMB.

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A Constitutional History of the American People, 1776-1850. Illustrated with maps. By FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE. In two volumes. Pp. xxvii, 486; xv, 520. Price, \$2.50. New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1898.

It is an ambitious effort which Professor Thorpe has made in his "Constitutional History of the American People." Von Holst in his admirable work has discussed the constitutional principles underlying our government, emphasizing the increased importance attached to the ideal of national unity with the growth of the nation. McMaster, approaching our history from another side, has pictured the life of the people, their social and intellectual development and the influence which this development has had on our national institutions. In the work under review, Professor Thorpe has attempted to combine these methods, finding a middle ground of authority in the laws and constitutions of the various states and the proceedings of their constitutional conventions. "They are the most reliable history extant of democracy in America."

This democracy is the real text of the author's work. He defines it as "the fruit of ages," resting upon a "foundation of free labor," "which has for its ultimate that with which it began, man," and "whose element of decay is the cheapness at which it holds men." Partly perhaps because of the author's delight in epigrams, illustrated in the foregoing definition, and partly because of the sources upon which the author relies, the work before us is not a consecutive history. It is rather a series of essays upon the significance of the changes which have been made in our state constitutions, and the development of certain tendencies in our national life which are considered peculiar to a democracy.

Dividing his work into two periods, the writer first compares the constitutions of the several states prior to 1800, showing the characteristic features of those documents in 1776, and the successive changes introduced during the first quarter century of our national existence. In this period sixteen states adopted twenty-six constitutions, an activity which is considered as due not so much to the hurry in which the first documents were framed, as to the early recognition of the fact that declarations of right and the enunciation of political theories were not satisfactory bases for an administrative organization. "The national constitution was intended to be not a theoretical but an administrative document," and as the forces of democracy advanced, increased attention was paid to this department of government, in the states as well as in the nation.

In the second part of his work Professor Thorpe considers the drift of democratic sentiment illustrated in the constitutions adopted

between 1800 and 1850. The new constitutions and the changes in the old demonstrate to him the prevailing force of one principle; theories of government giving place to rules of administrative action, and in the new duties of the governor he finds a specific example of the change he is noting. Political parties unimportant in colonial times and which "are yet in the infancy of their power," are also a distinct mark of the new epoch for they are always founded because of administrative errors although they may later seek out some theoretical principle as their reason for existence.

This analysis and comparison of constitutional changes forms the body of the work we are considering. In the first volume an attempt is made to treat the union as a whole; in the second, typical states are selected to illustrate general sentiment. There are also several chapters in which the author describes the conditions of life in the middle west during the first portion of the present century. Here was the origin of the United States as distinct from the states united, for the original commonwealths looked on the national government as their creature, while the western states regarded it as their creator. No less important will be the influence of this section upon the nation's future for here population tends to be centred and the democratic spirit is most powerful.

Whether or not the reader agrees with the author in his estimate of the value of the sources upon which his work is based, all students must thank him for the close examination he has given to them. Some researches have already been made among his authorities, but results covering a long period of time have never before been so well tabulated and made available for the general student. Especially in his opening chapters Professor Thorpe has succeeded in giving a comprehensive account of the tendencies which permeated our early fundamental laws, and although the second volume hardly maintains the standard of the first we realize that fields of information hitherto neglected have been utilized and a decided advance made in this method of comparative study. The constitutional convention originated in America and its work has become a recognized factor in modern politics. Indeed the author considers it our chief contribution to political practice. We are the first nation to make a judicial body the final arbiter in national questions and to abide by its decisions. It is in the authorities mentioned by Professor Thorpe that we find authentic records of the acts of these conventions and the establishment of that judicial system. Why then should they not form a good basis for the study of constitutional history? "In the state constitutions have been crystallized the various meanings which now for more than a

century have been read into the national constitution by successful political parties." Why, then, should they not reward intelligent research? There is but one answer to these questions and our author has given it in the valuable results he has obtained.

Yet this is not all that can be said. Although Professor Thorpe has placed great emphasis on definite legal changes he has neglected to call attention to influences which have affected our constitutional thought no less truly than have they. Noting carefully the definite action of constitutional conventions he appears to disregard all changes in political theory which have been due to custom alone. Until a social change has become incorporated in some written law or constitution he does not recognize it as a force in history. Indeed, we can go farther and say that rarely does a legislative interpretation of a constitutional clause receive consideration at his hands. Above all that important part of our national constitution which rests solely on judicial interpretation is practically ignored. These, in our opinion, are serious omissions, and although limitations of space may have compelled the author to neglect many features of our constitutional history, epigrammatic eulogies of democracy are a poor substitute for a study of the unwritten law of the land.

In several instances Professor Thorpe departs from strict constitutional study to give the history of some popular institution which has been affected by the democratic movement. Thus the importance of the church during the first half of the present century is well contrasted with its influence at an earlier period. As the later constitutions are studied the falling away of colonial ecclesiasticism is easily noticeable. One by one the conventions ceased to provide for any connection between church and state. Religious as well as property qualifications for the suffrage began to be rejected as undemocratic and out of accord with the recognition of men rather than of principles. The author considers the decreasing severity of punishments as another example of the new way in which the people were regarded. No longer was the criminal to be forever kept from his fellowmen, but he was to be reformed and made once more a progressive factor in civilization. Imprisonment for debt was abolished and gradually "as public opinion became crystallized these reforms were placed in the state constitutions." By 1850 catering to the people, or, as Professor Thorpe would say, trust in democracy had gone so far that Michigan incorporated an exemption clause into her constitution, though with some doubt as to the equity of such action. This was due not only to the debtor class forming a majority of the population, but also to the discovery that married women had property rights. The measure was popular although

"passing the sentiment of the exemption, which is very beautiful it may be questioned whether it has strengthened public morality."

Another result of the increased respect paid to democracy was the necessity of public education. In New England alone was early provision made for this training of voters. John Adams, writing the constitution of Massachusetts in 1780, put in educational clauses which make us regard him as the father of the public school, the state college and the institutions for the training of teachers. This provision, copied by the several states and greatly aided by the national government through its system of land grants was in truth, the reason why the Jeffersonian doctrine of men could replace the colonial régime of property. This transition from property to men is one of the chief points emphasized by the author. Again and again he bends his study to the illustration of this movement and so increases the impression of a series of argumentative essays rather than a connected history.

It is in the tabulation of constitutions and the bringing to light of doctrines there illustrated that Professor Thorpe has done his best work. When we turn from this field there is a slight weakness of argument and an occasional misstatement of fact which awakens a distrust much to be regretted. Thus he says (Vol. i, p. 56) "but one commonwealth now retains its annual legislature," the context seeming to show that what is meant is the annual assembling of that body. Surely Massachusetts is not the only state in which such is the case. Dates are also carelessly used. Thus within two pages the winter of 1797 is spoken of as the completion of Jefferson's first year in the vice-presidency, the eighth year since he entered Washington's cabinet and the beginning of the second decade of the national government. Such carelessness of statement together with the grouping of references at the beginning of the chapters rather than giving them as authority for specific points, serves to throw suspicion upon the whole tabulation, a suspicion the more to be regretted because in our opinion it is upon the whole unjustified.

The volumes are a welcome addition to the student's library, although their excellencies are marred by the style in which they are written. The author's tabulation and comparison of constitutions would alone make us wish to see the work brought down to our own times. It is only when we compare his work with that of Von Holst and McMaster that we realize the magnitude of the task which Dr. Thorpe has attempted. It is only when we consider what might have been done that we are dissatisfied with what he has accomplished.

C. H. LINCOLN.

Philadelphia.

The Philippine Islands and Their People. A record of personal observation and experience, with a short summary of the more important facts in the history of the Archipelago. By DEAN C. WORCESTER, Assistant Professor of Zoology, University of Michigan. Pp. xix, 529. Price, \$4.00. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1898.

Professor Worcester's book is as meritorious as it is opportune. The author's preparation was derived from extensive travels and explorations in nearly all parts of the Philippines. In 1887-88 he was one of a party which, prompted by "an interest in the study of birds, as well as a desire to aid in the exploration of a little-known country," spent eleven months in the Archipelago and visited fifteen of the islands. In 1890 Professor Worcester and one of his former fellow-explorers returned to the Philippines and continued their explorations for a further period of two years and eight months. Being naturalists as well as explorers, the author and his associates did not follow the usual lines of travel, but spent much of their time in the interior of the islands and among the primitive and oft-times barbarous tribes which constitute a large portion of the population. The reader of Professor Worcester's book finds it hard to decide which passion is stronger in the author, the love for science or the fondness for adventure; he needed both to accomplish his work, and he possesses both in a high degree.

The story of the dangers encountered by Professor Worcester in his contact with disease and savagery is sometimes humorous, often thrilling, and always interesting; the purpose of this review, however, precludes the discussion of that side of the book. This is the less to be regretted since in the book itself these are incidental to the description of the "Philippine Islands and Their People."

This record of personal observation and experience presents a very instructive concrete picture of the governmental institutions, political and clerical, which Spain has imposed upon the Philippines. The author is everywhere temperate in his statements, but his description of Spanish oppression compels the use of strong language. After depicting some of the inhuman devices resorted to by the government officials to compel the people of the island of Panay to pay their tax levies, he says (p. 237):

"The simple fact is that many of these poor people spend their lives in a fruitless effort to meet their obligations to a government which neither protects their lives and property nor allows them arms to protect themselves; which utterly fails to give them justice if they become involved in legal difficulties; which does not construct roads, build bridges, or open up means of land communication

and transportation; which makes no adequate provision for the education of their children, and treats them as suspects if they gain education abroad; which offers no relief if starvation or pestilence overtakes them; which even drafts the men for soldiers and then confiscates their property and imprisons their wives and children, because they cannot alone meet their obligations to the government which their husbands, brothers and sons are fighting to defend."

The record of the incidents of governmental oppression that came under the author's personal observation during his three and a half years' residence in the Philippines is a convincing corroboration of the literal accuracy of the foregoing sentences.

The church everywhere occupies such a prominent place in the government of the Philippines that Professor Worcester and his associates were brought into contact with it wherever they went, and the author's testimony regarding the religious institutions and officials ought to be valuable. He is not a Catholic, and in order to be fair, he makes his indictment chiefly by quoting from a Catholic, John Foreman, whose book on "The Philippine Islands" appeared in 1892. Professor Worcester commends the work of the Jesuits. They "stand for education and morality, while among their number are to be found the only men in the Archipelago engaged in scientific research." With the exception of the Jesuits the clerical orders are severely criticised. The state has entrusted the work of education to these religious orders, but they have neglected it and have joined the state in the business of extortion. He says (p. 347):

"It is certainly not too much to say that, in spite of some bright exceptions to the general rule of ignorance and brutish licentiousness, the friars as a class exert an extremely bad influence. The unwisdom of allowing them privileges in the Philippines which would not be accorded them elsewhere would seem to have been sufficiently demonstrated. That their evil practices have been one of the potent causes leading to the recent revolt, no one doubts who is the least familiar with social and political conditions in the Philippines; and much can be said in favor of the insurgents' demand that they be expelled from the colony and their places taken by *clerigos*, or secular clergymen not belonging to any order."

The author pictures in detail the social conditions obtaining in different parts of the Archipelago. It is very evident that the Philippines are fitted only for a paternal government which must be administered with vigor and justice. If they ever become capable of self-government, especially those who are not inhabitants of Luzon, it will only be after a long tutelage. Professor Worcester's

record of personal observation indicates very clearly that the Philipinos need three things above all others, honest government, sanitary regulations and education.

The economic resources of the Philippines are briefly considered in various parts of the book and in the appendix, which contains "notes on the natural resources and the conditions governing their development." That the islands are fertile and are stocked with valuable mineral resources is certain; but the extent to which industry can exploit these resources will depend not only upon the amount of capital invested but also upon securing efficient labor. "The native is a philosopher. He works when obliged to, and rests whenever he can get an opportunity." For the present it would seem that the requisite labor must be imported to a considerable extent. This labor must of course be drawn from tropical and sub-tropical countries; the climate of the Philippines will always keep the people of the temperate zones from settling in large numbers in the Archipelago.

EMORY R. JOHNSON.

NOTES ON MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT.

AMERICAN CITIES.

Greater New York.*—The Election.—The election held on the eighth of November was chiefly for state officers. The principal matter of local concern to the voters of New York City was the election of three judges of the supreme court in the first judicial district, which includes the borough of Manhattan and part of the borough of the Bronx. Of the three judges whose places were to be filled two were eligible for re-election. One of these was Judge Joseph F. Daly, who had served as judge for twenty-eight years. He had been elected as a Tammany candidate; and, having made an excellent record, deserved a renomination almost as a matter of course, in accordance with the well-established practice. Tammany's refusal to nominate him this year was openly stated to be that Judge Daly had refused to appoint as an officer of his court a man who was selected by the organization, but whom Judge Daly believed to be unfit. The nominee of Tammany for Judge Daly's place was condemned by the Bar Association as unworthy. A strong committee of one hundred was organized, and an active campaign was conducted against the Tammany judicial candidates, upon the simple issue of the independence of the judiciary. Tammany was, however, successful throughout the city, electing nearly all its candidates, to the bench, to congress, and to the state legislature.

The campaign was marked by two interesting developments in the career of Richard Croker, the boss of Tammany. He made a successful effort to get control of the state machine of the Democratic party, and, as state boss, he dictated the nominations which were made by the Democratic party. Perhaps as a result of this widening of his vision, he changed his policy of silence. At short intervals during the campaign he gave out more or less elaborate statements in the nature of campaign documents, but in the guise of "Interviews" or of "Speeches to the Executive Committee of Tammany Hall."

The Election Law.—The experience of the Committee of One Hundred for the independence of the judiciary emphasized the cumbersome and confused character of the present election law,

* Communication of James W. Pryor, Esq., Secretary, City Reform Club.

with its party columns and its almost necessarily complicated provisions for splitting one's ticket in any case in which three or four candidates are to be elected to any one office. Appreciation of the defects of the law is now much more general in this city than it was before the last election; and the time is propitious for agitation for an improved and simplified law which shall place all candidates and all voters upon an equal footing. So far as the city is concerned, it is of great importance that this reform in the election law should be secured before the next great municipal election, in 1900.

City Budget.—The city budget for 1899 was adopted by the board of estimate and apportionment on the last day of October, and is now before the municipal assembly. The total amount is \$93,500,000. In a formal statement accompanying the charter as drafted by the charter commission, a majority of the commissioners placed the probable amount of the annual budget at \$60,000,000.

Chicago.—City Schools.*—An important change was made in the conduct of the public schools of Chicago when the new board of education last summer elected as superintendent President Andrews, of Brown University. This was not brought about without elaborate and persistent efforts. Some friction between the board and the superintendent has developed already and the resignation of the superintendent is threatened. This grows out of a desire by certain members of the board to dictate the appointment of school principals, to which the superintendent does not accede and it is not certain how far the conflict may be carried. Such control by the board is not in accord with the recommendations in the elaborate report of the Educational Commission, which is finished but not yet accessible.

Street Railways. The absorbing question just now in Chicago is as to the future of the street railway franchises. With this end in view the companies are straining every nerve and enlisting every influence in their power. An effort to obtain the support of the real estate board for these measures, however, has resulted in ignominious failure. This body, mainly composed of the leading real estate agents and brokers of the city, is influential and representative in its character and has taken a leading part in promoting revenue legislation and other reforms closely related to taxation and real estate interests, and its endorsement was eagerly sought by the companies. An attempt to rush through a special meeting by dark lantern methods, at which representatives of the street railway companies argued the question from their standpoint was defeated; and resolutions subse-

*Communication of Newton L. Partridge, Esq.

quently introduced on their behalf at a regular meeting were voted down by an overwhelming majority.

The ordinances were prepared and, as usual in such cases, were kept in absolute secrecy until presented to the council at its meeting on December 5. The immediate occasion of this attempt to obtain renewals of ordinances, the first of which will not expire until 1903, is to be found in the fear that the legislature may and probably will repeal the amendment to the street railway law called the "Allen Bill," passed in 1897. For many years, twenty years has been the limit fixed by statute for street railway ordinances, but the limit was made fifty years and the minimum fare was fixed at five cents for the first twenty years by the "Allen Bill." The probability of its repeal is based upon the facts that a majority of the members who voted for that act were not re-elected, while many were defeated for nomination, or at the polls upon that issue alone; that a majority in the house have publicly stated that they will vote for a repeal; and that Governor Tanner seems to have broken definitely with the corporate interests to seek popular support.

A committee of the Civic Federation has been engaged for some months in the investigation of matters connected with the proper relations of street railways to the municipality, and with special reference to the amount of compensation to be obtained from the companies. For several weeks an expert accountant has examined the books of the street railway companies on behalf of this committee whose labors are now approaching completion and a report from whom embodying their conclusions may soon be expected.

Should the council pass the ordinances meantime, of course this labor will be largely lost. These ordinances, as introduced, provide for a compensation for fifty year franchises, ranging from nothing to a maximum of three per cent of gross earnings. It may be confidently asserted that a severe struggle will be required to rally the forty-six votes necessary to pass these ordinances; for the mayor will hotly contest their passage and he will be aided by a strong public agitation which will surely bring much pressure to bear on the aldermen.

Boston.*—Municipal Concerts.—The organization of a music commission to take charge of the musical entertainments given by the city has been the cause of an important extension of municipal activities in the direction of popular recreation. Usually such entertainments are confined to open-air concerts given during the summer in various parts of a city. With the creation of the music

* Communication of Sylvester Baxter, Esq.

commission a marked improvement in this respect takes place. A municipal band has been organized and concerts are given in various parks and other open spaces throughout the city at a considerable saving of expense and with a marked improvement in the character of the music. For the winter, indoor concerts have been decided upon. These are proving remarkably successful in every way. About thirty years ago a course of several free municipal concerts was given in Music Hall, but the practice was abandoned. This year a course of municipal concerts has been instituted in Music Hall, with a municipal orchestra organized for the purpose and with vocal soloists. A charge of ten and twenty-five cents is made, according to location of seats. The order of music is high, comprising such selections from classical and standard composers as are popularly pleasing. The audiences have filled the hall moderately. After one or two concerts were given it was stated by the corporation counsel that the city had no legal authority to give entertainments for which an admission fee was charged, so the direct municipal backing had to be withdrawn, the music commission continuing to act as the agent for public-spirited persons who had contributed a guarantee fund for the purpose. It seems probable, however, that the concerts will prove not only self-sustaining but yield a profit, to be devoted to the city hospital. The circumstance that the music commission is in charge of the concerts makes them *de facto*, though not *de jure*, "municipal." The objection of the corporation counsel does not apply, however, to the chamber concerts given by a municipal string quartette in suitable halls in the various sections of the city, for no entrance fee is charged for these, the tickets being distributed free of cost, through the agency of school teachers and other prominent persons in each section, to those who are likely to enjoy such entertainments. These municipal concerts have a real educational value, for they enable high-class music to be enjoyed by persons who otherwise would not be likely to hear it.

Municipal Camp for Boys.—The past summer, on the recommendation of the mayor, a municipal camp for boys was instituted on city land at Long Island in the harbor. It was planned to accommodate a hundred deserving boys from the public schools; a week at a time. In all, 831 boys enjoyed the privilege. A simple, but varied and substantial dietary was provided. The organization was on a semi-military basis, the daily schedule being made up of reveille, roll-call and drill, salute to colors, breakfast, police duty, inspection of quarters, guard mount, dinner, guard mount again, followed by recreation and lectures, supper, sunset-flag, camp-fire

talks, and, at 9.30, taps. The total cost of the camp was \$2499.08, leaving a balance of 92 cents within the appropriation of \$2500. For another year it is proposed to appoint an unpaid advisory and executive board to take charge of the camp, to lay a greater emphasis on military forms in administration and discipline, to give increased attention to elementary instruction in natural science, military hygiene and out-of-door sports, and to secure the co-operation of the school committee in developing the suggested scheme of instruction. In commenting on the matter, Mayor Quincy points to the low cost of maintenance, \$1.83 per capita, and says that for \$10,080, five hundred boys at a time could be kept in camp for a week each during a season of ten weeks, or five thousand boys in all.

Cleveland.*—Street Railway Fares.—There are two street railway companies in Cleveland which hold between them all of the nine franchises originally granted, together with renewals and extensions. The franchises were granted for twenty or twenty-five years, and existing grants expire from 1904 till 1914. The city council has recently passed ordinances reducing the fares on two lines. The ordinances provide for a four-cent cash fare and the sale of seven tickets for twenty-five cents. The lines affected do about one-fourth of the total street railway business of Cleveland. The companies have secured a temporary injunction in the United States circuit court restraining the city from enforcing the ordinances on two grounds, namely, that the ordinances are in violation of the contract rights of the companies, and that the rates of fare fixed by the ordinances are unreasonable. The case will probably be carried through to the United States Supreme Court as quickly as possible, whatever the decision of the lower courts may be. The present city administration has made a political issue of the street railway question during the last two councilmanic campaigns. The result can be seen in the vote on the low fare ordinances. In the fall of 1897 the same ordinances were defeated by a tie vote in the city council. A year later they were passed with every councilman present voting in the affirmative. The Reynolds ordinances introduced in 1897 to grant a uniform renewal of franchises for twenty-five years on terms favorable to the companies were defeated with difficulty. Since then the state legislature has repealed the Rogers fifty-year franchise law enacted in 1896, and the people have declared emphatically in favor of lower fares and against the renewal of franchises until the existing ones expire. There is no doubt that the sentiment in favor of municipal ownership of at least the tracks and roadbed is rapidly increasing. Under the present state laws the city has no

* Communication of Dr. Delos F. Wilcox.

power to buy the roads. But if the legal difficulties are removed, it seems quite possible that there may never be a general renewal of street railway franchises in Cleveland. Mr. William R. Hopkins, whose able monograph on "The Street Railway Problem in Cleveland" was published by the American Economic Association in 1896, is a member of the city council, and has been one of the leaders in the fight for lower fares. It is hoped that the present litigation will compel the companies to produce their books, and that the city will come into the possession of facts which will put it into a better position for making a good bargain with the companies when the existing franchises expire. If the courts should sustain the low fare ordinances, there would remain a few years in which to observe their effects before the first franchise expires. This is a part of the general policy outlined by Mr. Hopkins in his monograph and ably supported by him in the city council.

Cincinnati.—*Parks.**—The citizens of Cincinnati, by a vote of over thirty thousand nays to twelve thousand ayes, resolved against the proposed \$2,000,000 park extension bonds. The strong opposition was due solely to the fear of increased taxation. A few weeks before the election, the mayor appointed a park commission composed of men who had the respect of the community, but the *personnel* of this board could not save the measure. The defeat of this park project is greatly to be regretted, for the city at present has a very small park area.

Local Election.—The bar movement, called forth by the turning down on the part of the boss of a reputable judge, was not successful. The lawyers were handicapped in not having a daily paper to advocate this cause. The candidate disapproved of by them ran nearly 7000 behind his ticket, and only 3000 ahead of his opponent. At a normal election (the Republican majority was over 13,000, normally it is between 5000 and 6000) the movement would have succeeded despite the fact of straight ticket voting. This method of voting, by placing an X in the circle at the head of the ticket is a great drawback to independent candidates.

Providence.†—*City Charter.*—In February, 1896, a committee was appointed to draft a new city charter for Providence. The modifications of the old charter of 1832 have been comparatively few for a city that has grown from 17,000 in 1832 to about ten times that number. The requirements of the present city are far different from those of the small community of 1832, and the need of a new charter

* Communication of Max B. May, Esq.

† Communication of Professor George G. Wilson, Brown University.

which shall make it possible to manage the municipality on modern business principles is evident.

On November 17, 1898, the committee appointed nearly two years earlier submitted their report. This committee consisted of the following representative men: William C. Baker (mayor and chairman), Charles C. Nichols, Robert B. Little, Rathbone Gardner, Charles Sisson, William Gammell and Arthur L. Brown. The report of this committee resembles in many respects the report presented to the New York State Legislature for the government of second-class cities. The adoption of this new charter would bring Providence into line with modern municipal ideas and would certainly secure an efficient and responsible administration. It is hoped that the city council will adopt the new charter without serious modification and that the general assembly of the state will ratify this action. The nature of the new charter is best briefly given in the words of the commission:

"First. The proposed charter aims to confer upon the municipality such powers of self-government as are ample for the performance of its proper municipal functions, and no more. It is hoped thereby to obviate the necessity of constant application to the State Legislatures for special enabling acts, and to do away with the interference of successive legislatures in the affairs of the city, which has been found so contrary to the principle of municipal home rule, and so destructive of wise and consistent municipal action, in accordance with the will of a majority of our citizens.

"Second. The Commission has aimed at the entire separation of legislative and executive functions which, under our present system, are now so confused.

"Third. They have provided for a single legislative body, with careful safeguards against hasty action. The members of this body, except the president, are to serve without pay, and to be elected biennially.

"Fourth. They have conferred upon the mayor the largest executive powers, giving to him the appointment of all executive officers and boards, in the belief that in accordance with the modern theory, now almost uniformly adopted in this country, better results are obtained where the responsibility rests upon one individual, rather than upon a large number.

"Fifth. The actual executive functions are performed by boards who appoint their own administrative officers, instead of by committees of the legislative body, as at present. Among these boards are:

"(a) A Board of Estimate and Apportionment, consisting of the

mayor, the comptroller (substituted for our present city auditor), the city solicitor, the city treasurer, the president of the common council, and the president of the Board of Tax Assessors.

"This board makes up the appropriations for all departments, which may be reduced, but can not be increased, by the Common Council.

"(b) A Board of Contract and Supply, consisting of the mayor, the comptroller, the commissioner of public works, the city solicitor and city engineer.

"This board makes contracts for all work, material and supplies to be performed or furnished for the city.

"(c) A Police Board, which is composed of three (3) commissioners appointed by the mayor, to whom is entrusted the entire administration of the Police Department, and the appointment of all officers. The members of this board are to receive such salaries as the Common Council shall ordain.

"(d) A Board of Public Instruction, composed of six (6) commissioners, appointed by the mayor, to serve without pay, who have entire charge of the administration of the Public School System.

"(e) A Board of Fire Commissioners, who are salaried officers, and who have charge of the administration of the Fire Department, and the appointment of its employes.

"(f) A Board of three (3) Assessors of Taxes, who are salaried officers, who perform the duties now imposed upon the assessors of taxes in the city, with some modifications, the chief of which is that the board is required to make up tentative lists of assessment, which are open to examination of taxpayers, and subject to change and revision during a limited period.

"(g) A Board of Health, consisting of four (4) members, serving without pay, and of which the city engineer is also a member, who have entire charge of everything relating to the health of the city, appointing the superintendent of health, and not more than seven (7) district physicians.

"(h) A Board of Charities and Corrections, to serve without pay, who appoint the overseer of the poor, and have charge of the administration of the Poor Department.

"(i) A Board of Canvassers and Registration, performing the duties of the present board, but receiving their appointment from the mayor, and entitled to a salary fixed by the Common Council.

"In the provisions with reference to the lay out of streets and highways, the commissioners are authorized to assess upon the parties benefited the entire land damages and the cost of construction involved in the building of new streets."

Alameda, Cal.—Referendum.*—The city of Alameda, Cal., containing 15,000 inhabitants, is a residence town, and is practically a suburb of San Francisco. It is said to be the only city of its size in California enjoying a non-partisan government. On March 4, 1895, it passed what is known as the Referendum Ordinance, which provides:

"SECTION 1. Whenever ten per cent of the legal voters of the city of Alameda shall petition in writing therefor the Board of Trustees thereof shall submit to said voters such proposition of local public interest as may be specified in said petition, said submission to be made for the purpose of enabling the said voters to express their approval or disapproval of the question so to be voted upon, and to be made in the form and manner in the ordinance hereafter provided.

"SEC. 2. The signatures to said petition need not all be appended to one paper, but each signer shall add to his signature his place of residence, giving the street and number. One of the signers of such paper or papers shall swear that the statements therein made are true and that each signature to said paper appended is the genuine signature of the person whose name is thereto subscribed.

"SEC. 3. Whenever such petition shall have been filed with the city clerk of the city of Alameda not less than fifteen days prior to any general or municipal election, it shall be the duty of said city clerk to cause to be printed on the ballot to be used at the said election then ensuing (provided said ensuing election is to be a municipal election), the question to be voted upon, in the manner and form prescribed by law for voting on constitutional amendments and other questions.

"SEC. 4. In case said ensuing election is to be a general election, the city clerk shall cause to be printed ballots containing the question to be voted upon as in Section 3 of this ordinance; provided said ballots to conform in other respects to the requirements of the laws of the State of California. And the Board of Trustees shall provide separate boxes for the reception of the same.

"SEC. 5. The result of said balloting shall be embodied in the records of said board, and shall be regarded by the trustees of said board as expressing the wishes of the majority of the voters of the city of Alameda, and as advisory of the line of action of said board."

This ordinance has received the endorsement of every local convention during each of the last two city campaigns. According to Section 5, the wishes of a majority of voters expressed in accordance with this law are considered as advisory only. Yet probably no official with a regard for his political future would disregard the pronounced preference of the people upon a question of public interest. On two occasions the law has been put in operation. In one case the question was,

* Communication of G. R. Dodson, Esq., Alameda, Cal.

"Shall a special tax of twenty cents on the \$100 be levied for the purpose of erecting a new library building?" There were 916 yeas and 891 noes, while a large proportion of the voters expressed no opinion upon the subject. As the taxes were quite high that year and the vote did not indicate a strong desire on the part of the people for the new building, nothing was done in the matter.

In 1897, at a general election, there was placed upon the ballots the question, "For the saloon in this precinct?" The vote was as follows:

Precinct.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	Total.
Yeas	105	66	65	78	68	63	55	11	16	95	132	126	53	993
Noes	74	93	65	70	81	59	70	67	67	75	98	49	42	910

It will be noted that there was a majority in favor of the saloon; also, that seven precincts voted for and five against, while in the third precinct there was a tie vote. At the time the vote was taken the city clerk states, there were saloons in precincts number 1, 3, 4, 8, 10, 11 and 12. Of these seven, only one voted no. Of the six without saloons, two voted to have them. On such a close vote the city trustees did not feel bound to act according to the wishes of the people as expressed by the ballot.

FOREIGN CITIES.

Paris.—*Municipal Taxation.*—During the last few years we have had occasion to discuss the attempts of the French municipalities to reorganize the system of local taxation particularly to abolish the "*Octroi*." For a long time the central government, as well as the local authorities, have acknowledged the injustice of this form of taxation, particularly because of the heavy burdens which it places upon the poorer classes. The constant demand for a different system has been met with the answer that this form of indirect taxation can not be dispensed with, because of its great productivity. The tax upon the necessities and luxuries of life, which is imposed upon these articles at the gates of the city, offers almost unlimited possibilities of extension. With a budget as heavily weighted as that of Paris, the difficulty of replacing the 151,000,000 francs which these excise taxes furnish is almost insuperable. Commissions, both municipal and state, have been appointed every few years to devise some means of solving the problem, but their proposals have been met either with some local objection or the opposition of the central government. During the present year two commissions have been at work, both presenting reports of very great interest. The greatest

difficulty of supplying the deficit which the abolition of the "*Octroi*" would produce is to be found in the fact that real and personal property is already burdened with high state and local taxes. It is, therefore, necessary to find some other means of raising the necessary income of the city. In the report of the commission it is proposed to rearrange rather than abolish the "*Octroi*" taxes, with a view to placing additional burdens upon what the commission calls the "unnecessary or superfluous consumption," such as alcoholic liquors, beer and the like. Furthermore, to establish a municipal inheritance tax, ranging from 1.25 per cent on the net inheritance in cases of lineal heirs to 11.25 per cent in the cases of persons not related to the testator. Furthermore, a graduated rental tax is to be introduced, ranging from one dollar on rentals of \$100.00 to \$1,500 on rentals of \$10,000 and over. The commission finds, however, that all of these will not furnish sufficient to replace the "*Octroi*" and, therefore, proposes in addition a series of minor taxes, such as :

First. A tax on owners of horses at a rate of \$14 for each horse.

Second. A tax on the better class of restaurants amounting to 50 per cent of their rental value.

It seems hardly likely that this rather complicated and in many respects objectionable system of taxation will be accepted by the municipal council, and even if accepted it is probable that the central government will refuse to sanction so radical a change. It is to be noted that the municipal council of Paris, with its radical and even socialistic tendencies, is anxious to shift the burden of taxation from the poorer to the wealthier classes, and in fact to do everything to relieve the working classes from direct contribution to the public treasury.

SOCIOLOGICAL NOTES.

Organizations of Pupils in the Public Schools of Paris.—An interesting work in connection with the public schools of Paris is being encouraged and partially supported by the municipal council of that city. It seems that there are at the present time seventy-eight organizations in different sections of the city of Paris, composed of the school children who have left the schools. The object of these associations is to keep track of the children after leaving school, to bring them together at stated intervals for social and intellectual entertainment, to assist those who may be in distress, in exceptional cases, to endeavor to find positions for those out of employment, and, in general, to bring the influence of the graduate body to bear upon the present pupils in the schools. Such organizations correspond roughly to the alumni societies of our higher schools, and constitute an interesting experiment in secondary education. Some eight or ten thousand children were within the past year more or less regular attendants at meetings of these associations, and one of the committees of the city council has recommended that 27,000 francs be appropriated in amounts ranging from 200 to 1,000 francs for the expenses of such organizations. In most cases the amount recommended for each separate association is the same as that actually voted by the municipal council for the year 1897, and the results of that expenditure are viewed in the report of the committee with great satisfaction.

United States Industrial Commission.—Under an act of Congress approved June 18, 1898, an Industrial Commission, to be composed of five members of the Senate, five members of the House of Representatives, appointed by the presiding officer of each house respectively, and nine other persons "who shall fairly represent the different industries and employments," appointed by the President, was constituted. The names and addresses of the men organized in pursuance of this act of Congress are as follows:

Senator James H. Kyle, Aberdeen, S. Dak.; Senator Boies Penrose, Philadelphia; Senator Lee Mantle, Butte, Mont.; Senator Stephen R. Mallory, Pensacola, Fla.; Senator John W. Daniel, Lynchburg, Va.; Representative John J. Gardner, Atlantic City, N. J.; Representative William Lorimer, Chicago, Ill.; Representative L. F. Livingston, Kings, Ga.; Representative John C. Bell, Montrose, Colo.; Representative Theobald Otjen, Milwaukee, Wis.; Mr. Andrew L. Harris, Eaton, Ohio; Mr. S. N. D. North, Boston; Mr. Ellison A. Smyth, Pelzer, S. C.; Mr. John M. Farquhar, Buffalo, N. Y.; Mr. Eugene D. Conger, Grand Rapids, Mich.; Mr. Thomas W. Phillips,

New Castle, Pa.; Mr. Charles J. Harris, Dillsboro, N. C.; Mr. M. D. Ratchford, Massillon, Ohio; Mr. John L. Kennedy, Washington, D. C.

The officers chosen by the commission at its meeting for organization were: Chairman, James H. Kyle; first vice-chairman, Thomas W. Phillips; second vice-chairman, John J. Gardner; secretary, P. H. Donnelly, and clerk and disbursing agent, William E. Sackett. Five sub-commissions were organized: On agriculture and agricultural labor, Andrew L. Harris, chairman; on conditions of labor and capital employed in manufacturing and general business, E. A. Smyth, chairman; on conditions of labor employed in mining, John W. Daniel, chairman; on transportation, Thomas W. Phillips, chairman; on statistics, S. N. D. North, chairman.

The standing committees are: on organization, S. N. D. North, chairman; on business, Eugene D. Conger, chairman; on procedure, John J. Gardner, chairman. In the report of the committee on procedure, which was adopted by a meeting of the Industrial Commission held November 15, 1898, the following general plan for the work of the commission was outlined:

The purpose of this commission, as must be inferred from the wording of the law creating it, is to ascertain the nature of the existing legislation of the several states and of the United States bearing upon industrial conditions; the actual operation of that legislation in its relation to the workingman, to the manufacturer and business man, and to the consumer; the character and effects of similar legislation in foreign countries, and how far it is applicable or desirable in the United States, and what legislation, if any, along new lines, is practicable or desirable for the improvement of industrial conditions, with a view to determining how far it is possible to frame uniform industrial laws, the adoption of which can be recommended to congress and to the legislatures of the several states.

A similar statement will apply to the work of the commission so far as it relates to agriculture, to mining, and to transportation.

The main work of the commission may, therefore, be said to be to study and compare existing laws bearing upon industrial conditions here and elsewhere, to ascertain by competent testimony wherein they are deficient, defective, inoperative, or oppressive, and to recommend such remedial statutes as will tend not only to make the conditions of industry more uniform as between the several states, but to remove such existing sources or causes of discontent, inequality, and injustice as can be reached and regulated through legislation.

The committee believes the above statement to embody practically the whole program of procedure that it is either desirable or necessary to formulate in advance of the preparation of the syllabus of

inquiry, and until the commission is brought more closely in touch with the actual conditions which surround business and industry in the United States to-day.

Such a work is vast enough and important enough to require the best energies of all the members of this commission for the period of two years.

It is the first attempt made, under governmental authority, to ascertain these facts for the guidance of congress and state legislatures in the enactment of a constantly increasing body of industrial legislation.

In order to secure satisfactory results, the committee think it to be imperatively necessary that the work shall be confined strictly to the main purpose, viz., of ascertaining the nature and effects of existing legislation, and the nature of remedial legislation which may be necessary or desirable to equalize conditions in industry and to remove any just grounds of complaint on the part of either labor or capital or of the people at large.

To facilitate the progress of the work the division is recommended of the commission into four sub-commissions of five members each, to be severally charged with the investigation of present conditions and the formulation of remedial suggestions in the following branches of industry.

1. On agriculture and agricultural labor.
2. On the conditions of labor and capital employed in manufacturing and general business,
3. On the conditions of labor and capital employed in mining.
4. On transportation.

In addition, a fifth sub-commission is recommended, to be known as the sub-commission on statistics, in the membership of which there shall be one representative of each of the above sub-commissions, and which shall be charged with the collaboration for the use of the commission of all the statistical material now available, and of such original statistical material as may from time to time be found necessary. Upon this sub-commission will also naturally fall the supervision of the preparation and publication of results.

The committee recommends that the preparation of the detailed syllabus of inquiry, which will be necessary in each sub-commission, be referred to these sub-commissions.

It recommends that each sub-commission, after it has prepared its syllabus, report the same for the approval of the full commission, in order that there may be established a general harmony between the several inquiries, and in order to avoid any unnecessary duplication of investigation; and that the syllabus of each sub-commission shall

contain full inquiries respecting the existence and effect of combinations and trusts in their particular subjects of inquiry.

The committee also suggests that there are certain subjects of inquiry which appertain equally to all the groups into which it has recommended that the commission be segregated. The subjects of immigration, of education, of combinations and trusts and of taxation at once suggest themselves as belonging in this category. It is, therefore, recommended that these subjects, one or more of them, be examined into by the full commission pending the organization of the several sub-commissions.

The ultimate results of the work of the Industrial Commission in each of the fields into which it is proposed to inquire should come for approval before the full commission before they are transmitted to congress or forwarded to the several state governments as the official conclusions reached by the commission. Such a rule is absolutely necessary to secure harmonious and consistent results.

It is therefore recommended that the reports of the several sub-commissions shall be first submitted to the full commission for approval. This recommendation is based upon a rule adopted by the British Royal Labor Commission of 1891.

Another question which has received the attention of the committee has to do with the gathering of materials and information upon which to base its findings.

An immense amount of this material is ready at their hands, in the reports of the several investigations conducted by committees of congress, the reports of the National Bureau of Labor Statistics, the bureaus of labor statistics in thirty-two states of the Union, the reports of factory inspectors in many states, the reports of the several royal commissions on labor in England, and on the continent of Europe and in Australasia, and in numerous other documents, public and private, and in the voluminous literature, economic and controversial, of the labor question,

So far as possible it is desirable to avoid any duplication of this information and material.

If the commission should undertake to cover all the ground already covered in these reports, it would find itself confronted with an interminable task, the cost of which, if undertaken as thoroughly as it has already been done, would amount to much more than \$1,000,000.

It was ascertained that the work of the Department of Labor from the date of the organization of the Bureau of Labor in January, 1885, in the preparation of its thirteenth annual report and nine official reports, not including however the cost of printing and binding reports, has amounted to about \$2,000,000, and it was therefore decided

not to attempt to duplicate this work or to carry out any part of it in greater detail along the same lines. The secretary of the Industrial Commission is expected to digest and to classify testimony offered before the commission, following the plan of the Royal British Labor Commission of 1891, and such digest will be printed as a part of the final report of the commission. It has also been decided that all hearings of the commission shall be public and that the press of the country shall be invited to publish such portions of the testimony as it may desire. The syllabi of inquiry to be adopted by the sub-commissions will be made public in the near future.

A City Trades School in Boston.—An interesting discussion took place recently in Boston on the question of establishing a city trades school, to be known as the Franklin Trades School. The Franklin fund of the city of Boston now amounts to nearly \$360,000, and the mayor suggested that \$200,000 be set apart for public all-the-year-round baths, and the balance for the erection of a fine municipal building upon the lot on Washington street, near the corner of Dover street, upon which the old Franklin school house now stands. The recommendation of the mayor stated that :

"Such a building should include, in my opinion, a large hall, for use as a wardroom and also for public meetings, concerts, lectures, exhibitions and entertainments ; a smaller hall for society meetings, rooms for the Grand Army posts and Naval Veterans now quartered in the building ; offices for the use of the central labor organizations, and possibly offices for some municipal departments. The hall could be used to great advantage for courses of practical lectures, for the various classes of wage-earners, and thus the mechanics and artisans whom Franklin intended to assist by the provision in his will regarding the use to be made of the fund during its period of accumulation would be benefited by this final disposition of a portion of it."

The Boston Trade School Association, however, desires to have some of this money used for the establishment of a trade school to supplement the public schools and strengthen the work of manual training. The Franklin fund trustees had already taken action favorable to such a proposition as far back as December 28, 1893. On recommendation of the mayor to rescind this vote a public hearing was granted on November 14, 1898, at which several distinct interests were represented and the discussion is valuable in that it throws light on the position of organized labor in reference to the question of trade schools. Mr. Charles W. Birtwell spoke in favor of the plan for a trade school. He claimed that the statutes of Boston gave the legal right to teach boys and girls trades, and that the trustees had no right to rescind the vote. He said: "If this money is to be drawn

back and devoted to something else, the trade school cause will be doubly betrayed. If money is needed for bath houses let the citizens interested in them stand up and ask for it from their fellow-citizens. If the G. A. R. and the labor organizations want a free rental of rooms and a forum, let them ask for it; let them not seek to convert any institution for the youth into a fund for such purposes; let them meet their issue fairly."

Colonel Henry L. Higginson spoke in favor of the trades school and in reference to the position of the trade unions said, "The trade unions can do a great deal of good, but if they undertake to say 'we will not have anybody else' their day has come." Several other speakers argued that a trades school would not be an injury to the trade unions, and the secretary of the Master Builders' Association spoke in favor of the trades school. President F. S. Pickett, however, of the Central Labor Union, stated that a number of persons representing the Central Labor Union and the Building Trades Council, of Boston, desired to be heard. Among the speakers introduced by him were the following:

George E. McNeill said there was no agreement as to what is meant by a trade school. The opposition of the unions is because they believe that a trade school does not come within the provision of the will of Benjamin Franklin, and that it is antagonistic to the best interest of organized labor, consequently against the best interest of Boston and her citizens. "What we ask," he went on to say "is the establishment of a Franklin institute that shall combine within its walls the bath, the gymnasium, the forum and the trade school in its highest and broadest sense. We want to qualify boys for citizenship. We want blacksmiths who are capable of being congressmen even if not able to be elected, and when we get the mass of the people capable of serving us in congress, then congress will be leveled upward.

"To establish the trade school, as proposed, is simply a reactionary process, an attempt to get back into the so-called good old time of master and servant. The day of small manufacturers is gone."

Summer Outings for Children.*—From the income of the fund left by George L. Randidge for excursions to be given by the city for the children of Boston, 13,551 children have each been given a day's outing the past summer at an average cost of fourteen cents apiece, including a steamboat trip to Long Island, a luncheon and bathing facilities. The street railway company contributed a large number of free tickets and furnished special cars to convey the children to and from the wharf. The mayor regarded the bequest of Mr. Randidge as such an interesting and significant one that he took a deep interest in demonstrating what could be accomplished in this

* Contributed by Sylvester Baxter, Esq., Boston.

line of practical philanthropy with a comparatively small sum of money by making use of the organization and facilities of the city. He thinks it undeniable that the record could not be duplicated, or even approached, by any private charitable organization. He says: "The giving of these excursions has merely involved outside of the expenditures made from the income of the fund, the fuller use, without additional cost, of facilities, in the way of wharves, steamers, grounds, beaches, etc., which were already in the possession of the city. This record may well inculcate the lesson that a fuller utilization can be made, to the great benefit of the people, of facilities owned by the city." He regards it as a striking illustration of the large scale upon which philanthropic work of this character can be successfully carried out through municipal agency.

The Humanity Club of St. Louis,* which has for its motto: "Nothing Human Is Alien to Me," has had a successful career. It was founded in 1893 by Mrs. John W. Noble, and has confined itself mainly to the improvement of existing conditions of the various municipal institutions of St. Louis. For instance, it was instrumental in having the city place women guards in charge of women confined in the jail and workhouses, which effort has resulted in a material improvement of conditions, and has made these houses of detention less of a dungeon and a means of punishment and more of a means of reform. There has also been a constant improvement in the discipline. The club was also influential in having a law passed for the building of an exercise room and a bathroom for the women in jail, and has since the enactment of the law seen that it was efficiently enforced. It also succeeded in getting the "possibly" insane transferred from the hold-over, where formerly they were detained along with drunkards and criminals, to the city hospital for observation, a reform that has restored liberty to many.

It was also instrumental in establishing a maternity ward at the woman's hospital, and from its members were chosen the first women to be appointed of the Board of Managers of the House of Refuge, where all women in the care of the city are taken; through which board many improvements have since been inaugurated.

The club has thus far worked through those in authority rather than making any attempt to replace those in authority with new men. It has been quite successful in convincing those in power that their responsibilities should be used to prevent abuses and to improve conditions.

*Contributed by Hon. Clinton Rogers Woodruff.

BOOKS RECEIVED FROM SEPTEMBER 25, TO

NOVEMBER 25, 1898.

- Adams, H. C., *The Science of Finance*. Holt.
- Bogart, E. L., *Housing of the Working People in Yonkers*. (*Economic Studies*, Vol. III, No. 5.) Macmillan, \$0.50.
- Böhm, O., *Die Kornhäuser*. (*Münchener Volkswirtschaftliche Studien*, XXVI.) Stuttgart: Cotta. 2.40 M.
- Cahn, E., *Das Schlafstellenwesen in den Deutschen Grosstädten und seine Reform*. (*Münchener Volkswirtschaftliche Studien*, XXVIII.) 3 M.
- Channing, E., *A Students' History of the United States*. New Edition. Macmillan. \$1.40.
- Chapman, J. J., *Causes and Consequences*. Scribners. \$1.25.
- Colquhoun, A. R., *China in Transformation*. Harpers. \$3.00.
- Deploige, S., *Referendum in Switzerland*. (*Studies in Economics and Political Science*.) London: Longmans. 7s. 6d.
- Diehl, K., *Ueber die Verhältnisse von Wert und Preis im ökonomischen System von Karl Marx*. Jena: Fischer. 1 M.
- Elliot, C. W., *Educational Reform*. Century Co. \$2.00.
- Foncin, P., *Les Pays de France (Questions du Temps présent)*. Paris: Colin. 1 fr.
- Ford, H. J., *The Rise and Growth of American Politics*. Macmillan. \$1.50.
- Giddings, F. H., *The Elements of Sociology*. Macmillan. \$1.10.
- Green, M. E., *Food Products of the World*. Chicago: The Hotel World. \$1.50.
- Greene, E. B., *The Provincial Governor in the English Colonies of North America*. (*Harvard Historical Studies*, VII.) Longmans. \$1.50.
- Grieb, R., *Das europäische Oedland, seine Bedeutung und Kultur*. Giessen: Münchow.
- Gronlund, L., *The New Economy*. Chicago: Stone & Co. \$1.25.
- Hall, F. S., *Sympathetic Strikes and Sympathetic Lockouts*. (*Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law*, Vol. X, No. 11.) \$1.00.
- Henry, H. T., *The "Original Sources" of European History*. Reprinted from *The American Catholic Quarterly Review*, July, 1898.
- Hollander, L., *Die Lage der deutschen Mühlenindustrie unter dem Einfluss der Handelspolitik, 1879-1897*. (*Münchener Volkswirtschaftliche Studien*, XXIX.) 2.40 M.
- Judson, H. P., *Europe in the Nineteenth Century*. Meadville, Pa.: Flood & Vincent. \$1.00.
- Kalender und Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Königreich Sachsen nebst Marktverzeichnissen für Sachsen und die Nachbarstaaten auf das Jahr 1898. (*Statistischen Bureau des K. Sachs. Ministeriums des Innern*.)
- LeBon, G., *The Psychology of Peoples*. Macmillan. \$1.50.
- Lewy, A., *Zur Genesis der Heutigen Agrarischen Ideen in Preussen*. (*Münchener Volkswirtschaftliche Studien*, XXVII.) 3 M.
- Lichtenberger, A., *Le Socialisme et la Révolution française*. (*Bibliothèque d'Histoire contemporaine*.) Paris: Alcan. 5 fr.
- Lloyd, H. D., *Labor Copartnership*. Harpers. \$1.00.
- de Malarce, A., *Histoire et Manuel de l'Institution des Caisses d'Épargne scolaires avec le Règlement et les Modèles de Comptabilité*. Paris: Hachette.
- Makato, T., *Japanese Notions of European Political Economy*. Philadelphia.
- Newcomb, H. T., *Railway Economics*. Philadelphia: Railway World Co. \$1.25.
- Norman, J. H., *British India's Future Standard Currency*. (Reprint from *The Accountant*, London, May and June, 1898.) 6d.

- Fagenstecher, F. A., *Die Thronfolge im Grossherzogthum Hessen*. Mainz: Philipp v. Zabern.
- Pisani, G., *Delle Libertà nella Monarchia*. Sauremo: G. B. Blancheri.
- Reitz, V., *Das Grundbuchsrecht in Rheinhessen*. Mainz: Zabern.
- Robinson, H. H., *Loom and Spindle*. Crowell. \$1.25.
- Robinson, J. H., *Petrarch*. Putnams. \$2.00.
- Rodbertus, K., *Overproduction and Crises*. Translated by Julia Franklin. London: Sonnenschein. 2s. 6d.
- de Rousiers, P., *Les Industries monopolisées aux États-Unis*. (Bibliothèque du Musée Social.) Paris: Colin. 4 fr.
- Schmoller, G., *Umriss und Untersuchungen zur Verfassungs-, Verwaltungs- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. 13m.
- Schwill, F., *History of Modern Europe*. Scribners. \$1.50.
- Sikes, E. W., *The Transition of North Carolina from Colony to Commonwealth*. (Studies in Historical and Political Science, Series XVI, Nos. 10 and 11.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. \$0.50.
- Stamwood, E., *A History of the Presidency*. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin. \$2.50.
- Taylor, H., *Origin and Growth of the English Constitution*. 2 Vols. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin. \$4.50.
- Thorpe, F. N., *A Constitutional History of the American People, 1776-1850*. 2 Vols. Harpers. \$2.50.
- de Tocqueville, A., *Democracy in America*. New Edition. Translated by H. Reeve. 2 Vols. Century Co. \$5.00.
- Tufts, J. H. and Thompson, H. B., *The Individual and His Relation to Society as Reflected in British Ethics*. Part I. University of Chicago Press. \$0.35.
- Wallace, A. R., *The Wonderful Century*. Dodd, Mead. \$2.50.
- Waxweiler, E., *La Participation aux Bénéfices*. (Bibliothèque du Musée Social.) Paris: Rousseau. 6 fr.
- Webb, S. and B., *Problems of Modern Industry*. Longmans.
- Woodruff, E. H., *Introduction to the Study of Law*. Baker, Voorhis. \$1.00.
- Woolsey, T. S., *America's Foreign Policy*. Century Co. \$1.25.
- Worcester, D. C., *The Philippine Islands and Their People*. Macmillan. \$4.00.
- Wyckoff, W. A., *The Workers, The West*. Scribners. \$1.50.

